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ABSTRACT 
Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare: An Organizational Learning Analysis of a Failed Strategic 
Initiative. 
by 
BP McCoy 
March 2020 
Chair: Richard Baskerville 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
The world is a dynamic and turbulent place. Organizations of all types regularly face the 
dual challenge of learning from the emerging realities of their environment and using that 
knowledge to accurately adapt to remain competitive. Often, the changes required to remain 
competitive demand a significant and irretrievable strategic investment of resources and changes 
in the status quo of how the organization will function going forward. Such strategic changes are 
often communicated in the form of mission or vision statements, campaign plans, or 
philosophies.  
Considering the resources committed and the opportunity costs involved, strategic initiatives 
must be implemented with care and precision to succeed, as a failed implementation could pose 
an existential threat to the organization. This case study examines one organization's attempt and 
failure to sufficiently implement a strategic initiative. This study may be tailored and applied to 
any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and contested 
environments of business or conflict. The study format is a cross-sectional single case study 
informed by the Theory of Action. The results of this study revealed five explanatory frames 
which serve to describe and explain the dynamics of the organization, and they illuminate the 
xv 
influence Model I single-loop and Model II double-loop organizational learning systems have on 
the implementation of a strategic initiative. Captured within the explanatory frames was the 
discovery of a surprising anomaly, namely the presence of a sub rosa clan. The sub rosa clan’s 
Model I behavioral control produced a bête noires1 effect that countered the senior 
management’s Model II learning efforts, sustained the status quo, and sunk the strategic 
initiative. This study contributes to the organizational learning, maneuver warfare, and control 
theory literature streams and offers managers potential corrective interventions that may be 
applied proactively and preemptively to enable the successful implementation of a strategic 
initiative.  
Keywords: Organizational Learning, Theory of Action, Single-loop learning, Double-loop 
learning, Clans, Maneuver Warfare, Mission Command. 
 
 
1 French; the literal translation is “black beast.” A bête noires is avoided by others. It may be a thing that is 
particularly dreadful. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1989 the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) General Alfred M. Gray led the 
seminal effort to publish FMFM-1 Warfighting (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a; 
USMC, 1989). This act represented a strategic initiative (Shivakumar, 2014) that officially 
changed the United States Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy from one of attrition to one of 
maneuver (Damian, 2001).  The doctrinal change signaled a momentous shift in the Marine 
Corps’ theory about war, how it prepares for war, and how it wages war (USMC, 1989). The 
shift from an attrition-focused philosophy to one focused on maneuver was strategic, as it 
determined the weapons the Marine Corps procured, how it organized its formations, and how it 
trained and educated its members (Brown, 2018; Shivakumar, 2014; Terriff, 2006a).  Officially 
declaring the warfighting doctrine and philosophy for the Marine Corps and, therefore, the ‘law 
of the land,’ FMFM-1 Warfighting represented a seismic shift in the status quo throughout the 
organization that was not wholly embraced by all (Tucker, 1996).  A schism simmered between 
the attritionists and the maneuverists (Anonymous, 2011) for nearly three decades. 
In 2016, the 37th CMC General Robert B. Neller issued FRAGO-01/20162 as a call to 
action for the Marine Corps to ‘reinvigorate Maneuver Warfare (Mw)’ (USMC, 2016a).  In turn, 
the Marine Corps’ Training and Education Command (TECOM) held a series of three working 
group sessions over a two-year period in an effort to understand why the Marine Corps was not 
executing its foundational doctrine vigorously and how to reinvigorate the philosophy in practice 
(TECOM, 2016, 2017, 2018).  One organization participating in the TECOM workshops was the 
 
2 Fragmentary Orders extend or expand upon the original or base order. FRAGO-1 expanded on CMC's original 
planning guidance. 
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Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). MCTOG, a formal schoolhouse and the 
Ground Combat Center of Excellence gamely responded to the 37th CMC’s call to action by 
undertaking a strategic initiative of its own by issuing a long range campaign plan that restored 
Mw ‘front and center’ to its curriculum (MCTOG, 2018b). This study examines in situ 
MCTOG’s attempt and the subsequent insufficient implementation of their strategic initiative to 
answer the research question: Why is it difficult for the Marine Corps to implement Mw despite 
30 years of doctrine, training, and education efforts to do so? This study may be broadly adapted 
to any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and 
contested environments of business or conflict as management challenges are not unique to one 
organization, rather they are created systemically and baked into organizational management (see 
Vaughan, 1996, p. 415), and aid in developing broader principles for implementing strategic 
initiatives (see Yin, 2009).  
To provide full transparency and reveal to the reader my potential biases as a researcher, I 
will outline my personal background and involvement with the problem area. I am a retired 
Marine colonel who served during the time of the original implementation of FMFM-1 and the 
decades that followed. During my service, I experienced the transition to Mw from the 
perspective of the training and education continuum as a student in the first class to receive 
formal Mw instruction at Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) in 1991–1992. I also served as a 
tactics instructor at AWS and as the operations officer of TECOM, and I was well-versed on the 
levels of emphasis placed on Mw in the training and education continuum. From an operational 
perspective, I served as a company commander in the Gulf War in 1991, company commander 
from 1992 to 1995, and various operational staff positions. As an infantry battalion commander 
for two very kinetic tours in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, I gained a deep appreciation for the demands 
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that the reality of combat places on doctrine. Throughout all those experiences I encountered 
leaders and peers with varying degrees of understanding and commitment to Mw. 
Currently, I am a contracted employee at MCTOG and provide curriculum development 
and delivery to newly selected ground combat battalion and regimental commanders. I also 
participated in the development of the MCTOG campaign plan. Due to my closeness to the 
problem area and my relationship to the members of MCTOG, I will break from the traditional 
third-person approach of academic writing and adopt a more transparent and authentic first-
person approach for this study (Vita). 
My steps to account for and mitigate any biases are addressed in Chapter III: Case 
Method, Chapter IV: Case Results, and Chapter V: Discussion, under the limitations section. 
While my bias is something I must acknowledge and mitigate, my up-close perspective of the 
problem area and the organization I conducted this study within also provided the foundation 
stone for discoveries. In the words of Root-Bernstein, sometimes the discoveries choose the 
discoverer. “What was found was always there but overlooked by habit, lack of interest or an 
untrained eye” (Root-Bernstein, 1989, p. 15, 66). Only when a subject is viewed through the 
lenses of various experiences and training, and by questioning what is known about a subject in a 
new way, can discoveries be unlocked. Root-Bernstein pointed to the heart of an inductive study 
through a quote attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, “the more ways you twist the lion’s tail, the 
more you make him roar.” While fully accounting for the bias my background may create, I also 
gain the ability as a researcher to dig deep into a stoic, devoted, and sometimes stiff-necked 
organization, and ask the hard questions. 
Military organizations have particularly strong cultures and even stronger sub-cultures 
(Holmes-Eber, 2014b; Johnson, 2018; Kelly, 2008). These cultures are deeply intertwined with 
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traditions and artifacts, such as rituals and ceremonies (Builder, 1989; Hawkins, 2015; Johnson, 
2018; Piscitelli, 2017) that create a Heideggerian Dasein3 and define the organization’s 
fundamental existence. Strong cultures, “while stable and lasting, are also hard to change” 
(Schein, 2017, p. 343), and, in a turbulent world, this might be a liability. Often, culture is seen 
as the issue holding organizations in the past and hindering change (Builder, 1989; Davidson, 
2010; Hanson, 2001; Nielsen, 2014; Whiteley et al., 2013). Advancing organizations with strong 
cultures and subcultures forward into new contexts demands an adaptation not of their stable and 
lasting cultures, but through the adaptation of their organizational learning systems (Davidson, 
2010). However, change must be an adaptation that is particularly coherent with the 
organizational being, i.e., its defining traditions and artifacts and values (Friesenborg, 2013; 
Schein, 1984). This study, informed by the Theory of Action (ToA) (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 
1978, 1996), intends to investigate how organizational learning systems, not simply culture, 
impacted a military organization’s efforts to adapt to and address future security challenges 
through the implementation of a strategic initiative to reinvigorate a warfighting philosophy. 
I.1 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explain, through an qualitative, interpretive, cross-sectional, 
single case study (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009), why there exists a gap between the espoused Mw 
theory held by a deeply traditional military organization and the actual theory in practice that is 
something short of Mw and perhaps remains attrition warfare. To inform this study, I applied 
 
3 Martin Heidegger introduced the term Dasein (in German being-there) to describe how traditions can be so strong 
that they create a kind of collective—an experience of being that is peculiar to particular military organizations or 
branches. 
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ToA (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996) against a contemporary situation faced by a military 
organization as it attempted to effectuate a warfighting philosophy and meet the challenges 
created by an ever evolving operating environment and the changing character of war (USMC, 
1997a, 2016c). More specifically, the organization in this study is seeking to adapt to the future 
operating environment (FOE) by evolving its training and education curriculum to reinvigorate 
the extant, if somewhat dormant, Mw warfighting philosophy (USMC, 1997a). The 
reinvigoration of Mw is seen by the Marine Corps as a critical enabler necessary to execute the 
Marine Operating Concept (MOC) (USMC, 2016b), a modern concept of operations necessary 
to cope with the FOE. 
I.2 The Military and Organizational Learning 
Military organizations are some of the largest organizations in the world. According to the 
National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2020 published by the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), the United States maintains approximately 1.3 million active duty 
personnel. Counting select National Guard, Reserves, and Department of Defense civilians, the 
end strength is over 2.2 million personnel, not including contractors (USD DOD, 2019, p. 260). 
The estimated US defense budget for FY2020 is $718.3 billion (USD DOD, 2019, p. 1). These 
immense organizations share common management problems with other kinds of organizations 
(Augier et al., 2014) including leadership (Hawkins, 2015; Maltz, 1997), culture (Higbee, 2010; 
Tinoco & Arnaud, 2013), performance (Haeckel & Nolan, 1993; Parker & Parker, 2017; Szalma 
& Hancock, 2008), and learning (Clemons & Santamaria, 2002; Davidson, 2010; Shultz, 2012). 
Improving military organizations’ ability to adapt to evolving security realities will not only 
provide more effective and efficient use of public resources worldwide, but it will also provide 
better national security and improve economic stability and peace in the community of nations. 
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I.3 The Need for Marine Corps Organizational Learning: Past and Present 
I.3.1 Past Organizational Learning: Breaking the Mold 
Specifically, the case at hand provides an excellent venue for exploring the learning adaptations 
of military organizations. In 1975, the United States ended its involvement in the Vietnam War. 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) turned to address a new role in the defense of Western 
Europe at the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; 
Terriff, 2006a, 2006b). The Soviet Union’s army was massive, heavily armored, and tactically 
overmatched the relatively lightly equipped Marine Corps (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 
2006a). The USMC recognized two immediate needs to remain relevant: first, to carve out a 
niche in the national security plans; and second, to address how to survive in an ever-increasing 
lethal battlespace due to technological advances in target acquisition, precision guided munition 
(PGM) technology, and the sheer armored mass of the Soviet army. To address these needs, the 
29th CMC determined the current doctrine of attrition warfare was obsolete and wholly 
insufficient for the task (Brown, 2018; Lind, 1985b; Osinga, 2007; Terriff, 2006a). 
Attrition warfare is best characterized in the words of Osinga: “Firepower as a 
destructive force is king. Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion etc.) is used to weaken or dilute 
the effects of enemy firepower… Measures of success are ‘body count’ and targets destroyed.” 
(Osinga, 2007, p. 166). Clearly, any attempt by a light force to symmetrically confront the Soviet 
army in attrition warfare would be extremely costly and would more than likely fail (Terriff, 
2006a). The USMC needed to learn and adapt to a new reality if it were to remain a useful 
institution to the nation, and survive both on the battlefield against the Soviet Union and in the 
budget wars of the Pentagon (Brown, 2018; Terriff, 2006a). However, attrition warfare was not 
only the Marine Corps’ tacit doctrine for decades, it was woven throughout its values and norms. 
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Young Marine recruits are socialized into the Marine Corps with stories, bordering on folklore, 
of the Corps’ greatest battles being contests of attrition: Belleau Wood, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, 
Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sahn, and Hue all resonate with Marines at a deeply personal level 
(Bartlett & Sweetman, 2008; Hough et al., 1958; MCA&F, 1960; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 
2006c). Attrition warfare values leaders with physical courage and who are skilled in 
implementing processes, procedures, and control mechanisms to generate overwhelming mass 
and fires through synchronization while minimizing risks yet not shying away from casualties 
(Hanson, 2001; Johnson, 2018; Lind, 1985; Linn, 2002; Osinga, 2007; Weigley, 1977). Being 
process- and control-oriented, attrition warfare is designed for top-down hierarchical 
relationships and task-oriented objectives. While effective at using destruction to break an 
enemy’s will and capacity to resist (Osinga, 2007), attrition warfare of the industrial age had 
been outpaced by the changing character of war in the information age, and any force practicing 
it was highly vulnerable to an array of modern-day adversaries exploiting the technology and 
lethality presented by technological advances in target acquisition PGMs (Damian, 2001; Terriff, 
2007b; Weigley, 1977). 
In response to the new operating environment, the Marine Corps sought future relevancy 
by evolving its doctrinal approach to warfare based on Col John Boyd’s sense and respond 
theory, Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA-Loop) (Boyd, 1985; Brown, 2018; Osinga, 
2007; Terriff, 2006a). In 1989 the USMC published FMFM-1 Warfighting as its keystone 
doctrinal publication. FMFM-1 Warfighting articulated the Marine Corps’ philosophy of how it 
understands the nature and demands of war, its theory about war, and how it prepares for and 
wages war. This warfighting doctrine (FMFM-1 1989 and later updated to MCDP-1 in 1997) 
espouses a theory that Marines will operate and thrive in an environment described as the “fog of 
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war” (USMC, 1989, p. 6, 1997a, p. 7) characterized by friction, uncertainty, adversity, and 
ambiguity and rely on dispersion, surprise, and maneuver to offset enemy advantages en masse 
and mitigate their use of PGMs (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a). Additionally, Mw 
doctrine contrasts with attrition warfare values and norms in several ways: Mw values leaders 
who display initiative rather than dogged obedience to orders and eschews hierarchical command 
and control in favor of executing the intent of the commander two levels up (MAGTF 
Instructional Group, 2015; Reiter & Meek, 1999; USMC, 1997a). Mw views the acme of tactical 
prowess as attacking enemy weaknesses, achieving surprise, and defeating the enemy’s cohesion 
(Terriff, 2007b; USMC, 1997a, 1997c, 1997b) rather than attacking enemy strengths head on as 
in the celebrated battles of Belleau Wood, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa (Bartlett & 
Sweetman, 2008; Hough et al., 1958; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F, 1960). 
Mw values junior leader decision making marked by initiative, boldness, and acceptance 
of risk and intent rather than simply executing ‘go-and-do’ orders-oriented terrain objectives 
(Brown, 2018; Lind, 1985b; MAGTF Instructional Group, 2015; USMC, 1996, 1997a, 1997c, 
1997b). Attrition warfare held central to the aim of seizing and holding terrain and breaking the 
enemy’s will to resist through demoralizing attrition (Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006b). In 
summary, the Mw doctrine sharply contrasts with the legacy attrition warfare approach 
employed by the US military from the Civil War though Vietnam (Weigley, 1977). This contrast 
resulted in a schism within the Marine Corps between those that embraced Mw and those that 
embraced attrition warfare, with each side often derisively labeling each other as maneuverists or 
attritionists, respectively (Brown, 2018; Terriff, 2006c). While debates and diatribes raged within 
the USMC, in the end the decision process for organizational change was more teleological than 
it was dialectical (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995), as the 29th CMC signed FMFM-1 into effect with 
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the “with the force of a papal ‘bull’” (Lloyd, 1989). While there were open and spirited 
arguments made for the merits of attrition warfare as the so-called ‘Marine way of war, where 
we close with and kill the enemy’ (Robeson, 1989; Terriff, 2006c, p. 221; Tucker, 1996), and 
arguments made for how Mw seemed to eschew close quarters fighting and therefore was 
somehow un-Marine-like, in the end, the 29th CMC had the final say, and FMFM-1 Warfighting 
became the official cornerstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. 
 The Marine Corps, perhaps more than any other service, has a tradition of vocalizing 
dissent, but once a decision is rendered the Corps tends to rally behind the direction set by the 
CMC (Builder, 1989; Johnson, 2018). However, after the 29th CMC’s decision to implement 
Mw, there was persistent grumbling amongst Marines, with the dull roar of a long-running 
narrative along the lines that Mw was a fad’ and was about ‘dazzling the enemy till they drop’ 
rather than being concerned with ‘real combat’ (Anonymous, 2011; Brown, 2018; Damian, 2001; 
Piscitelli, 2017; Robeson, 1989; Terriff, 2006a).  
I.3.2 The Present Need for Organizational Learning: The Say–Do Gap 
In 2016, nearly three decades and eight CMCs after the publication of FMFM-1, the Marine 
Corps was again winding down a counter-insurgency effort as the United States transitioned to 
supporting roles of indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (JFD, 2016; Johnson, 2018; 
USMC, 2016b). After 15 years of counter-insurgency operations against guerilla, terrorist, and 
proxy forces in the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps faced a new, uncertain and much 
more lethal future operating environment. The emerging environment was described in the Joint 
Forces document titled the Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested 
and Disordered World (JOE 2035; JFD, 2016). The JOE 2035 describes conflict against potential 
peer, near peer, and non-state organizations with state-like capabilities and presents a wide array 
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of national security challenges. 
Facing uncertainty once again, the Marine Corps turned to Mw doctrine to chart a path 
forward. The 37th CMC, in FRAGO-01/2016: Advance to Contact (FRAGO-01/2016), issued a 
call to action for the Marine Corps to “reinvigorate a maneuver warfare mindset for the 21st 
century” (USMC, 2016a, p. 8). The 37th CMC's call to action to reinvigorate Mw contends that at 
one time not only did the Marine Corps fully adopt and executed Mw, but it had done so 
‘vigorously.’  
Even after nearly 30 years, the schism between attritionists and maneuverists continued. 
The Marine Corps’ professional journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, had hosted in its pages the 
early debates surrounding Mw in the late 1970s and 1980s through to the publication of FMFM-
1 in 1989. After the publication of FMFM-1, the journal featured arguments for and against Mw 
(Lloyd, 1989; Robeson, 1989; Tucker, 1996). Between 2010–2011, there were a series of 10 
anonymous articles styled after the CS Lewis’ 1954 work The Screwtape Letters, titled The 
Attritionists Letters. It these letters, General Screwtape (an ardent ‘attritionist’) admonishes a 
young (Mw-curious) Captain Wormwood, against the misguided notions of Mw and berates him 
over the follies of Mw while extoling the virtues of attrition warfare (Anonymous, 2011). The 
Attritionists Letters, while anonymous in print, were recognized inside the Marine Corps as a 
muffled scream protest registered by a minority of pro-Mw officers against the lack of 
institutional commitment to Mw in actual practice. This series of articles speaks to the schism 
that remained between attritionists and maneuverists (Johnson, 2018). In other words, The 
Attritionists Letters signaled that Mw, after 22 years of practice by that time, was not wholly 
accepted in the Marine Corps. It is evident that the 37th CMC’s call to action to ‘reinvigorate 
Mw’ represents an acknowledgement of a ‘say–do gap' between the institution's espoused theory 
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of Mw and the current theory-in-practice. It is also interesting to note that the authors of The 
Attritionists Letters were advocating for the espoused doctrine of Mw, yet they felt the need to 
remain anonymous. With that in hand, and while outside the scope of this dissertation, it may be 
fair to question if the Marine Corps ever practiced Mw, let alone vigorously. 
Emblematic of the above described struggle to reinvigorate Mw is the challenge faced by 
MCTOG to adapt its organizational learning system and curricula to implement the long-range 
vision of the MCTOG 2018–2028 Campaign Plan (MCTOG, 2018b). That campaign plan aimed 
to put into action the results from the TECOM workshops and contribute to the reinvigoration of 
Mw, therefore enabling the implementation of the MOC (Nicastro, 2017, 2018; TECOM, 2016, 
2018). 
I.4 The MCTOG Campaign Plan and the Bid to Reinvigorate Mw 
MCTOG is a uniquely situated organization within the Marine Corps that functions both as a 
formal schoolhouse in the training and education continuum and as a “Center of Excellence” 
(COE) representing the interests of the operating forces of the Marine Ground Combat Element 
(GCE). For the purpose of this study, GCE is defined as those elements of the Marine Corps 
specifically trained, manned, and equipped to engage enemy forces in direct ground combat. This 
unique positioning of MCTOG ensured it had two very different and powerful sets of 
stakeholders with significant demand signals.  
First, as a formal schoolhouse, MCTOG conducts individual-level training and education 
of a critical segment of the force consisting of mid-grade officers and senior-grade enlisted 
Marines within the GCE. The Marines graduating from MCTOG are assigned to critical 
operations and intelligence positions in the operating forces and will be called upon to plan and 
execute a wide range of missions around the globe. These missions include the expeditionary 
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application of lethal and non-lethal capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from 
low-intensity counter insurgency operations to high-intensity combat against peer competitors. 
They also respond to humanitarian crises or the evacuation of American citizens from a conflict 
zone. Developing and delivering a cutting-edge curriculum that is both true to Mw and develops 
the skills and agility necessary to execute the MOC is firmly a MCTOG task. “Ensure we are 
developing Marines with the agility and perspective to manage uncertainty, think critically, and 
solve complex problems” (MCTOG, 2018a, p. 4; USMC, 2016b, p. 25). On request, MCTOG 
also provides collective training to GCE battalion and regimental battle staff to prepare them for 
worldwide operational deployments. Most often, the requests are to train battle staff on planning 
processes and procedures for operations, intelligence, and the employment of firepower.  
Secondly, in addition to its individual and collective unit training missions in its role as a 
schoolhouse, the MCTOG functions as a COE. “The service [supporting establishment] looks to 
MCTOG to lend intellectual capacity and rigor to develop, refine and sustain emerging concepts 
and doctrine to ensure the operating forces are prepared” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The dual role 
of schoolhouse and COE and being situated at the nexus of two sets of stakeholders in tension, 
each with significant and differing demand signals, placed a tremendous strain on resources. 
(Fig. 1). 
The MCTOG campaign plan recognizes it sits astride the institutional tension between 
the operating forces and the supporting establishment. “Systemic institutional change happens at 
the service level [supporting establishment] where responsibly resides to fulfil the 
responsibilities of Title 10 of the US Code; to conduct the training, manning, and equipping of 
the operating forces” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The weight and complexity of the supporting 
establishment’s responsibilities and the bureaucratic processes to execute them are deliberate and 
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slow. On the other side, there are the GCE operating forces. The “[GCE] operating forces find 
themselves at the nexus of tension and opportunity where meeting daily operational requirements 
and remaining ready to win… outstrip their resources. Operating forces’ focus on immediate 
challenges for readiness to fight and win today, limits their resources to focus on innovation to 
win tomorrow’s wars” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The MCTOG campaign plan seeks to embrace 
this unique position. “But we can leverage this as a position of advantage to enable and sustain 
meaningful change as the GCE’s center of excellence” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2) As Fig. 1 depicts, 
MCTOG is ideally situated for not only the conduct of this study by being on the front line of the 
reinvigoration of Mw effort, it is also ideally situated in the context of engaged scholarship, to 
leverage the findings from this study and help to reinvigorate Mw for both the supporting 
establishment and the GCE operating forces.  
Figure 1: MCTOG and Institutional Tension 
 
 
 
USMC Supporting Establishment
- Resources
- Policies
- Doctrine
- Institutional training
- Bureaucratic process bound
- Long term systemic change
USMC Operating Forces
- Dynamic operating environment
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- Short term innovation
MCTOG
- Formal schoolhouse with the unique dynamic 
purpose for:
- Training Ground Combat Element (GCE) units  
- Training and Education (T&E) of key GCE 
individuals 
- GCE Center of Excellence (COE) uniquely situated to:
- Capture and institutionalize/exploit innovation
- Quickly produce doctrine to suit emerging needs
- Train and educate leaders in operational art 
Institutional Tension
- Key node in T&E continuum 
- Potential high payoff
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Finally, a major reason for conducting this research at MCTOG is the potentially 
influential position held by training and education institutions within the military. As Davidson’s 
research explains, “internal institutional process can prevent, promote, permit military learning 
through change… and act as a powerful counterweight to entrenched organizational culture” 
(Davidson, 2010, p. 192). 
The MCTOG campaign plan was an effort to a to address the Marine Corps’ drive to 
reinvigorate its Mw philosophy and enable execution of the MOC. In doing so, MCTOG would 
be pivotal to the Marine Corps by providing a ready and relevant operating force to meet the 
national security challenges of the FOE. 
The Marine Corps’ Mw philosophy, and the reinvigoration thereof, is thoroughly 
embedded in the goals of the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028. However, the actual 
execution of the campaign plan at MCTOG fell completely flat. A full year after the 
Commanding Officer signed the campaign plan into effect, it had gone absolutely nowhere. In 
December 2018, MCTOG attempted an intervention in the form of a leadership offsite, an event 
many of the participants of this study attended. This study was conducted a year and a half after 
the campaign was signed into effect and nearly six months after the December 2018 leadership 
offsite. While visible progress was being made towards implementing the campaign plan at that 
point, the progress was slow and incomplete. 
The MCTOG campaign plan was a failed strategic initiative intending to reinvigorate Mw 
and enable the MOC in order to meet the challenges of the FOE. By describing and explaining 
the root causes and dynamics of the say–do gap, this study may increase MCTOG’s 
understanding of how and why the initiative failed and may inform potential corrective 
interventions.  
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I.5 The Importance of This Study: Blood and Treasure 
Explicating the dynamics at play in the say–do gap between an espoused warfighting philosophy 
and the warfighting theory in practice is not a trivial matter for two reasons. Primarily, 
improvements in a military organization’s ability to adapt to dynamic and ambiguous operational 
environments have a dramatic potential to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of national 
security, which entails the better use of a large share of national resources in the form of both 
blood and treasure. Secondarily, the 37th CMC has stated the importance of Mw doctrine in three 
major service planning documents: FRAGO-01/2016 (USMC, 2016a), the Marine Operating 
Concept (MOC) (USMC, 2016b), and the 37th CMC’s Message to the Force: Seize the Initiative 
(USMC, 2017). Each document underscores the criticality of Marines’ ability to execute Mw in 
the context of the 21st century in order to operate within the complexity, adversity, and 
uncertainty of the FOE (JFD, 2016; USMC, 2016b). Most notable was the MOC, which boldly 
makes a statement on the importance of adapting to the FOE in articulating the central problem 
statement: 
“The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, or equipped to meet the 
demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain, 
technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit 
signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime domain.” (USMC, 
2016b, p. 8) 
The document then goes on to describe the remedy to the central problem: 
“The MOC is the starting point to address this problem by reaffirming the 
primacy of maneuver warfare and combined arms for the 21st century and 
identifying the critical tasks to develop the future force.” (USMC, 2016b, p. 8) 
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In fact, the MOC dedicates an entire chapter titled “The Primacy of Maneuver Warfare” to the 
topic and confirms that the 37th CMC and the institution are committed to Mw as the enduring 
doctrinal warfighting philosophy. 
I.6 The Reinvigoration of Mw Gets Underway 
In FRAGO-01/2016, the 37th CMC directs TECOM to establish a working group to study and 
make recommendations on how Mw may be reinvigorated. This action strongly implies that the 
37th CMC believes the Marine Corps’ current ability to execute Mw in the context of the FOE of 
the 21st century was insufficient. In response to this directive, TECOM hosted a series of three 
separate workshops, each with the same core facilitators but with different participants and 
subject matter experts. 
The results of the first workshop conducted on October 25–27, 2016 focused on 
institutional structure and culture reform, namely in the form of changes to personnel 
management processes and the enculturation of Mw by reversing the bias for the science of 
warfare, the ‘attritionists’ approach, in favor of the art of warfare, the ‘maneuverists’ approach 
(TECOM, 2016). The most prominent point coming out of the first workshop session was this 
quote from the outbrief: “The Marine Corps can talk about maneuver warfare but has not 
institutionalized an ability to do [sic] maneuver warfare” (TECOM, 2016, p. 7). The reason for 
the lack of an ability to “do” Mw was attributed to a fixation on attrition in both the operating 
forces and in the training and education continuum (TECOM, 2016).  
The results of the second workshop series conducted on June 20–22, 2017 focused on 
enabling Mw by strengthening tactical decision making rather than solely following technical 
processes and “improving the quality of instructors through dedicated instructor development” 
(Nicastro, 2017; TECOM, 2018, p. 13). 
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Responding to the 37th CMC’s call to action to reinvigorate Mw and seeking to act on 
both FRAGO-01/2016 and the findings from the first two TECOM “Reinvigorate Maneuver 
Warfare” workshops, the MCTOG developed a long-range vision to restore Mw to primacy. This 
effort was captured in the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 (MCTOG, 2018b). This 
document would be the vehicle for change in the Marine Corps. Its implementation is the focus 
of this study and will be discussed in detail later in this study. 
The third workshop was conducted on April 24–25, 2018 and focused on reviewing the 
findings of the first two workshops and defining the training and education actions needed to 
effectuate Mw. I was invited to participate as a subject matter expert in this third workshop 
session and was present for the discussions. During the discussions concerning the efficacy of 
Mw, the general thrust of conversation regarding the need for a reinvigoration of Mw circled 
around how Marine units had become accustomed to the static and very procedural nature of the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Johnson, 2018; West, 2011). In those 
theaters, Marines have encountered the leading edges of the FOE in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
the situation is ambiguous and where the familiar command, control, and information flow is 
often irrelevant with high levels of uncertainty. The general consensus of the discussion was that 
Marine tactical leaders did not always adapt appropriately to ambiguity in tactical situations and 
often defaulted to becoming internally oriented, task-focused, and fixated on “go and do” orders, 
which was practically the opposite of what Mw emphasizes. The outcome is the opposite of what 
is required to execute the Mw doctrine and the concepts presented in the MOC.  
Another key finding from the group is articulated in the post-workshop reflections 
provided by one workshop participant. “Participants acknowledged that executing maneuver 
warfare in the context of the MOC and FOE ‘demands a higher standard’ of understanding and 
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realizing of our warfighting philosophy” (Nicastro, 2018, p. 2). Finally, at the end of the 
workshop, one participant threw up his hands and said, “I guess we [the Marine Corps] doesn’t 
have the culture to execute Mw” as others nodded in agreement. Another participant offered, “I 
don’t think people have a fundamental nor conceptual understanding of Maneuver Warfare.” 
The latter comment prompted me to note that the effort to reinvigorate Mw may not be about 
culture or structure, as both were focus items from all three workshops. Instead, I was prompted 
by the statement to investigate the role an organizational learning system might have as an 
impediment or pathway to full effectuation of Mw. 
Ignoring for a moment the persistent and open schism between attritionists and 
maneuverists, and assuming the 37th CMC premise is correct that at one time the Marine Corps 
vigorously practiced Mw, the Marine Corps’ current understanding and practice of Mw is 
insufficient to meet the demands of the FOE and execute the MOC. The two requirements 
necessary for the Marine Corps to remain a relevant and ready force in the 21st century and 
effectively meet the demands of the FOE and the MOC, the Marine Corps must understand why 
and how its adoption of Mw has been insufficient thus far. The consequences of going to war 
with a force that espouses one theory of warfighting while in practice executes another theory of 
warfighting will be a dislocation of expectation, and the stakes are blood and treasure. While the 
TECOM workshops tended to focus on organizational structure and culture as the reasons for a 
lack of Mw efficacy, this study will address the issue from an organizational learning perspective 
(Davidson, 2010). The next chapter will investigate the pertinent literature streams surrounding 
this area of study. I cast my net widely among the literature in an effort to illuminate the research 
question from several angles and to build a theoretical framework for a study that will help me 
separate the discourse from the discord. 
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II will discuss the 
relevant literature streams pertinent to this study. Chapter III will explain and justify the 
methodological research approach for this study. Chapter IV will detail the findings from the 
research work. Chapter V will discuss this study’s contribution to the literature and managerial 
practice by detailing potential interventions to improve an organization’s implementation of a 
strategic initiative to effect change. 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
To begin this study, I investigated five literature streams to inform and frame the problem and 
provide a theoretical framework to rigorously examine the problem of the failed strategic 
initiative in the form of the MCTOG campaign plan to reinvigorate Mw. The five literature 
streams are organizational learning, organizational learning and culture in a military setting, Mw, 
and the Marine Corps planning documents regarding the reinvigoration of Mw, and Control 
Theory as it applies to hierarchies and clans (Table 1). While not all inclusive, Table 1 illustrates 
the top 12 seminal or critically informative articles for the main literature stream and 
organizational learning and the top five seminal or critically informative works for each of the 
other literature streams. Working from left to right in Table 1, the first literature stream, 
organizational learning, captures articles firmly planted in the camp of scholarly research and 
largely situated in private sector organizations. The second literature stream contains scholarly 
articles and book chapters on organizational learning and culture situated in military 
organizations. The third and fourth literature steams, Mw and USMC planning documents, 
address the history and implementation real-world problem of adopting the espoused theory of 
Mw and firmly ground the discussion in the literature. During the course of the fieldwork, the 
data pointed to the phenomenon of clan activity within the MCTOG hierarchy. Accordingly, 
control theory was included in the literature review as the fifth literature stream. 
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Table 1: Literature Review 
Organizational Learning (OL) Military Learning 
and Culture 
Maneuver 
Warfare 
USMC Planning 
Documents 
Control Theory 
Hierarchies and 
Clans 
Theory in Practice, 
OL, OL II (Argyris 
& Schön, 1974, 
1978, 1996) 
Exploration and 
Exploitation in 
Organizational 
Learning (March, 
1991) 
 
OL and The 
Marine Corps: The 
Counter 
Insurgency in Iraq 
(Schultz, 2012) 
FMFM-1 
Warfighting 
(USMC, 1989)* 
* Revised to 
MCDP-1 (USMC, 
1997) 
 
Marine Operating 
Concept (MOC) 
(USMC, 2016) 
Integrating the 
Individual and the 
Organization 
(Argyris, 1964) 
 
The Reflective 
Practitioner 
(Schön, 1983) 
A Dynamic Theory 
of Organizational 
Knowledge 
Creation (Nonaka, 
1994) 
 
Innovate or Die: 
OC and origins of 
Mw in the Marine 
Corps 
(Terriff 2006) 
 
A New Conception 
of War (Brown, 
2018) 
 
MCTOG 
Campaign Plan 
2018-2028 
(USMC, 2017) 
Markets, 
Bureaucracies and 
Clans. (Ouchi, 
1980) 
 
Reflective Systems 
Development 
(Mathiassen, 1998) 
Exploration & 
Exploitation in 
Organizational 
Learning: A 
Critical 
Application of the 
4I Model. (Nielsen 
et al., 2018) 
 
Resistance to 
Organizational 
Cultural Change in 
the Military (Kelly, 
2008) 
Maneuver warfare: 
Can Modern 
Military Strategy 
Lead You to 
Victory? (Clemons 
& Santamaria, 
2002) 
FRAGO-01/2016: 
Advance to 
Contact. 
(USMC, 2016) 
Hierarchies, Clans 
and Theory Z: A 
new Perspective on 
Org Development. 
(Ouchi & Price, 
1978) 
An OL 
Framework: From 
Institution to 
Institution 
(Crossan et al., 
1999) 
 
The Link Between 
Individual and 
Organizational 
Learning (Kim, 
1993) 
 
Lifting the Fog of 
Peace: How 
Americans 
Learned to Fight 
Modern War 
(Davidson, 2011) 
The US Army and 
Mission 
Command: 
Philosophy vs 
Practice 
(Matzenbacher, 
2018) 
USMC Science & 
Technology 
Strategic Plan 
(USMC, 2018) 
Enacting Clan 
Control in 
Complex IT 
Projects: A Social 
Capital 
Perspective. (Chua 
et al., 2012) 
 
Organizational 
Learning: The 
Contributing 
Processes and 
Literatures. 
(Huber, 1991) 
Organizational 
Learning (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985) 
OL Mechanisms: 
A Structural and 
Cultural Approach 
to OL. 
(Popper & 
Lipshitz, 1998) 
Innovate or die: 
Organizational 
culture and the 
origins of 
maneuver warfare 
in the United 
States Marine 
Corps. (Terriff, 
2006) 
CMC Message to 
the Force: Seize 
the Initiative 
(USMC, 2017) 
Informating the 
Clan: Controlling 
Physicians’ Costs 
and Outcomes. 
(Kohli & 
Kettinger, 2004) 
 
II.1 Organizational Learning 
The past 45 years have witnessed an ever-increasing growth in organizational learning literature. 
This growth is attributed to organizations’ need to match the challenges in an ever more fluid, 
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turbulent, and volatile world (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). The ability of an 
organization to learn quickly and properly increases its ability to adapt and compete in a 
changing environment (Eisenberg et al., 2018). We now live in a world of disruptive change 
(Christensen & Overdorf, 2000) where organizations, whether military, government, or business, 
must innovate to remain relevant. In other words, “what got you here, won’t get you there,” and 
yesterday’s tried and true processes and procedures may be insufficient or perhaps even 
detrimental to an organization striving to meet the demands of tomorrow (Bontis et al., 2002). In 
the military, we know future operating environments will be disruptive, complex, and uncertain 
(USMC, 2016b), yet are we aware that an organization’s capacity to learn is touted as a 
fundamental strategic capability (Fiol & Lyles, 1985a). While it is a commonly accepted theme 
that organizations must adapt to and thrive in a disruptive world, is it is not a commonly accepted 
that they must know how to learn as an organization in order to adapt to and thrive. However, 
there is no clear agreement as to what organizational learning is, let alone how best to achieve it 
(Scott & Candidate, 2011).  
While the literature generally agrees that organizational learning is important, there is 
considerable discussion on what organizational learning is exactly and how an organization goes 
about doing it. To begin, this review will seek to establish in the literature the key underpinnings 
of organizational learning, including defining learning, how organizations create knowledge, and 
organizational learning and outlining the levels of learning in an organization and the factors that 
influence organizational learning. 
II.1.1 Organizational Knowledge Creation 
Learning is a central theme running throughout the organizational literature stream. The notion 
of learning is often taken for granted, and rarely do we explore how it affects our daily lives. 
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Therefore, a specific definition of learning must be determined. There are two main camps in this 
debate surrounding the definition of learning. First, there is the cognitive process camp, which 
claims that organizational learning is a cognitive process that occurs when new insights are 
acquired (Fiol & Lyles, 1985a; Huber, 1991). Huber (1991) claimed that learning has occurred 
when one entity within an organization gains knowledge that may be put to use at some point in 
the future, as this new knowledge may be cause for reflection, adjusting assumptions, and/or 
building new mental models with which change occurs, even if it is not observable behavior 
(Huber, 1991). 
Second, is the cognitive behavioral process camp, which claims that organizational 
learning is a cognitive behavioral process that happens only when new insights are accompanied 
by changes in behavior (Fiol & Lyles, 1985b; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998; Weick, 1991). The 
cognitive behavioral process camp (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978, 1996; Crossan, Lane, & 
White, 1999) acknowledges that while cognitive learning is important, learning does not occur 
until new insights, mental models, and assumptions result in new behavior. Argyris and Schön 
(1978) contended that an organization learns when it identifies and corrects errors, while Crossan 
(2003) asserted that learning is complete when one aligns one’s insights with one’s behaviors. 
From a cognitive process viewpoint, the Marine Corps met the requirement for organizational 
learning in that it recognized a need for change and wrote a new doctrine. However, the 
argument could be made by the cognitive behavioral process camp that organizational learning 
did not occur, as the new insights (doctrine) were not accompanied by changes in behavior.  
The literature points to an ongoing discussion regarding organizational learning and 
whether an organization can actually learn. Some have contended that organizational learning is 
simply the sum of individual learning within the organization (Kim, 1993). Kim (1993) claimed 
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that only people can learn, and so the learning that takes place in an organization is restricted to 
what the individuals within the company have learned or by gaining a diversity of thinking in 
either new personnel coming into the organization or by the temporary injection of knowledge 
through consultants or collaborating with other organizations. Individual learning alone, 
however, does not account for how organizations can experience a complete turnover in 
personnel, as often happens in military units. In fact, military units and their service-supporting 
establishments are specifically designed to replace people as the organization lives on (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Hawkins, 2015; Kim, 1993). Therefore, an organization may experience a 
complete turnover of collective learning, yet the new people in the organization still behave the 
same way based on what the organization previously learned. As Hedberg articulated, “Members 
come and go and leadership changes but organizational memories [persist to establish and 
reinforce] norms, assumptions and preserve certain behaviors… norms and values over time” 
(Hedberg, 2003, p. 6). Levitt and March (1988) supported this notion of preserved memory by 
explaining that learning resides within the structure of an organization and contended that 
organizational learning is a compilation of experiences and operating rhythms such as processes, 
procedures, and organizational structure (Levitt & March, 1988). This dissertation will refer to 
two main types of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Gorman (2002) provided a taxonomy of 
knowledge most easily described as a spectrum running from explicit knowledge to tacit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge would be describing the procedure for how to fix a flat on a 
bicycle, with a collection of steps set in sequence that can easily be written down and passed on 
in a lecture. At the other end of the spectrum is tacit knowledge, which would be trying to 
explain the procedure for how to ride a bike. How to ride a bike can be known experientially, but 
it is difficult to pass on by simply telling another person. Between the two ends of the spectrum 
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are degrees and types of knowledge. Starting on the explicit end are declarative ‘what’ 
knowledge, procedural ‘how’ knowledge, judgement ‘when’ knowledge, and finally, wisdom 
‘why’ knowledge. We will find later in this study that teaching Mw is very much at the tacit end 
of the spectrum, while the methodical procedures most associated attrition warfare are at the 
explicit end of the spectrum. 
As highlighted earlier, the literature on organizational learning focuses on individual 
learning and learning embedded in the structure of an organization. How learning and knowledge 
travel within an organization gave rise to the study of individual, group, and organization 
learning levels. Individual learning as described by Simon (1996) and Kim (1993) leads to an 
exchange of knowledge between individuals and groups of individuals. This exchange is held as 
the collective knowledge of the organization (Hedberg, 2003; Levitt & March, 1988). Collective 
knowledge was further explored in Nonaka’s (1994) study, which investigated the dynamic 
process of knowledge creation within an organization and developed an operational model. The 
model captures the interplay of tacit knowledge created by individuals and the role of the 
organization in contextualizing and amplifying that new knowledge in explicit form. In other 
words, it takes the tacit task of riding a bike, or employing Mw, and makes it more explicit and 
accessible to others internal or external to the organization. Nonaka’s (1994) 2 x 2 model (Fig. 2) 
organizes the creation of knowledge in the quadrants: socialization, externalization, 
combination, and internalization. Nonaka (1994) explained how each quadrant can create 
knowledge. For example, in the socialization quadrant, tacit knowledge can be created between 
two or more people interacting and exchanging that knowledge, like each relating how each 
learned to ride a bike and then melding those experiences. Likewise, explicit knowledge can be 
created between two or more people combining procedures, steps, and checklists, like two people 
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comparing their steps for fixing a flat on a bicycle and combining them to create a new process 
that can be taught in a lecture. The quadrants of internalization and externalization are where 
knowledge moves from explicit to tacit and tacit and explicit, respectively. With internalization, 
a person or group can move from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge by internally processing 
information and making connections to expand their understanding in a very experiential 
manner. To explain the externalization of knowledge from tacit to explicit, Nonaka (1994) 
offered that while “tacit knowledge held by individuals may lie at the heart of the knowledge 
creating process, realizing the practical benefits of that knowledge centers on its externalization 
and amplification through… a dynamic entangling of [all four quadrants]” (p. 20). 
 Figure 2: Model of Knowledge Creation 
 
Note: (Nonaka, 1994, p. 19)  
In the next section, I will address Argyris and Schön’s (1978) ToA and its greater 
implications on organizational learning. 
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II.1.2 Organizational Learning 
Yanow (2000) proposed that the organizational learning process is rooted in organizational 
culture (Yanow, 2000). Thus, understanding organizational culture is critical to understanding 
the organizational learning process (Ando, 2002; Eisenberg et al., 2018; Friesenborg, 2013; 
Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Nielsen, 2014; Schein, 1984; Skerlavaj et al., 2007; Wang & Rafiq, 
2009; Whiteley et al., 2013). Schein (2017) complicated the role of organizational culture and 
learning by presenting the paradox of becoming a perpetual learner and the stabilizing influence 
of culture. He wrote that, “while strong cultures are desirable as a basis for lasting change, they 
are by definition stable and hard to change.… If the world is becoming more turbulent, requiring 
more flexibility and learning, does this not imply that strong cultures will increasingly become a 
liability” (Schein, 2017, p. 343). Not surprisingly, the USMC has a rich, storied history and 
culture of martial prowess formed over 244 years of national defense. This USMC, like all 
others, “must compete in and adapt to an ever-changing environment” (Eisenberg et al., 2018)—
an environment characterized by fluidity, turbulence, and volatility (Argyris & Schön, 1996). 
II.1.3 Organizational Learning: Theory of Action (ToA) 
ToA was introduced in 1974 by Chris Argyris and Donald Schön and represents seminal work in 
the field of organizational learning. Their theory states that individuals and organizations hold 
two types of theories of action: (1) espoused theories, what they say they do; and (2) theories-in-
use, what they really do. The space between these two theories in action represents a “say–do-
gap.” Within the say–do-gap exists a complex interplay of norms, assumptions that define the 
atmosphere of a setting. There are also governing variables, which are the truths that people try 
to hold within a range of tolerance with various action strategies that are employed consciously 
or subconsciously. These action strategies, in turn, have consequences to relationships, learning, 
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and the self that influence how an organization behaves, either as a Model I or Model II type 
organization, and how it learns with either single-loop or double-loop learning. Each of these 
elements of ToA are detailed below. 
Theories of Action: Argyris and Schön distinguished between two types of theories of 
action: espoused theories and theories-in-use.  
Espoused Theory: Espoused theories embody the world view and values upon which 
people believe their behavior is based and what they believe about themselves, or, in the case of 
an organization, what it believes about itself. Espoused theories are known to all since they are 
proclaimed in both words, typically by individuals, and in writing, typically by organizations. 
Espoused theories are often at odds with actual behavior driven by governing variables, and thus 
a contradiction exists (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Schein, 1996). 
Theory-in-use: Theories-in-use are signaled by individual and group behavior and are 
often unknown to the individual and or organization (Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978, 1991). They 
are described as either Model I or Model II (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Schein, 1996). 
Congruency and Incongruency: Congruency occurs when one’s espoused theory, what 
one says, matches one’s theory-in-use, what one does. As stated by Argyris and Schön (1974), 
“inner feelings are expressed as action” (p. 23). Conversely, incongruency occurs when one’s 
espoused theory, what one says, does not match one’s theory-in-use and is a form of self-
deception (Argyris & Schön, 1974). “Often times individuals [and groups] are blissfully unaware 
of this incongruency as their theory-in-use behaviors fell outside of the espoused theory…when 
people become aware of this gap they are often shocked” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. xiii). In this 
dissertation, I will refer to incongruency as the say–do-gap. Argyris and Schön (1974) were 
careful to note that congruency holds no virtue over incongruency. “An espoused theory that is 
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congruent with an insufficient theory-in-use is less valuable that an adequate espoused value that 
is out of congruence with an inadequate theory-in-use because the incongruence can be 
discovered and provide stimulus for change” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 23–24). This is an 
important point; this study does not make a value judgment on the effectiveness of the Marine 
Corps’ efforts to institute and subsequently reinvigorate Mw as the warfighting philosophy; 
rather, I aim only to investigate why the effort appears to be insufficient after 30 years. 
Norms: Prevailing conditions and practices within an organization form a complex and 
tacit set of social rules (Argyle, 1990; Argyris & Schön, 1974) and set an atmospheric tone 
within an organization. Norms may appear as unwritten rules for “how things get done around 
here” (Hawkins, 2015), who holds power, how decisions really get made, what behavior gets 
rewarded, and who gets promoted (Jaeger, 1983). 
Assumptions: Argyris and Schön (1974) discovered that assumptions are spoken or 
unspoken, conscious or unconscious, and frame a person’s perspective about self, others, the 
situation, and the connections between action, consequence, and a situation. 
Governing Variables: Governing variables represent goals that a person is trying to keep 
within some acceptable range while trying to live up to the espoused values in a plan at the 
individual or organizational level (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Any action taken by an actor to keep 
one governing variable within an acceptable range will likely impact upon a one or more other 
governing variables and trigger a trade-off among governing variables4 (Argyris & Schön, 1974). 
Action Strategies: Action strategies are used by a person or organization, consciously or 
 
4 In some works, Argyris and Schön used the terms “governing variables” and “governing values” interchangeably. 
For this study, I will use the term governing variables exclusively to avoid confusion with Marine Corps core values. 
30 
 
unconsciously, to keep the governing variables within an acceptable range or tolerance level. 
These strategies, however, carry either intended or unintended consequences for learning and 
relationships (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996).  
Consequences: When individuals, groups, and organizations employ action strategies to 
maintain governing variables within a range of tolerance, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
there are consequences for those actions. Argyris and Schön (1974) categorized the implications 
for the employment of action strategies as consequences to learning, relationships, and self. 
Model I and Model II: Central to ToA are the Model I and Model II constructs. Argyris 
and Schön (1974, 1978, 1996) defined a Model I learning system as one where behavior is 
governed by the following values: achieving goals, maximizing winning and minimizing losing, 
minimizing the expression of negative feelings, and rationality. A Model I construct is likely to 
be more efficient in dealing with structured situations and routine problems and is associated 
with single-loop learning. A Model II construct defines learning system where behavior is 
governed by valid information, informed choice, and internal commitment (Argyris & Schön, 
1974, 1978, 1996). 
Single-Loop Learning: In single-loop learning, individuals, groups, and organizations 
modify their actions according to the difference between expected and reached outcomes. This 
produces incremental learning, which is necessary for the routine parts of doing business; 
however, there is no questioning of the premise or values of an activity, and the actor “learns to 
avoid or suppress conflict and satisfy existing governing values” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). 
As illustrated in Fig. 3, single-loop learning is the conduit for Model I organizational learning, 
wherein one’s underlying assumptions about values, self, and others are hidden (Friesenborg, 
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2013), and change is directed at one’s action strategies to maintain governing variables within 
tolerant levels. 
Figure 3: Single-loop Learning 
 
 Double-Loop Learning: In double-loop learning, people, organizations, or groups 
review actions in the framework of our operating assumptions and ask “what is going on here?” 
and “what are the patterns?” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). In contrast with single-loop 
learning, the actor in double-loop “learns to be concerned with the surfacing and resolution of 
conflict rather than suppressing it” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). Note that “double loop 
learning does not supersede single loop learning” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). As illustrated 
in Fig. 4, double-loop learning is the conduit for Model II organizational learning, where one’s 
underlying assumptions about values, governing variables, self, and others are publicly discussed 
and analyzed (Friesenborg, 2013). This public acknowledgment results in the questioning and 
adjustment of governing variables to bring one’s espoused theory into congruency with one’s 
theory-in-use. 
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Figure 4: Double-loop Learning 
 
The next section addresses the military learning literature stream and the contextual 
influence of culture and how typically strong military cultures may influence organizational 
learning. 
II.2 Military Learning and Culture 
According to Shultz (2012), there is only a small segment of scholarly literature in security 
studies that addresses the related subjects of military learning and innovation. Modern war is full 
of ambiguity, and military organizations must create an organizational learning environment to 
be effective. “The concept of critical thinking and organizational learning cannot be 
underestimated’ (Zacharakis & Van Der Werff, 2012). Learning, innovation, and change are 
difficult to achieve and maintain in larger organizations in general, and military organizations in 
particular (Builder, 1989; Davidson, 2010; Haynie, 2018; Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Johnson, 2018; 
O’Connor & Kotze, 2008; Shultz, 2012). 
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The USMC is both large and a military organization, and it is one with a deeply 
engrained culture rife with artifacts and rituals of past heroics that have often been elevated to 
near-mythical status (Brown, 2018; Davidson, 2010; Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Piscitelli, 2017; 
Terriff, 2006b, 2006a). As Schein (2017) stated, “while strong cultures are desirable as a basis 
for lasting change, they are by definition stable and hard to change” (p. 317). Zucker (1977), and 
later Schein (2017), concluded in their studies of awareness in organizational culture, there is a 
complex interview, observation, and joint-inquiry approach required to give the necessary 
attention to the opportunities and constraints that organizational culture provides. Here, it is 
evident that Schein’s (2017) recommended approach is quite similar to Argyris and Schön’s 
(1974, 1978, 1996) ToA, and a case study from the interpretive perspective may be very helpful 
in illuminating and deciphering the cultural context in organizational learning systems of military 
instructional institutions. 
The Marine Corps has recognized the need to evolve and adapt its operating concepts for 
the future and has embarked on a self-described “campaign of learning” (MCCDC, 2018; 
USMC, 2016c) to prepare itself for the future. To this end, the USMC has published the Marine 
Operating Concept, which details how the force will be developed and employed the future 
(USMC, 2016c). A critical component of the USMC’s campaign of learning and the MOC is to 
reinvigorate the foundational Mw warfighting philosophy, which represents both an espoused 
theory and is also a doctrinal artifact. While it is deeply embedded in the organizational culture, 
there are various levels of understanding of and commitment to that philosophy. While it is 
recognized in the literature that there is a need to understand organizational learning in the 
military in order to deal with the ambiguity of the FOE (Davidson, 2010; Holmes-Eber, 2014a; 
Zacharakis & Van Der Werff, 2012), and despite the overwhelming amount of literature 
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concerning organizational learning in general, the literature has not consolidated any theory on 
organizational learning specifically in a military context. While Davidson (2010) illustrated the 
positive impact of education and learning institutions in the military dating to the early 20th 
century, Davidson concedes it was still insufficient. The literature has very little to offer 
specifically concerning the role of organizational learning systems when services attempt to 
adopt a new warfighting philosophy or doctrine (or ‘reinvigorate’ one), as with the Marine Corps 
and Mw and the US Army with Mission Command. The next section focuses on the Mw 
literature steam. 
II.3 Maneuver Warfare 
In Chapter I above, I thoroughly discussed much of the Mw literature stream and provided a 
background on the foundations of Mw as warfighting philosophy headed by the seminal work 
FMFM-1/MCDP-1 Warfighting (USMC, 1989, 1997a). These documents capture the Marine 
Corps’ understanding of Mw and is descriptive in nature regarding the expected attitudes and 
behaviors of Marines necessary to execute Mw. Additionally, the literature stream provides the 
history spanning from Mw’s inception (Boyd, 1985; Brown, 2018; MAGTF Instructional Group, 
2015; Osinga, 2007; Terriff, 2006c) to Mw becoming official Marine Corps doctrine (Brown, 
2018; Damian, 2001; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a, 2006c). It also illustrates the difficulty the 
US Army has had in adopting its own version of Mw, which was coined Mission Command 
(Matzenbacher, 2018). 
II.4 USMC Mw Planning Documents 
The USMC Mw planning documents literature stream detailed the Marine Corps’ institutional 
attempts to initiate the reinvigoration of Mw, beginning with the 37th CMC’s call to action in 
FRAGO-1/2016 and the TECOM ‘reinvigorate Mw’ workshops (TECOM, 2016, 2017; USMC, 
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2016a, 2017). These actions underscore the central role the Mw philosophy plays in preparing 
and employing the force for the FOE (USMC, 2016b, 2017). These documents also provide 
insight into the Mw values the institution espouses. The Mw literature discussed in Chapter I also 
introduced MCTOG’s strategic initiative to reinvigorate Mw via its campaign plan (MCTOG, 
2018b). As a result of the TECOM workshops, the various schoolhouses within the TECOM 
training and education continuum were tasked to explicate how Mw was being taught in their 
respective institutions (MCU, 2016, 2017). The responses were consolidated by Marine Corps 
University (MCU) and largely remained tabulated accounts of the number of classes and hours 
devoted to Mw curricula, with little on their efficacy in teaching or reinvigorating Mw. In the 
end, there is not an empirical observation or analysis of any concrete attempts to reinvigorate 
Mw. 
II.5 Control Theory Hierarchies and Clans 
The fifth literature stream concerns control theory, specifically the role of “clan control” (Ouchi 
& Johnson, 1978; Ouchi & Price, 1978a; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) within a formal hierarchy. 
This literature stream was not addressed until after field work had been conducted. The first 
coding cycle revealed the potential of clan activity that may have had an impact on how MCTOG 
learned as an organization. Further research into the works of Ouchi (1980) and Ouchi and Price 
(1978) revealed how organizations function and achieve results through one of three methods of 
control: formal bureaucratic, market, and clan control. In the case of MCTOG and the Marine 
Corps, market control was not applicable due to the nature of the relationship between the 
individual and the organization. Each member of MCTOG is an employee versus a market actor 
seeking financial gain and generating capital (Ouchi, 1980). However, formal bureaucratic 
control is easily applicable. Clan control, especially operating within a formal hierarchy, was 
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revealing when applied to the Marine Corps in general and MCTOG specifically. Ouchi and 
Price (1978b) defined a clan as: 
“… a culturally homogenous organization, one in which most members share a 
common set of values or objectives plus beliefs about how to coordinate effort in 
order to reach common objectives… and draws informal control from peer 
monitoring and sanctions to promulgate shared values, beliefs and norms.” (p. 
64)  
 This definition describes the methods of informal control clans may wield and shed new 
light on the data corpus. Ouchi and Price (1978b) continued to explain how clans achieve control 
through a process of socialization, where the more complete the socialization, the stronger the 
control of the clan. They made a fascinating point that, “a strong form of this complete 
socialization is seen in such total institutions as the Marine Corps and some [emphasis added] 
monasteries” (Ouchi & Price, 1978a, p. 65). One interesting caveat to explain some of the 
tension within MCTOG between the hierarchical management and the clan emerging from the 
data is the claim that “clans merge individual goals with organizational ones and thus provide 
them the motivation to serve the organization” (Ouchi & Price, 1978b, p. 64). As the data will 
show later in the results section, this was not the case at MCTOG—the clan’s goals ran counter 
to the organization’s goals. Kohli and Kettinger (2004) discussed in their study how clans may 
be initially counter to hierarchical organizational goals, but they demonstrated how those two 
sets of goals may be aligned through intervention. Additionally, Chua et al. (2012) claimed that 
clan control is “essential for complex multi-stake holder projects” (p. 579) and described 
processes for enacting clan control with individuals who have strong social capital—those who 
are capable of building ties, sanctioning norms favorable to organizational goals, or censoring 
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norms that are counter to organizational norms. 
II. 6 Framework of Theory of Action and Warfighting Philosophies 
The rigor of conducting a detailed literature review across the five literature streams provided a 
considerable depth of understanding to the complexity of the problem. Specifically, the literature 
review informed a synthesis of ToA and two warfighting philosophies, namely attrition warfare 
and Mw. Table 2 below represents an original contribution towards aligning organizational 
learning requirements with warfighting philosophies by indexing the main descriptors of the 
attrition warfare and Mw warfighting philosophies and the salient elements of ToA, specifically 
Model I single-loop and Model II double-loop organizational learning systems.  The table 
provides a side-by-side compare-and-contrast view of Model I and Model II learning systems by 
units of analysis: governing variables; action strategies and consequences; for relationships, 
learning, and self. Additionally, Table 2 illustrates how the Marine Corps’ espoused theory of 
Mw closely aligns with Model II organizations that are more likely to engage in double-loop 
learning, while the pre-1989 warfighting practice of attrition warfare is closely aligned with 
Model I organizations that are more likely to engage in single-loop learning. 
An organization with a Model I learning system and action strategies leading to single-
loop learning consequences will have significant difficulty achieving the espoused theory of Mw.  
  
38 
 
Table 2: Framework of Theory of Action and Warfighting Philosophies 
 Model I 
Learning System 
Attrition Warfare: 
Theory-in-practice 
Model II 
Learning System 
Maneuver Warfare: 
Espoused Theory 
Governing 
Variables 
Avoid Risk (not lose or 
lose face) 
Emphasize rationality 
 
Control, Efficiency, 
Process, Hierarchy, 
Internal focus on “my 
lane”, Obedience to task 
 
Free and informed 
choice, Internal 
commitment, Trust 
 
Initiative, External focus 
on the enemy, Fluidity, 
Trust, Obedience to 
intent 
Action 
Strategies 
Control environment, 
centralized tasking 
Low teamwork 
Low risk 
Internally task focused, 
“go-and-do” orders and 
procedures to minimize 
risk, maximize effects 
Process focused 
planning and top-down 
communication and 
decision making to 
achieve synchronization 
Must eliminate risk 
 
Sharing control, 
Transparency, 
Surfacing conflicting 
views, Encouraging 
public testing of 
evaluations in design 
and implementation 
of action 
Intent focused orders not 
bound by tasks to 
maximize flexibility 
Flexible inclusive 
planning, decision 
making, and 
communications to 
achieve intent 
Must accept risk 
 
 
Consequences/ 
Relationship 
Defensive relationships 
Low freedom of choice 
Reduced production of 
valid information 
Little public testing of 
ideas 
Relationships tend to be 
more rigid and reflective 
of hierarchy with dialog 
and discussion about 
“how” 
High premium on 
obedience to orders 
Relationship trust is 
based on obedience 
 
Minimally defensive 
relationships 
High freedom of 
choice 
 
Relationships less rigid 
and more introspective 
with open dialog and 
discussions about “why” 
Relationship trust is built 
on understanding. 
 
Consequences/ 
Learning 
Single-loop learning  
Self-fulfilling  
 
Learning is focused on 
better implementing 
procedures 
Increased likelihood of 
single-loop learning and 
fixation on low-risk 
internally focused tactics 
and decisions 
Learns that Risk ≠ Gain 
 
Increased likelihood 
of double-loop 
learning. 
Learning is focused on 
communication, trust, 
and relationships 
Increased likelihood of 
double-loop learning to 
innovate to solve 
complex problems 
Learns that Risk = Gain 
 
Consequence/ 
Self 
Individuals seek to 
minimize losing and 
maximize winning 
Individuals seek 
assurance/security of 
reputation through strict 
application of processes 
and procedures  
Individuals are 
minimally defensive 
in protecting 
reputation and will 
seek understanding 
of issues 
Individuals are more 
likely to seek and accept 
personal risk of 
reputation for 
organizational goals 
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Understanding what type of organizational learning system MCTOG mostly resembles 
shed light on what has been, thus far, an unsuccessful struggle to implement its campaign plan. 
The Model II organizational learning system is dependent upon a workplace culture that 
encourages staff members at all levels of the organization to share ideas and insights. Perhaps 
that is the nature of a workplace culture where the adoption of Mw and the MCTOG campaign 
plan falls short (Eisenberg et al., 2018; Frost et al., 1985; Örtenblad, 2004; Whiteley et al., 2013). 
Using ToA as the lens to view this problem would help explain whether the norms, assumptions, 
governing variables, and actions strategies within MCTOG are indicative of a Model I or Model 
II organization. It will also shed light on MCTOG’s difficulty to execute their campaign plan and 
reinvigorate Mw. 
The literature review was wide-ranging, with five separate steams considered, and did 
provide a perspective from several angles to better illuminate the multi-faceted problem of 
reinvigorating Mw. The literature review further helped to design the research method to best 
answer the presented research question. 
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III RESEARCH METHOD 
MCTOG is a complex and dynamic organization, and therefore choosing the appropriate 
research method was paramount to an effective study. The research approach needed to be 
pragmatic, flexible in nature, and capable of providing comprehensive in-depth understanding of 
how things actually work in the real world. A case study method would ensure a tightly bounded 
and engaged academic scholarship welcoming of diverse disciplines across all organizational 
levels. Argyris and Schön’s (1974) recommended approach to ToA was one of joint inquiry, 
meaning the researcher becomes a participant observer, and therefore the research encounter is 
one of “engaged” scholarship (Mathiassen & Sandberg, 2013; Van de Ven, 2007). This research 
seeks to co-produce knowledge and enhance learning effectiveness with practitioners, 
specifically the Commanding Officer of MCTOG.  
III.1 Selecting the Case Study Approach 
A case study is a methodological approach that allows for in-depth, multi-faceted explorations of 
complex phenomena in their natural settings. This study employed Argyris and Schön’s (Argyris 
& Schön, 1974; O’Connor & Kotze, 2008; Salner, 1999) ToA to explore how and why an 
organizational learning system impacted MCTOG’s ability to effectuate the strategic initiative to 
reinvigorate Mw via the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 (MCTOG, 2018b). To answer the 
research question, I deployed a cross-sectional, single case study method for the following 
reasons. First, this study was an empirical and exploratory effort to answer “how” and “why” 
questions about a “contemporary, complex social phenomenon situated in real life” (Yin, 2009, 
p. 13). Second, the study sought to provide an “analysis of a bounded phenomenon” (Merriam, 
1998, p. xiii): the reinvigoration of Mw in MCTOG. Third, the six case study approaches to 
gathering data, “analyzing documents, interviews, direct observations, participant observation 
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and physical artifacts” (Yazan, 2015, p. 149; Yin, 2009) would provide a thorough understanding 
of the problem allowing the research to be full of thick, rich descriptive data and provide internal 
validity through triangulation among the individuals, the levels within the organization, and my 
interpretation of the data (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009). 
III.2 Building the MCTOG Theoretical Framework 
As an interpretive single case study, I built the conceptual model as data was collected (Yin, 
2009). The broad structural concept of the MCTOG theoretical framework (see Fig. 5) was 
drawn from the work of Argyris and Schön (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Argyris, 2000; 
Argyris, 2003). The key elements in the framework are espoused theory, theory-in-use, 
assumptions, norms, governing variables, action strategies, and consequences for learning. In 
keeping with Dubin’s (1969) theory-building approach, the specifics within the units of analysis 
were based on my observations of the real world. The MCTOG theoretical framework was 
inferred from the study’s secondary and primary data. The MCTOG Campaign Plan established 
the organization’s espoused theory, the TECOM workshops, and the internal MCTOG staff 
survey (MCTOG, 2019b; TECOM, 2016, 2018), which helped initially define the governing 
variables as Marine Corps values, both bureaucratic and Mw. Action strategies and consequences 
for learning were uncovered from the primary data created from the field work. For additional 
investigation in the role of assumptions and norms in learning, I turned to the works of Edgar 
Schein (1984). Schein’s (1984) approach was to dig deeper than the surface artifacts to uncover 
the underlying assumptions and norms of the organization, “if we are to decipher a given 
organization’s culture [assumptions norms] derived from a dynamic model of learning and 
group dynamics, we must use a complex interview, observation and joint inquiry approach to 
uncover the unconscious assumptions that are hypothesized to be the essence of the culture 
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[norms]” (p. 14).  
A single case study design analyzes an organizations’ practices by examining the actual 
practices of the faculty and staff members who comprise the organization (Creswell & Poth, 
2018; Yazan, 2015; Yin, 2009). For this study, MCTOG served as the single case, and the 
organization’s faculty and staff members served as the multiple subunits at the individual, group, 
and intergroup levels. As the engaged researcher, I wanted to understand each participating 
faculty and staff member at each level of interaction: as individuals, as members of homogenous 
groups (uniformed service members or government service employees), and as members of 
intergroups (MCTOG Core Design Team), in order to better perceive the entire organization’s 
learning system. This multi-level approach was intended to avoid an error inherent in single-case 
study design addressed by Yin (2009)—simply put, ‘not seeing the forest for the trees.’ This 
error occurs when researchers solely characterize the organization using individual-level data 
and neglect to aggregate the data of the groups and intergroups to best explain the case of the 
organization as a whole (Yin, 2009). 
 MCTOG and a ToA Theoretical Framework: Theories in use are complex. If all 
behavior were to be accounted for, the complexity would be overwhelming (Argyris & Schön, 
1974, p. 7). Using ToA as the primary theoretical framework serves to both model and simplify 
the complexity of the MCTOG case study and capture data to indicate the impacts of the theory-
in-use consequences on learning, relationships, and self and to influence either single-loop or 
double-loop learning. The framework also helps diagram the interplay between governing 
variables and the action strategies employed to hold one governing value within tolerance, 
perhaps at the expense of other governing variables. This should give us insight into the 
congruency or incongruency of the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. 
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To better illustrate MCTOG’s use of espoused theory and theory-in-use, Fig. 5 presents 
an adaptation of Argyris and Schön’s (1974) ToA that captures norms, assumptions, governing 
variables, and action strategies inferred from primary and secondary data and in the context of 
MCTOG’s campaign plan as the espoused value. While single-loop and double-loop learning do 
not happen simultaneously, both are depicted in this framework for simplicity. 
Figure 5: MCTOG ToA Theoretical Framework 
 
Governing Marine Corps Variable: The Marine Corps’ core values of “honor, courage, 
commitment” and “every Marine a rifleman” (Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F, 
1960; Terriff, 2007b) are woven into the ethos of the Marine Corps from recruit training (boot 
camp) and officer candidate school (OCS). Every Marine is thoroughly indoctrinated into a 
hierarchical organization that values and rewards behavior that conforms to norms, is 
instantaneously obedient, and respects rank. USMC values are captured in artifacts, such as 
doctrinal publications, customs and traditions, and throughout the training and education 
continuum. Ritualistic of rites of passage, such as the Crucible and The Basic School, reinforce 
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the Corps’ values and anchor these desired behaviors in a Marine Corps history replete with acts 
of valor, toughness, obedience, and glorifying sacrifice to accomplish a task (Holmes-Eber, 
2014a; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F, 1960; Terriff, 2007b). To sum up this description as an 
expression I inferred from the data: Task Focus + Obedience = Success + Promotion. 
Governing Bureaucratic Variable: Values that reinforce hierarchical authority drive 
task specialization that favor formal procedures, rules, and roles and are impersonal and designed 
for optimal management and administration of an organization. Bureaucracies tend to reward 
technocrats, those that are best positioned through specialization qualifications (special 
certifications, program skills), and those that also have the political skills necessary to compete 
for resources within the organization. To sum up this description in an expression I inferred from 
the data: Technical Competence + Political Skill = Success + Promotion. 
Governing Maneuver Warfare Variable: Values embedded into Marines’ training and 
education continuum through doctrine and curricula create a culture that rewards an individual 
for initiative; a bold bias for action built on trust, communication, decentralized execution, and 
opportunity; and taking risks to achieve the desired intent. To sum up this description in an 
expression I inferred from the data: Intent Focus + Initiative + Risk Taking = Success + 
Promotion. 
Internal Consistency: Governing variables have an acceptable range of behavior that 
exists when there is no self-contradiction, referred to as internal consistency (Argyris & Schön, 
1974). If in an action strategy calls for one or more of the governing variables to fall out of 
tolerance, then there is internal inconsistency. For example, the governing variable maneuver 
warfare, which promotes bias for action and initiative, may be in tension with the bureaucratic 
governing variable that values and promotes process and procedure. If a theory-in-use employed 
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by an actor can keep those two governing variables in tolerance, then there is internal 
consistency. If one falls out of tolerance to accommodate the other, then there is internal 
inconsistency (Argyris & Schön, 1974). 
III.3 Organizing Data Collection 
Understanding the Research Setting: The United States Marine Corps is an 187,000 
strong, globally distributed organization. To focus this study, I narrowed the research setting to 
the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). MCTOG is a formal school within 
the USMC training and education continuum providing advanced individual training to 
designated operations and intelligence personnel within the Ground Combat Element (GCE) and 
provide advanced collective training to operational units within the GCE. MCTOG is also the 
GCE Center of Excellence (COE), with the responsibility of leading GCE doctrine development 
and examining emerging concepts and technology to enhance GCE operational readiness 
(MCTOG, 2018b). Focusing on the GCE is important because, while the entirety of the Marine 
Corps, including aviation, logistics, and supporting establishment organizations, in principle 
operates under the Mw doctrine, the execution of the Mw doctrine at a level approaching 
espoused theory is most critical to the GCE that will actively seek close combat decisive 
engagements with the enemy in the FOE.  
Participant Screening: Participant screening focused on those personnel assigned as 
faculty or staff at MCTOG and who had participated in the design, implementation, and delivery 
of instruction or who were members of the Core Design Team (CDT) for implementing the 
MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028. Eliminated from participation in this study were 
government contractors who were not eligible due to the lengthy 4-5 months-long approval 
process required by the Human Research Protection Program Office, which would delay the 
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study beyond the period of time the CDT would be in session. This was not a detriment to the 
study, as contractors by law cannot make decisions for the government (US military) and are 
much more transient than GS or uniformed members. I specifically sought to recruit a holistic 
representation of MCTOG personnel to include uniformed military and government service 
employees. Of the uniformed military, I again sought a balanced representation between officers 
and enlisted Marines, and a cross section of occupational specialties with operations, 
intelligence, and aviation representation. Additionally, these participants had previously come to 
MCTOG from either the supporting establishment or various elements of the operating forces, 
thereby providing an indirect cross section of the Marine Corps. The participants were a mix 
between the more senior members of MCTOG, considered prime movers, who held leadership 
and decision-making roles and those with less time and influence at MCTOG but who filled 
important roles in executing the MCTOG mission. 
Participant Recruitment: I recruited a total of 14 volunteers for this study: 10 
uniformed military members and four government service employees spread across faculty and 
staff positions. Given the in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group-guided discussions, 
observation of the MCTOG working groups’ internal interactions, and interactions with the 
commander, I assessed that this number of participants was adequate to produce rich, reliable 
data for analysis. The uniformed military participants ranged in rank from E-7 Gunnery Sergeant 
to O-5 Lieutenant Colonel, and the four government service employees ranged in grade from 
GS-11 to GS-14. All participants were briefed on the purpose of the study and signed an 
informed consent form acknowledging their volunteer status, their expectation of confidentiality, 
and that there would be no compensation for participation. It is important to note that all 
participants seemed eager to engage in this academic study, and all were very cooperative and 
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generous with their time. Extraordinary care was taken during recruitment to avoid any 
appearance of command influence. Additionally, to avoid any optics that may influence a 
volunteer participant, I did not use my retired rank as a Marine colonel and ensured that all 
recruitment materials, emails, and scripts identified me as Mr. McCoy, a doctoral student in 
pursuit of my own academic objectives. 
The uniformed military member population had been exposed to Mw doctrine during 
compulsory entry- and career-level training and education and have presumably practiced Mw in 
operational settings, including combat. A Marine from the faculty typically has 12–16 years of 
service and is responsible for teaching tactics and operations in the context of Mw. Per the 
MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028, each faculty and staff member had a role in co-developing 
curricula to meet the rising conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats of the 
FOE and to effectuate the goals of MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 and the MOC (MCTOG, 
2018b; USMC, 2016b, 2016a). 
The government service (GS) employees varied in years of GS experience, and all had 
previous military experience. The GS participants held government service ratings ranging from 
GS 11–14 and will be roughly equivalent to their military counterpart participants in terms of 
rank. The GS population is responsible for co-developing curricula in support of Campaign Plan 
2017–2027 to meet the rising conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats of 
the FOE and to effectuate the goals of MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028. 
III.4 Collecting the Data 
In studying espoused theory versus theory-in-use, it is critical to compare what a subject 
professes in interviews with what behavior actually occurs at the individual, group, intergroup, 
and organizational levels (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). Primary data was collected 
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during a four-week-long field work period via in-depth, semi-structured one-on-one interviews 
with MCTOG faculty and staff participants. During these interviews, I was able to establish 
espoused theories at the individual level. I followed up the individual interviews with three 
separate homogenous focus group sessions to create the opportunity to observe any differences 
and tensions between individual espoused theories from the one-on-one interviews and theories-
in-use that may emerge at the group level. Two focus groups consisted of uniformed military 
only. Due to the number of participants in this group I broke this group into two sessions to 
better accommodate participation with a smaller number of participants per session. The 
participants for these two sessions self-organized by their schedule availability for one group of 
six and one group of three. One uniformed participant was unavailable the group session due to a 
scheduling conflict. The third focus group session consisted of GS employees only. Due to 
scheduling availability, only three of the four GS participants were involved in the focus group 
session. 
The in-situ observation of the MCTOG CDT provided me an opportunity to observe 
actual behavior (theories-in-use) for congruency with individual espoused theories at the 
intergroup level as well as to observe the consequences of the various action strategies on 
learning and relationships (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1991). Finally, observing in situ the 
MCTOG CDT interacting with the MCTOG senior management for the final outbrief provided 
the opportunity to observe all the above at the organizational level. Observing in situ interaction 
at various levels provided a vantage point to identify elements of the theories-in-use and their 
associated consequences for learning and the relationship to self and others to determine which 
actions are and are not conducive to organizational learning at MCTOG. 
Interviews and Focus Groups: The interviews and focus groups were semi-structured 
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and discovery-oriented and employed interview and focus group protocols approved by the 
separate institutional review boards for Georgia State University and Training and Education 
Command (TECOM). Interview and focus group questions were aimed at establishing a baseline 
of each participant’s understanding of Mw and the campaign plan and then discussing 
organizational learning concepts as they applied to MCTOG executing the campaign plan. To 
gather norms, assumptions and action strategies, how people communicate, and how conflict is 
resolved, the interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim using 
TEMI, an online transcription service with 90-95% accuracy. I then manually proofed each 
transcript while listening to the audio to ensure the accuracy of the transcription. Following each 
interview, I recorded my reflections in a contact summary report (Miles et al., 2014), added 
explanations for acronyms, and noted shifts in the tone of voice and nonverbal communication. 
The participants were asked a series of questions regarding their understanding of Mw in 
practice and what the espoused theory should look like in action. I also plumbed the participants' 
attitudes, assumptions, and perceived norms regarding working at MCTOG as it pertains to a 
learning environment. During the interviews, I wanted to explore the role of culture regarding 
governing values by asking questions that would illuminate Schein's (1984) levels of culture—
artifacts and creations, values, and basic assumptions—and how those might interact to impact 
learning. 
I followed up on the interviews and focus group sessions with in situ direct and 
participant observations of MCTOG CDT sessions, interactions in a leadership offsite session, 
and the final out briefing of the final town hall meeting where the commander announced the 
results of the CDT. These observations provided an opportunity to compare what was espoused 
in the interviews and focus group sessions with the observed behavior and action strategies put 
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into play during interactions at the intergroup and organizational levels. Specifically, I sought to 
observe how the participants responded to criticisms, differing views, perceived challenges, and 
the participant networks that form positive or negative consequences for learning and 
relationships. 
Data collection occurred in three stages: establishing the espoused theory, data collection 
from interviews and focus groups, and data collection from the CDT. Stage 1 consisted of two 
steps and was intent on establishing espoused theory. Stage 1, Step 1 was the initial data 
collection and analysis of secondary data from documents to establish the espoused theory at the 
organizational level. Stage 1, Step 2 collected primary data from the interviews to establish the 
espoused theory at the individual level. Stage 2 collected primary data at the homogenous group 
level with the focus group sessions (all uniformed military or all GS). Stage 3 collected data 
from direct and participant observations and was intended to collect data on intergroup and 
organizational behaviors. Stage 3, Step 1 collected primary data via a participant observer of the 
CDT, a MCTOG Leadership Offsite at the heterogeneous groups level. State 3, Step 2 collected 
data via direct observation of organizational behavior. Each stage and step are detailed below. 
 Stage 1: Initial Data Collection and Analysis: The initial data collection and analysis 
consisted of two steps: establishing the espoused theory and analyzing MCTOG written artifacts. 
I collected and analyzed extant secondary data in the form of documents internal to MCTOG, 
including organizational goal documents, curricula, guidance, organizational charts, working 
group charters, and policy memoranda and artifacts. I also collected data external to MCTOG but 
central to the study, such as Marine Corps documents on doctrine, directives concerning Mw, 
and the TECOM workshops to reinvigorate Mw. Together, these documents, once analyzed, 
served as important artifacts (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009) and provided an understanding of the 
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espoused theory of the organization (Schein, 1984, 2017). I assessed the quality of the 
documents and archival data according to four criteria: authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning (Merriam, 1998; Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2009). The documents 
and artifacts helped triangulate the primary data collected from interviews, focus groups, and 
direct observations and participant observations. 
The interviews produced the bulk of the primary data to determine espoused values at the 
individual level for this study. I conducted one-on-one, semi-structured interviews of 10 
uniformed military personnel and four government service employees that amounted to 19 hours 
and 29 minutes of digital audio recordings. The questions, per the interview protocol, were 
intended to spark deep narratives from each participant that, when woven together, gave shape to 
the experience composite at MCTOG and insight into the organizational learning system and 
how that system impacted the campaign plan implementation (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 
1996). The interview questions were open-ended and designed to uncover the unit of analysis 
beyond individual norms, assumptions, and governing values. Semi-structured interviews gave 
me the flexibility to redirect questions or probe into previously given answers. The interview 
protocol was designed to establish validity (Yin, 2009) and is noted in Appendix A, and the 
composite narrative is noted in Table 5. 
 Stage 2: Focus Groups Primary Data: The focus group sessions occurred with 12 of 
the 14 participants and produced five hours of digital audio recordings. The sessions produced 
the primary data used to determine the espoused values and action strategies at the group level 
and detect any movement in individual espoused values in a group setting. This stage consisted 
of establishing three focus groups, two consisting of uniformed military participants and the 
other consisting of GS employee participants. Each focus group participated in a discussion I 
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guided to determine how people interact within the MCTOG organization and how learning 
takes place. The data collected here were analyzed to gain an understanding of both the espoused 
values of each homogenous group (uniformed military members and GS employees) and to 
observe and detect governing values and action strategies by individuals (Argyris & Schön, 
1974, 1978, 1996). The focus group protocols for GS employees and uniformed military are 
provided in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. 
 Stage 3: Participant Observation and Direct Observation: Myers (2009) made the 
distinction between observation, “watching from the outside and taking no part in the activities,” 
and participant observation, where the researcher not only observes but also interacts with the 
participants in an effort to understand what is happing from the inside. “Participant observation 
in-situ… where they are… will allow both intimate observation of parts of their behavior and 
reporting it in ways useful to social science” (Myers, 2013, p. 137). Per the research protocol, I 
did not use my rank of colonel; however, due to being known professionally by the participants 
and my previous involvement in the 2018 leadership offsite, I assessed that any attempt I made at 
being a pure observer in the background, taking no part in the activities of the working groups, 
would present to the participants as inauthentic and would likely dampen discussions. The 
approach of participant observer was more organic and allowed for deeper discussions and 
connections (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). 
In addition to the individual interviews and focus group sessions, the time period for the 
field work, running from May 20, 2019 to June 18, 2019, presented several opportunities to 
conduct direct and participant observation at all levels: individual, group, intergroup, and 
organization. Specifically, intergroup and organizational levels were observed during the Core 
Design Team workshops, the Building Citizenship and Care Leadership Offsite (Part II), and the 
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MCTOG Town Hall curriculum decision announcement.  
 Participant Observation: Core Design Team (CDT): Of the 14 total participants, eight 
were members of the CDT and met for three to four hours a day on May 21, 22, 23, 30, and 31, 
2019 (MCTOG, 2019a). I attended these sessions as a participant observer and recorded by field 
note (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002) over 17 hours of interaction and discussion. The CDT met to 
discuss the future of the curricula and pedagogy for the two main instructional courses offered by 
MCTOG. The intended outcome of the CDT was to merge the separate curricula redesign efforts 
from sub-working groups and a red team to create a continuous, integrated learning environment 
through an intentional design process that will accelerate learning, enable the intellectual 
advantage, and create the Learning and Maneuver Warfare Center for the GCE. Additionally, the 
CDT sought to develop a master narrative intended to knit together the learning outcomes for the 
various courses in the curricula (MCTOG, 2019a). These meetings involved roughly two dozen 
members from across MCTOG (officer, enlisted, and GS) on a rotating basis, with every day 
resulting in a different mix of attendees. This provided a venue for observing intergroup behavior 
in discussing the campaign plan and curricula changes. 
 Participant Observation: Leadership Offsite: Of the 14 participants, six had attended 
the December 2018 Campaign Plan Discussion Leadership Offsite, a two-and-a-half-day event 
that took place at San Diego State University. While this event preceded this study, it was 
discussed during the interviews and focus group sessions and provided keen insight into 
individual and group approaches to executing, or rather not executing, the campaign plan. I 
attended and presented at this conference as a member of MCTOG and had first-hand 
observations from its conduct. The sequel to that event was the 2019 Building Citizenship and 
Care Leadership Offsite (Part II). This event was observed as part of this study as well, and I 
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took on the participant observer role once again. The attendance of the latter event involved 
roughly 40 members of MCTOG, with 12 of the 14 participants of this study in attendance. This 
event was held at the Community Center aboard Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms 
California over the course of a single afternoon on June 10, 2019. While short in duration, this 
venue provided valuable insight into group, sub-group, and organizational behavior in wide-
ranging discussions covering curricula and the identity of MCTOG. 
 Direct Observation: Town Hall Decision Announcement: The town hall event took 
place June 18, 2019, which was the final day of my field work period. This was an “all hands” 
event requiring the attendance of all MCTOG personnel; therefore, all study participants 
attended. The goal of the town hall meeting was for the Commanding Officer to announce the 
curricula decisions from the CDT workshops. The town hall was held aboard the MCTOG 
compound and lasted approximately 30 minutes, with a quick brief by the Commanding Officer 
and a short question and answer period. This venue also provided insight into individual, group, 
sub-group, and organizational behavior. I was strictly an observer for this event. 
These three venues provided opportunities to observe how the mixed working groups 
interact at the intergroup level (uniformed and GS) and at the individual level when briefing the 
person with the most authority, namely the Commanding Officer of MCTOG.  
Capturing the Nonverbal Communication: The participant observer approach was 
useful in allowing me to examine nonverbal communication, especially if there was a 
discrepancy between a verbal declaration accompanied by a nonverbal contradictory cue. 
Nonverbal communication is typically sent with intent (consciously or unconsciously) and used 
with regularity among members of a social community are generally interpreted as intentional 
(Argyle, 1990; Mandal, 2014). During my prior military service, I was trained in Human 
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Behavior Pattern Recognition and Analysis (HBPR&A). HBPR&A training provided 
observational skills to sense, make sense of, and establish a baseline of behavior in operational 
settings involving groups of people. The HBPR&A training enables one to detect behavioral 
anomalies that fall above or below a baseline. This training was invaluable reading on the 
nonverbal behavior of the organized working groups and briefings.  
In HBPR&A, nonverbal communications are classified into six categories: proxemics, the 
push or pull effect of one person on another person or group that signal affiliations or rivalries; 
geographics, where people tend to anchor themselves in a social setting to establish security, 
dominance, or affiliation; heuristics, a prototypical match used by a person as a shortcut in 
assessing a situation, such as another’s viewpoint or position, which is a tell for displaying one’s 
assumptions about the self and others; biometrics, which are tell-tale biological responses to 
stress, anger, and anxiety that are impossible to mask, like the reddish skin tone from a histamine 
flush; atmospherics, the environmental cues or feel of the room as being an enjoyable or 
contested space; and kinesics, body language cues that betray underlying emotions and thoughts 
regardless of verbal communication. 
Utilizing participant observation, direct observation techniques (DeWalt & DeWalt, 
2002), and HBPR&A training (Argyle, 1990; Mandal, 2014), I was able to observe and detect a 
range of behaviors at the individual, group, intergroup, and organizational levels that provided 
the opportunity to detect congruence or incongruence between the espoused theory and theories-
in-use and to observe the consequences to learning, relationship with self and others, and the 
total sum impact on organizational performance. 
III.5 Analyzing the Data and Addressing Bias 
The qualitative data analysis approach will be the double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1993; Myers, 
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2013). There are four reasons for this choice. First, the double hermeneutic enables a deep 
understanding of people in organizational settings and provides an approach to human 
understanding with a philosophical grounding for interpretivism (Myers, 2013). Second, in the 
double hermeneutics approach, the researcher studies the organization from the inside and must 
speak the language (Myers, 2000) and, in this case, understand the undercurrents of culture at the 
macro (USMC) and micro (MCOTG) levels. Third, all qualitative research from an interpretive 
perspective is subject to prejudiced opinion. In an attempt at full transparency, I acknowledge 
that my nearly three decades as a US Marine and possessing deep familiarity with MCTOG as a 
member of the organization and as a major contributor to the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–
2028 could introduce bias into my data interpretations. As Klein and Myer (1999) explained, 
“hermeneutics recognizes that prejudice is the necessary starting point of our understanding” 
(Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 76). “The critical task of hermeneutics then becomes one of 
distinguishing between true prejudices, by which we understand, and false prejudices, by which 
we misunderstand” (Gadamer & Linge, 1976, p. 124). From a hermeneutics perspective, my 
previous experiences cannot be ignored and are best addressed with frank transparency. On the 
one hand, I must acknowledge and account for a level of conscience and unconscienced bias. On 
the other hand, my experience and exposure to the subject of Mw, the attempt to reinvigorate it, 
and my affinity for and loyalty to the Marine Corps and MCTOG provided the impetus for this 
study. With mitigating measures in place, my experience combined with academic rigor and 
research skills will lend a valuable perspective in making sense of what happened during the 
studied events and field work interviews. The fourth reason to employ hermeneutics is the 
prominent role of culture within the Marine Corps (Brown, 2018; Holmes-Eber, 2014c; TECOM, 
2016; Terriff, 2006c). At MCTOG, hermeneutic philosophy was useful in interpreting the 
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cultural context to discover the meanings behind actions and dialogue (Frost et al., 1985) that 
affect the MCTOG organizational learning system at the individual, group, intergroup, and 
organizational levels.  
Memos, Codes, and NVivo: Due to the large number of interviews and observations, 
procedural and analytical memo keeping was used to inform the bottom up approach. Documents 
and transcripts from secondary and primary data were uploaded into NVivo 12, a qualitative data 
analysis software tool for organizing, categorizing, and coding data captured from artifacts, 
interviews, focus group transcripts, and field notes (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). While this 
software was very helpful for storing, sorting, coding, and developing themes, it was only a tool. 
The interpretive approach to this qualitative study demanded manual analysis to sift through and 
obtain the subtext nuances of pauses and inflections and emotional and kinesthetic emphasis 
used to amplify speech during an observation encounter. 
The data analysis was a continuous and cyclical process. As data were collected, a 
preliminary analysis was conducted on the archival documents, transcribed digital audio 
recorded interviews, and focus group discussions, as well as the field notes taken during direct 
observation and participant observation of working groups at the offsite and town hall meetings 
and briefings. This study was exploratory in nature, so I employed a bottom up data analysis and 
allowed the concepts to emerge from a continued analysis of the data as it was collected and 
analyzed for further coding of keywords and phrases. According to Miles and Huberman (2014), 
“codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 56). My approach to the first coding cycle was a 
blend of conceptual coding to describe and summarize the data collected in terms of ToA (Miles 
et al., 2014; Saldaña, 2013). I also employed thematic coding and identified the thematic 
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contours of the qualitative data to capture the richness of MCTOG as a dynamic organization. 
The first coding cycle produced 14 parent nodes and 74 child nodes. From the first coding cycle, 
the story of the failed implementation of the campaign play began to take shape. The second 
coding cycle was conceptional and focused on answering the research question and identifying 
where MCTOG attempted to engage in Model II double-loop learning system behaviors and 
Model I single-loop learning system behaviors and the impacts of those behaviors on the 
implementation of the campaign plan. 
After every contact with the participants, I prepared a contact summary report to capture 
the atmospherics (tone, mood, nonverbal communication) from each contact and to refine future 
follow-up questions in the interview and focus group protocols and to discover emergent themes. 
III.6 Sharing the Research in Real Time 
Congruent with engaged scholarship and the co-production of knowledge (Van de Ven, 2007), at 
the conclusion of the data collection, I periodically conducted updates in the form of analytical 
memos with the Commanding Officer of MCTOG, the most senior uniformed service member 
who was not a participant in the study, but who collaborated with me to focus the study. 
Additionally, I conducted a final debriefing with both the Commanding Officer and the top GS in 
the organization, the Deputy of MCTOG, who was a participant in the study. The debriefing 
covered all aspects of the study to include the case results and discussion items—particularly 
those that bore implications for practice. 
The debriefing was another element to check on observer bias, as it provided the 
opportunity for questions from senior members of MCTOG and to challenge the case results, 
conclusions, and recommendations. Questions asked during the debriefings were focused on 
expanding understanding of the discoveries detailed in the results section of this study and 
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discussing potential remedies. While there were no objections to the findings, there was a very 
productive discussion on what to do with the findings. Additionally, having a senior 
representative from both uniformed service members and GS members provided a valuable 
opportunity to communicate the findings to those capable of making systemic changes to the 
organization. 
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IV CASE RESULTS 
The fieldwork for this study yielded a daunting amount of unstructured data harvested from 14 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, three focus groups, and field notes created from 21 hours of 
participant observations from group meetings and briefings. The method, combined with my 
roles within the organization as an employee, retired Marine colonel, and as a researcher, 
afforded a unique opportunity to study this organization as it implemented the campaign plan. 
This approach gave me a multi-faceted vantage point from which to observe an organization 
from both near and afar. From this vantage point and with tools and skills provided by academic 
rigor, I was able to unearth and make sense of explanatory frames throughout this case; those 
that would have eluded me in the past. 
MCTOG was typically organized in a pyramidical hierarchy with lines of authority, roles, 
and responsibilities cleanly depicted in a line and block hierarchical graphic (MCTOG, 2017). 
MCTOG was well-led by experienced, intelligent, and earnest active-duty Marines and GS 
employees. The Commanding Officer’s intent and guidance were clear and issued in writing and 
verbally disseminated. The leadership created and maintained a positive command climate; 
people wanted to be there (MCTOG, 2019b). MCTOG was primarily staffed by a roughly 150-
strong intelligent, dedicated, and experienced hybrid workforce consisting of both active military 
and GS employees. The organization was not unwieldy, being neither large nor widely 
distributed and inhabiting a compound of less than one acre. The usual suspects contributing to a 
dysfunctional organization, including poor leadership and climate, improper organization, a 
workforce that is not up to the task, or an unwieldy size or being too widely distributed, were all 
absent. With so many positive aspects to the organization and so few of the negatives associated 
with a dysfunctional organization, why did the campaign plan implementation and realization of 
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the vision fail? Seeking to understand this phenomenon was the inspiration for this study. 
The data unearthed five phenomena operating within MCTOG that provide an 
explanatory framework (Figure 6) for answering the research question: “Why was it difficult for 
the Marine Corps to implement the strategic initiative of Mw despite 30 years of training and 
education efforts to do so?”  The power of the explanatory frames is that they provide a structure 
and lexicon to a set of unstructured, often hidden, and nameless dynamics at work within an 
organization.  This framework provides ‘name it to tame it’ mechanism necessary for managers 
to make sense of a complex and dynamic situation. As a result, managers are more likely to 
actualize their strategic pursuits.  
Figure 6: The Five Explanatory Frames 
 
The five explanatory frames are: 1) “Uncertainty in a hybrid organization.” 2) “Mw 
functional illiteracy.” 3) “The campaign plan gets a damn good ignoring.” 4) “Lions living as 
lambs.” 5) “Sub rosa clan control to maintain the status quo.” 
These five explanatory frames describe and explain the complex and nuanced behavior of 
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MCTOG’s members that ultimately placed the bureaucratic governing variable at odds, and 
incompatible with the USMC and Mw governing variables. The behavior observed within the 
bureaucratic variable was a form of careerism that ran afoul of the traditionally held Marine 
Corps ethos of "honor, courage, and commitment” (Holmes-Eber, 2014b; Johnson, 2018). 
 Finally, the five explanatory frames revealed how a sub rosa clan operating within 
MCTOG’s formal hierarchical structure to effectively countered MCTOG senior management’s 
attempts to create a Model II, double-loop environment and implement a strategic initiative in 
the form of the campaign plan (Chua et al., 2012; Ouchi, 1980). The result of this complex 
interplay was that MCTOG’s attempted intervention to implement the campaign plan and 
accomplish the mandate of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to reinvigorate Mw, ultimately 
fell short of its goal. 
The five explanatory frames presented in this chapter provide the warp and weft of a 
storyline that examines one organization’s attempt to adopt a new espoused theory in the form of 
the campaign plan. Running throughout this storyline is a fil de guidage rouge5, provided by the 
salient elements of ToA, which are espoused theory, theory-in-use, Model I and Model II 
organizational behaviors, governing variables, and single-loop and double-loop organizational 
learning. Together, the explanatory framework set against the theoretical ToA framework serves 
to answer the research question. 
IV.1 Explanatory Frame 1: Uncertainty in a Hybrid Organization 
MCTOG is a novel organization compared to most other Marine Corps organizations. As a 
result, what seems familiar from the outside to incoming uniformed members results in a 
 
5 A red guiding thread running through a story or body of work 
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dislocation of expectations once they were inside the organization. 
“Okay, this place is interesting. I’ve never been to a command that has the 
dynamics of MCTOG. When I first got here, I thought it was the craziest 
command I have ever been to.” (Faculty participant) 
In 13 different interviews, participants referenced MCTOG’s unfamiliar hybrid 
organization 53 times. In many ways, the novelty of MCTOG rendered previous assumptions 
and norms held by the members from their previous experiences obsolete, requiring the 
discovery of new assumptions and norms. The discovery process was idiosyncratic to each 
member, as MCTOG lacked any form of socialization process to onboard new members and 
explicitly established norms, values, and expectations. Without a formal onboarding process, 
discovery took place on the job over the first year of their assignment and through interacting 
with other members. The lack of formal socialization to aid new members in assimilating into the 
unfamiliar structure created ambiguity in MCTOG’s purpose and created mixed messages and 
silos of communication organized around those with the highest rank among middle 
management. 
“You have three lieutenant colonels and a vast preponderance of the leadership 
who all have a different answer of what MCTOG [does], is indicative of the 
problem.” (Faculty participant) 
Explaining the atmospherics of what life at MCTOG was like for the participants 
provides a contextual understanding of how the environment may have contributed to the other 
explanatory frames discovered and that ultimately influenced organizational learning. There 
were three main dynamics forming the atmosphere for life at MCTOG. First was the dynamics 
created by a hybrid workforce of uniformed and GS employees. Second was the effect of many 
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of the uniformed members at a crossroads in their personal and professional lives while trying to 
establish a work–life balance. Third was the sense of uncertainty within the frenetic tempo at 
MCTOG. 
One of the factors making MCTOG a novel organization that seemed alien to the 
uniformed members was how the structure and hierarchy at MCTOG differed from the operating 
force in two important ways. First, MCTOG was staffed with a high concentration of senior 
ranking uniformed members. Second, MCTOG had a significant presence of GS employees, 
which most uniformed members had never worked closely with. 
The high concentration of senior uniformed members was due to the relatively high rank 
of the student population, which created a need for a faculty and staff that is atypically top-heavy 
in grade compared to the structure of the operating forces that is familiar to most Marines. 
MCTOG only had about 90 uniformed faculty and staff, yet the concentration of majors, 
lieutenant colonels, and master sergeants assigned to MCTOG would be equivalent to a typical 
Marine Corps organization five times that size. Such a concentration of seniority appeared to 
blur what usually are very clear lines of hierarchical authority familiar to Marines. 
“You have such a high number of ‘Alpha males,’ majors, lieutenant colonels, a 
colonel, master guns, a ton of master sergeants, it’s very disjointed, everyone is 
going in different directions, a thousand miles an hour, and it wasn’t cohesive.” 
(Faculty participant) 
The high concentration of seniority also added to a level of isolation or “siloing” between small 
sections led by relatively senior Marines. The impact of this concentration on communications 
across the command was referenced 40 times over 11 interviews. 
“So, the three instructors I had…none of them ever talked. They kept to 
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themselves, tried to do their own thing, and there was no crosstalk. No trying to 
help each other out.” (Faculty participant) 
Even in an organization as small and compact as MCTOG, the insulating effect of silos impacted 
even the most basic of relationships, facial recognition. 
“There's people that I know have worked for here for two years, I'm having a 
conversation with them, and someone walks by, and I'm like, who is that? They 
work here; they have a white badge. They have worked here at least six months 
because the badge-maker has been broken for at least that long. But they've 
[actually] worked here two years, and I've never seen that person. To me, that's a 
problem at any organization, especially one this small.” (Faculty participant) 
The other element of novelty about MCTOG was the presence of civilians in the 
command, including the number two position in the organization. Again, to most Marines, this 
was a completely different environment from the operating forces where civilians were not part 
of the workforce. Even though all GS civilians had significant prior military experience, there 
was a tension between the uniformed members and the GS employees. The GS employees 
perceived a lack of respect for their experience prior to and within MCTOG, and the uniformed 
perceived the GS employees to be entrenchment and resistant to change. 
“Yep, so that bridge gets burned, and the lack of communication is sometimes 
deliberate… There are some outstanding Americans here as GS that are 
professional all the time… there others that should have been fired years ago that 
are like a cancer holding this place back.” (Faculty participant) 
GS employees tended to be in the organization much longer than uniformed members. 
For example, two of the four GSs in this study had been at MCTOG for all 10 years of the 
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organization’s existence. This longevity contrasted starkly with the uniformed members, whom 
at most will spend three years, and often less, at MCTOG before heading to their next 
assignment per normal Marine Corps personnel rotation policy. Often, the GS’s tended to feel 
that the uniformed members did not appreciate their experience and that they were not listened to 
when the organization engaged in problem solving. 
"I've seen this problem three times now, and what you want to do just won’t 
work.” (Staff participant) 
Some participants voiced an undercurrent of resentment to the presence of civilians in a Marine 
organization. One GS employee with 20 plus years of service as a Marine, including combat 
tours, described his encounter with a senior enlisted Marine during his first week on the job at 
MCTOG. 
“I tried to have a conversation with a master sergeant, and we talked a little bit, 
and after a couple of days, he was like, ‘why are you here? We don't need 
civilians; we Marines can do our jobs’.” (Staff participant) 
Conversely, some uniformed members saw the GS employees as entrenched and rigid. 
“People are comfortable; there are staff [GS] that have been here for a lot of years that 
have done things a certain way for a lot of years.” (Faculty participant) 
One GS participant expressed knowledge about this perception as well. 
“So, there is a perception, in my opinion, a false perception, you know some people 
have been here so long they need to leave ‘cause [sic] they're stuck in their ways.” 
(Staff participant) 
The novelty of MCTOG as a hybrid, top-heavy organization in and of itself created an 
atmosphere of uncertainty about where one fits in the organization and one’s value to the 
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organization. Such uncertainty may sow the seeds fear and vulnerability, leading to a myriad of 
defensive routines individuals will employ to reduce their exposure to embarrassment. 
At the Crossroads of Life and Career: In addition to the uncertainty that accompanies 
joining an unfamiliar and novel organization, many uniformed members found themselves 
arriving at MCTOG with 10–12 years of service and at a crossroads in their careers. For the first 
time in their careers, many contemplated the decision to either commit to getting to 20 years of 
service to become retirement eligible or to simply resign and start another career in the private 
sector. Adding to the context of life at MCTOG was a sense of tiredness among the uniformed 
members. Many participants had arrived at MCTOG after being in the operating forces for 
several years, where they had completed multiple overseas deployments. Typically, the 
OPTEMPO in the operating forces is incredibly high and exhausting, and many of the instructors 
hadn't taken leave6 for over two years before arriving at MCTOG and being expected to get up to 
speed to instruct quickly. 
“I mean we had a majority of guys [at MCTOG] with 60 plus days of leave on the 
books that are coming off deployments… we had one guy last year, 90 some 
days… and they go right into that [instructing]. So, I think that... some folks just 
have different perspectives here, that kind of gets lost.” (Faculty participant)  
When I asked a different participant about the impact of the operational tempo at MCTOG on the 
faculty and staff the reply was as follows. 
“They've gotten beaten down… some are just tired of being in this profession 
[Marine Corps].” (Faculty participant) 
 
6 An active duty, uniformed member of the military earns 30 days of ‘leave’ or paid time off annually. 
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The other crossroads element encountered is that of finding a work–life balance. 
“One of the problems I see [is] a lot of competing interests for the instructors, 
whether it’s from trying to do their own service level [mandatory] professional 
military education [to remain competitive for promotion], learn aspects at 
MCTOG… you know the whole work, life, family balance.” (Faculty participant) 
Many participants freshly out of the deploying operational forces are seeking to spend more time 
with their families, which in their minds seemed to conflict with personally directed professional 
development necessary to teach at MCTOG. 
“The family/work balance is automatically, again, the first to suffer. But my wife 
also understands that I’m coming home every night for the first time in a decade 
that we’ve been together. So, she’s not terribly upset because I come home and we 
eat dinner as a family and she gets the kids ready for bed and I go upstairs and I 
got a stack of books on my desk I’m trying to read.” (Faculty participant)  
Often times, instructors adopted a passive approach to MCTOG’s passive DIY self-directed 
learning and focused instead on completing their tour and catching up on family time. 
“Hey, am I really going to invest my nights and weekends reading these 
publications when there is no real quality control mechanism? Or am I going to 
make some decisions on, I'm going to work for 12 hours… to accomplish the 
missions I've been given. But some nights and weekends I’m going to spend some 
time with my friends and family because I haven’t seen them in a couple of years?" 
(Faculty participant) 
Uncertainty is a Given Certainty: As previously discussed, the lack of a formal 
onboarding program at MCTOG that could communicate the organization's identity, norms, and 
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values left new members to come to their own conclusions for each. Although questions 
concerning uncertainty were not part of the interview protocol, a general feeling of uncertainty 
due to a lack of direction within MCTOG appeared as a common theme throughout the study, 
with 73 references over 13 interviews and in the two uniformed focus groups. 
“There’s no clear sense of who we are as an organization. What the hell exactly is 
it we’re doing… just this constant nebulous reactive world you live in, where 
nobody really understands what the hell they’re doing or where they fit into it.”  
Specifically, nine interviews produced 43 references pointing to a high OPTEMPO being 
responsible for an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
“But like [participant x] said, that's your primary job on Monday, and then you're 
shifted to a different effort on Tuesday, and then you're doing something 
completely different on Wednesday, so most of us go into pure survival mode.” 
(Faculty participant)  
Adding to the frustration of being “in survival mode” was also the perception that the 
uncertainty and high OPTEMPO was self-generated within MCTOG. 
“I think it is definitely self-inflicted… we do it to ourselves, intentionally and 
unintentionally.” (Staff participant) 
Finally, the lack of socialization through an onboarding process made for a very insular 
or siloed organization where members of one department did not share information with 
members of another department. Worse, even in a small compound with only 150 employees, 
people didn’t know each other. 
Good Things About MCTOG: For all the frustrations vented during the interviews, all 
participants expressed positive sentiments about MCTOG and thought they brought value to the 
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organization. They also expressed that MCTOG was positively assisting the operating forces. 
“I would say 99.9% of the people say they liked being a part of MCTOG. 
There’re some negative comments… but everybody believes that what they do 
here not only makes a difference here at MCTOG but makes a difference across 
the OPFOR [operating forces].” (Staff participant) 
When asked to describe the impact of serving at MCTOG, one participant expressed a sense of 
professional growth stemming from his duty as an instructor. 
“Challenging, rewarding, frustrating… being in the classroom with the students, 
challenging but very rewarding right? That’s how I’m being developed.” (Faculty 
participant)  
The established MCTOG norms and assumptions of uncertainty, exhaustion, high 
operational tempo, and individuals facing personal and professional crossroads all combine to 
provide a rich description of life at MCTOG and provide the atmospheric context to the 
following four explanatory frames. 
IV.2 Explanatory Frame 2: Mw and Functional Illiteracy 
The original phenomenon that inspired this journey was the 37th CMC 's FRAGO-1/2016 call to 
action to reinvigorate Mw. FMFM-1 Warfighting was published in 1989 by then CMC General 
Al Gray and was vigorously implemented throughout the training and education continuum. 
However, some 27 years later and after 15 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 37th 
CMC’s FRAGO-1/2016 indicated dissatisfaction with the emphasis being placed on Mw and 
sought an intervention to revive the cornerstone doctrine necessary for meeting the emerging 
challenges of the 21st century. MCTOG was uniquely positioned to influence the reinvigoration 
of Mw and saw the requirement for its own internal intervention necessary in the form of the 
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campaign plan. But for MCTOG to reinvigorate Mw, its instructors must know the doctrine and 
be able to teach it to the student population at the tacit level.  
Teaching Mw at MCTOG was a Presumed Competency: The data show that among 
the MCTOG faculty and staff, the knowledge and understanding of Mw and commitment to 
teaching the Mw doctrine was an espoused theory only. To examine Mw as an espoused theory, 
the interview protocol employed three questions intended to gauge a participant’s understanding 
of Mw. For example, all participants were asked, “What is maneuver warfare and what does it 
look like in practice?” The answers provided revealed the gap between each participant’s 
espousal that they understand and practice Mw and their actual understanding and ability to 
practice Mw, their theory-in-use. Additionally, during focus group discussions and during 
participant observer sessions, I was able to assess the overall understanding of Mw as a doctrine 
and philosophy from the answers given. While accounting for the fact that participants may be 
caught off guard trying to articulate what may be fairly described as an abstract philosophy, and 
might struggle a bit before getting around articulating the underlying principles and core 
concepts, most never did get around to it. Nine of 14 participants gave rambling explanations of 
Mw that seldom went beyond a few Mw buzzwords. For illustration, the Mw buzzwords are 
bolded in the quotes below. 
“All right, so, maneuver warfare, when I think of it, MCTOG is utilizing ideally 
combined arms to generate some tempo or at least to have the desired effect on 
your enemy. To make him bend to your will. That's – when I think of maneuver 
warfare, that's what comes to mind for me.” (Faculty participant) 
Often, participants struggled to distinguish Mw from attrition warfare. 
“Um, first I’d say what maneuver warfare is to me, it would be, obviously, my 
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definition per se is, is obviously do the most damage to the enemy with the least 
amount of damage to yourself or your unit. When I say that to achieve, to achieve 
which you know, your endstate.” (Faculty participant) 
When pressed for more specific answers to define Mw, participants often conceded they could 
not articulate Mw as a concept in action. 
“I don’t know if we actually define maneuver warfare. It’s just one of those things 
that we just say, oh yeah, maneuver warfare, EABO, MCO [tactical operating 
concepts]. You know we just kind of throw it out there without really defining 
what it means.” (Faculty participant) 
One participant that had professed to be among the few career-long “maneuverists” struggled to 
describe maneuver warfare. 
“It’s one of those nebulous things where it’s – I don’t know, it's a mindset. So that 
would, almost kind of be trying to define what a mindset looks like. And it's one of 
those things where I know it when I see it, but I don't know if I can tell you in 
practice what that actually is going to look like. Well, I don't.” (Staff participant)  
Perhaps some of the difficulty in describing Mw lies in the deficit that exists among the 
MCTOG faculty in the deliberate study and effort necessary to render a tacit understanding of a 
concept into something more explicit for teaching students. This lack of study and understanding 
presented itself in two ways during the interviews. First, when questioned, the instructors that 
struggled with explaining Mw conceded they had not read the doctrine in a long while, some not 
since entry-level training that had occurred over a decade ago. 
“I've read it. It's been a while since I've read it, but I know it defines conflict. It 
defines war, attrition, war of attrition, and maneuver warfare.” (Faculty 
73 
 
participant) 
In response to a follow-up to this question to another faculty member struggling to define Mw, 
“When was the last time you read MCDP-1?” The reply was illuminating. 
“Not [sic], I mean, not since TBS, at TBS7” (Faculty participant) 
 In the preface of the original Mw publication Warfighting FMFM-1 and in the updated 
Mw publication Warfighting MCDP-1, the 29th CMC implored all Marines to “read and 
reread” MCDP-1 Warfighting (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; USMC, 1989, 1997d) saying, 
“This manual, Warfighting, describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the 
field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty” (USMC, 1989, p.1). 
The lack of engagement by MCTOG faculty with the capstone doctrine of the Marine 
Corps is evidence the 37th CMC was correct in his FRAGO-1 call to action to reinvigorate the 
espoused theory of Mw. Furthermore, this is illustrative of the say-do-gap between the espoused 
theory of the campaign plan and the theory in use by MCTOG instructors. The data from this 
study shows that the 37th CMC call to action was well-founded, and the theory in use at MCTOG 
fell well short of the 29th CMC call to “read and reread” the doctrine. 
The second manner in which the lack of study and understanding of Mw presented was 
how several participants confused the principles of Mw with elements of the Marine Corps 
Planning Process (MCPP) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). MCPP and IPB 
are two highly structured and methodical planning and analysis processes closely aligned with 
attrition warfare and the staple tools of staff planning for tactical operations. The following two 
quotes from interviews with instructors speak to the emphasis placed on IPB and MCPP and how 
 
7 TBS is the “The Basic School,” a compulsorily six-month entry-level school for all new Marine officers. 
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they are conflated with Mw, in addition to the confusion between the IPB process and Mw 
philosophy and doctrine8. 
“Maneuver warfare practice I would say in today’s Corps is understanding the 
battlefield, understanding your organization’s capabilities, and as important if 
not more, is understanding the enemy in order to manipulate the terrain, whether 
it, whatever domain it may be in.” (Faculty participant) 
“So, maneuver warfare in my words, I guess, is the evaluation of an adversary, 
understanding them as a system and then being able to creatively plan for and 
adaptively apply our capabilities in order to unwind theirs to unhinge their 
ability to actually fight on the battlefield.” (Faculty participant) 
As a former tactics instructor, operations officer, and commander of an infantry battalion 
for two combat tours in Iraq, I can attest that these statements are not fundamentally wrong. 
Understanding the enemy is, of course, always a good thing, as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz 
would agree (Charles & Tzu, 2012; Howard, 1998). However, the descriptions offered do reveal 
a lack of understanding of the differences between Mw and the Marine Corps’ standard, linear 
planning processes. Further evidence of conflating the planning processes with Mw doctrine was 
the superficial sprinkling in of Mw terms such as “reconnaissance-pull” and “enemy 
vulnerability” when trying to define Mw.  
“I mean, for me, I'd say maneuver warfare is understanding your environment, 
understanding the adversary. You know, I kind of see it as a recon pull thing. So 
you use a little bit of understanding the enemy as a system and then going to see, 
 
8 Bolded words are for effect and to identify Mw vernacular.  
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you know, where the adversary is vulnerable. And then from there supporting 
that, their vulnerability. It's not just straight-up attrition warfare to where you 
just – I've got more tanks than you, and we just keep going.” (Faculty participant) 
The above quotes are emblematic of the claim by some members of MCTOG that many 
other members were simply “cocktail party dangerous” when it came to truly understanding and 
teaching Mw. In a focus group of uniformed participants discussing the level of Mw proficiency 
among instructors at MCTOG, they arrived at the following consensus summed up by one of the 
participants: 
“I think 40% of us understand and know how to apply maneuver warfare within 
our MOS [military occupational specialty]. About 40% are just conversing in it, 
and 20% are probably cocktail party dangerous.” (Faculty participant) 
What is interesting about the consensus achieved in the focus group is that many of the 
participants of this focus group themselves struggled to provide cogent answers on Mw during 
their one-on-one interviews. Espousing their own knowledge of Mw and then pointing to others 
as not knowing Mw is a classic defensive routine (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). By 
engaging in this defensive routine, the participants maintain governing values within tolerance 
by avoiding the admission of their own lack of knowledge of Mw to preserve their self-image as 
a professional knowledgeable in Mw. This defensive routine ensured the foundational flaw, that 
the lack of sufficient understanding of the Mw capstone doctrine remained undiscussed within 
MCTOG. 
Discovering this general acknowledgment among the MCTOG staff and instructors that 
there existed such a low level of knowledge regarding Mw was very surprising. While surprising, 
what made this discovery very interesting was the organizational defensive routines and skilled 
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unawareness necessary to prevent a significant defect in the organization from being surfaced 
publicly—especially an organization with an experienced faculty and staff set out to reinvigorate 
the Marine Corps' foundational doctrine. Taking the focus group's assessment and triangulating 
with and from interviews, observations, and participant observations of the working group’s 
discussions, a form of functional illiteracy in Mw among MCTOG instructors emerged. I’ve 
extended the term functional illiteracy to frame the phenomenon of a large segment of MCTOG 
faculty and staff possessing a low-level understanding of Mw as a hindrance to the MCTOG 
mission. Just as inadequate reading and writing skills are a severe hindrance to an adult's 
contribution and functioning in a community, so goes the ~60% of MCTOG instructors that are 
unable to fluently articulate the basics of Mw to a level necessary to teach Mw and thereby 
contribute the MCTOG mission. The United Nations Education Science and Culture 
Organization (UNESCO) defines functional illiteracy as “a person is functionally illiterate who 
cannot engage in all those activities in which literacy is required for the effective functioning of 
his group and community” (UNESCO, 1978, p. 178). This definition fits the description 
rendered by the focus group and the instructors who are not literate in Mw doctrine and, 
therefore, cannot teach Mw and contribute to the group. Those deemed “D + or cocktail party 
dangerous,” roughly 60% of the instructor cadre, ultimately cannot sufficiently contribute to 
MCTOG’s effort to reinvigorate Mw. 
Teaching Mw at MCTOG and Skilled Incompetence: The data revealed a low 
understanding of Mw across the MCTOG faculty and staff, pointing to a hit or miss 
understanding of Mw that was dependent on each individual’s self-study beyond TBS or other 
entry-level exposure to Mw. While the MCTOG campaign plan also claimed to develop a 
“world-class faculty” (MCTOG, 2017a, p. 5), the data revealed what on the surface appeared to 
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be MCTOG's presumption of Mw competence with its instructors. After further analysis, Mw 
functional illiteracy was more than a simple unexamined presumption: it was a functional 
illiteracy that was both undiscussed and undiscussable in an open forum at MCTOG. As one 
participant put it in a private interview: 
“I would say we have to stop assuming that officers and SNCOs that get orders 
here have the prerequisite knowledge or skills to be successful.” (Faculty 
participant) 
However, these sentiments were not voiced openly and addressed; instead, feelings were 
suppressed, and the status quo, unequal understanding of Mw, and unfair workloads were 
maintained. Maintaining the status quo meant MCTOG leaned heavily on those who arrived at 
MCTOG with the requisite knowledge, skills, and experience to be successful as instructors and 
carried the bulk of the instruction and workload. This core group of instructors self-identified as 
the “fire brigade.” The fire brigade consisted of officers and enlisted members and had the 
strongest grasp of Mw. The uneven distribution of work among instructors led to frustration and 
resentment, exhaustion, and in some cases burn-out amongst members of the fire brigade.  
“So, there are those who make that very mature, balanced decision [to do very 
little]. And then there are others [the fire brigade] that are extremists who do the 
twelve hours of work and then study at nights we do bottom-up like individual 
professional development, and then all they get in return is even more work. And 
then the twelve-hour day gets extended. Because they showed talent, they're going 
to get worked. Because at the end of the day, the face that MCTOG puts out is 
more important than what's going on under the hood.” (Faculty participant) 
The reliance by MCTOG management on the fire brigade to deliver the bulk of quality 
78 
 
instruction and maintain a high-quality MCTOG experience for the students created resentment 
amongst the more capable fire brigade instructors for shouldering what they perceived to be an 
unfair burden leading to burn out. 
One instructor hinted at the old saw, “Never demonstrate a capability in the presence of a 
need.” 
“If you get singled out as being the expert, those in the middle and the 
bureaucracy know what happens to the racehorse, they get ridden until they die.” 
(Faculty participant) 
One member of the fire brigade, when asked, “What do the non-fire brigade instructors do?” 
replied: 
“What is everybody doing? I really don't know; as a member of the fire brigade, 
I'm constantly going from one thing to another. I know the perception here is that 
the majority don't do a whole lot… [they] are very positive about working at 
MCTOG, especially if the tax they pay is low and the core group [fire brigade] is 
used and abused.” (Faculty participant) 
Marines reporting to MCTOG for instructor duty were drawn from across the Marine 
Corps operating forces and supporting establishments and represented several military 
occupational skill designations. What became clear during the study was that individuals 
possessed an uneven distribution of capabilities to instruct on operations, tactics, and Mw. The 
checkerboard of talent arriving at MCTOG indicates that the issue of low Mw competency 
observed at MCTOG possibly extends across the rest of the Marine Corps. 
It was also clear that MCTOG did nothing to provide policies that benefitted everyone in 
the form of instructor development. Instead, pressured by a high operation tempo, the minority of 
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instructors that could instruct at a high level delivered the bulk of the instruction, and the rest 
participated in the margins. The dynamic reminded me of the plight of Boxer, the workhorse in 
George Orwell’s 1945 classic, Animal Farm. This classic tale exposes the all-too-common 
inequalities in work environments through Boxers’ efforts working to exhaustion and lameness 
on the farm while the other characters gladly let him do so, offering all assistance short of actual 
help. Boxer’s reward for hard work was a trip to the glue factory. 
While undiscussable in a public forum at MCTOG, the topic of insufficient or ineffective 
instructor development was referenced 135 times in 12 of 14 interviews and in all three focus 
groups. While there was instructor development available regarding the science of learning and 
best practices for classroom instruction and leading discussion, it was episodic, not progressive, 
and not mandatory. However, the MCTOG senior management assumed all instructors were 
participating and were surprised when I informed them otherwise, as one instructor put it: 
“So, initially, when it stood up last summer, we were all under the impression that 
it was going to be a mandatory thing. The way that shook out was that if an 
instructor didn't want to do it, they just didn't do it.” (Faculty participant) 
Another instructor confirmed the optional nature of instructor development. 
“Yeah, nothing, [official direction] if it’s mandatory, it’s on paper only, and I 
haven’t seen a piece of paper that says it’s mandatory.” (Faculty participant) 
Moreover, even if the extant instructor development program had been mandatory, it did 
not address the low levels of Mw understanding amongst most of the instructors. One participant 
said: 
“We don't have any instructor development focused on the philosophy of 
maneuver warfare at all… You know the analogy I've tried to use with people is, if 
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I'm teaching math, you can make me the best teacher in the world as far as my 
instructional technique. But if I don't know math, my students won't know math 
when they leave.” (Faculty participant) 
When it came to MCTOG instructors attaining a level of competency in Mw sufficient to 
teach it, the bid for success relied on instructors being autodidacts, an aspiration that was not 
uniform across the organization. 
“We all talk about maneuver warfare a lot. I’m not sure that everybody here is 
necessarily vested in developing an in-depth understanding of what that means to 
us individually and as a service, That, I think, is where we’re lacking.” (Staff 
participant) 
Resistance to Instructor Development, I’m Not Smart and You Can’t Make Me: 
One unstated reason instructor development remained unformalized by the command and 
uncovered in the research was an unspoken resistance among the instructor cadre. This resistance 
appeared in two main narratives: “I’m already an expert” and “We don’t have time.” These 
narratives represent defensive routines aimed at preserving two elements of the bureaucratic 
governing variables: protecting one's reputation as a competent and experienced professional and 
protecting one’s personal time. 
The “I’m already an expert” narrative can be related to the unusually high concentration 
of senior Marines. Most of the senior enlisted Marines assigned to instructor duty had already 
served one or more tours of duty as instructors and had achieved a rating of “Master Instructor.” 
The following quote is from a senior instructor paraphrasing other senior instructors.  
“And some [say] I’m already a master instructor, I don’t need to learn anything 
else.” (Faculty participant) 
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While this is true, master instructor certifications were focused on basic entry-level training for 
the most junior Marines. The below quote is from an adult education subject matter expert on 
staff at MCTOG. 
“But look at the context in which they become master instructors, it was for 
specific task-based training, do this, then this, then this, if this happens then do 
this, the explicit piece, right?” (Staff participant) 
And this quote from a long-time member of MCTOG and faculty observer: 
"We have a very seasoned and senior staff, and having them go to something 
called the new instructor course gives them an instant turn-off. I'm a Master 
Sergeant, I am a LtCol, I am a Major… I don't need to be told or instructed how 
to be an instructor.” (Faculty participant) 
Basic entry-level training programs are focused on behavioral tasks and are at the explicit 
end of the knowledge spectrum, focusing on declarative knowledge (what) and procedural 
knowledge (how) (Gorman, 2002). Teaching at the explicit end of the spectrum is sufficient for 
teaching the fundamentals and skills, IPB or MCPP. The explicit end of the spectrum was 
typically delivered didactically and followed the formal instruction document titled the Master 
Lesson File (MLF). The MLF is a very structured document that proscribes the elements for 
instructing on a subject to include formal lecture, typically following a script with pre-approved 
slides with no deviation from the instructor (MCTOG, 2018a). The MLF proscribed a didactic 
pedagogical approach for teaching, which was very familiar and comfortable to the instructors. 
By adhering to the MLF, there was little risk of an instructor ever being challenged or wrong; 
therefore, they avoided embarrassment and risk to their reputation. By sprinkling in a few Mw 
buzzwords, one could satisfy both Mw and bureaucratic governing variables and maintain the 
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status quo of the theory in use. However, this pedagogical approach is insufficient for teaching 
the art of Mw, tactics, and operations at the level of the campaign plan aspirations. 
To reinvigorate Mw, the campaign plan envisioned a much more dynamic pedagogical 
approach focused on the more tacit end of the knowledge spectrum. Teaching Mw would require 
a departure from the familiar MLF didactic approach and would require a dynamic program of 
instruction (POI) that focused on judgment (when) and wisdom (why) (Gorman, 2002). This 
approach requires instructors to be fluent in Mw in order to facilitate discussion, discourse, and 
engaging the students in free-play wargames where they challenge and may be challenged by the 
students, and the instructor could be wrong. This was unsettling for much of the instructor cadre, 
as it threatened the bureaucratic governing variable by exposing them to embarrassment and loss 
of reputational status, and therefore upset the status quo of the Model I theory in use. This 
sentiment of vulnerability to embarrassment and loss of reputation is captured in this quote by an 
instructor: 
“So [the student] is like this guy [MCTOG instructor] has done some things, been 
some places, so he must be a true professional. Until you open your mouth and 
you're wrong, and when you're wrong, you've lost that credibility.” (Faculty 
participant) 
The instructor cadre was not the only element within MCTOG to resist the aims of the 
campaign plan and the effort to reinvigorate Mw. MCTOG management also exhibited a level of 
avoidance when it came to mandating instructor development. A quote from a senior manager at 
MCTOG underscores this reluctance. 
“Nobody wants to own that program [instructor development] because they’re 
going to have to teach their peers, and that's difficult. Showing them that they’re 
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wrong isn't always easy or the nice thing to do, but we have to adopt that because 
we're not going to get any better.” (Staff participant) 
The sentiment in the above quote speaks to a Model I organization seeking to maintain the status 
quo by not publicly surfacing defects, in this case, unprepared instructors. There was also what 
may be described as cultural resistance to anything labeled mandatory that places the MCTOG 
management in the position of making unpopular policy. 
“I know you're well aware right, in the Marine Corps, as soon as you put the 
word 'mandatory' in front of anything, it is automatically a turn-off for a lot of 
people.” (Faculty participant) 
IV.3 Explanatory Frame 3: The MCTOG Campaign Plan Gets a Damn Good Ignoring 
The third explanatory frame is the ineffective implementation of the MCTOG campaign plan. 
Despite MCTOG being in existence for 10 years, and the importance and complexity of its 
mission as a schoolhouse and COE, it never had an overarching strategic vision to guide its 
actions and activities and grow the scope of the organization. Consequently, resources and 
priorities were approached in a very reactionary manner, as evidenced by MCTOG conducting 
10 internal reorganizations in 10 years and never establishing a clear identity as a schoolhouse or 
COE. Without a comprehensive long-range vision, MCTOG was reflexively responding to short-
term and divergent stakeholder demands from the supporting establishment and operating forces. 
The combination of a robust task list from stakeholders, no clear identity as an organization and 
lack of a long-range vision, all contributed to the chaotic atmosphere and sense of uncertainty 
among the members. As an institution, MCTOG was underperforming in terms of its potential to 
contribute to the overall combat readiness of the Marine Corps. 
In June of 2017, MCTOG embarked on an effort to answer CMC’s FRAGO-1 call to 
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action and establish its long-range goals as an institution. This effort was in the form of a 
campaign plan outlining a 10-year (2017–2027) vision for the organization. Central to this vision 
was to reinvigorate Mw through training and educating operations and intelligence officers and 
senior enlisted Marines. MCTOG’s role as a schoolhouse afforded an ideal platform to influence 
the key influencers across the GCE. 
The Campaign Plan as a Strategic Initiative: The MCTOG 2018–2028 campaign plan 
(MCTOG, 2018b) was an aspirational and strategic document designed to chart the 
organization’s path for the future, establish priorities, and restore Mw to primacy as the doctrinal 
underpinning all combat operations.  
The MCTOG campaign plan was ‘strategic’ in four ways (Shivakumar, 2014). First, the 
plan would provide a unifying vision for the training and education of key members of the 
Marine Corps’ operating forces for the next decade (MCTOG, 2018b). Second, it aimed to 
reinvigorate Mw, a priority for the CMC (USMC, 2016a). Third, such a change would 
necessitate a large commitment of irretrievable resources, namely the time and effort to not only 
redesign the existing curricula but to reimagine it in an entirely new approach to teaching. 
Another significant commitment would be to formalize and resource a faculty development 
program to develop the “world-class faculty” (MCTOG, 2018a, p. 5) necessary to deliver the 
new curricula. Fourth, successful implementation of the MCTOG campaign plan was not a trivial 
matter (Pinfield, 2006). The potentially dire battlefield consequences resulting from the Marine 
Corps supporting establishment planning and equipping for war under the espoused theory of 
Mw (USMC, 2016c) while the operating forces were actually holding to an attrition warfare 
theory-in-practice presented a misalignment of preparation and execution. Such a misalignment 
would be exposed on the battlefield against a capable enemy, likely resulting in mission failure 
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and costing considerable blood and treasure. 
In addition to the campaign plan being a strategic document, it served as an intervention 
by MCTOG senior management to stimulate the adaptive change necessary for MCTOG to 
address the chaotic and uncertain environment felt by its members and to gain relevance as an 
institution. However, as an intervention, it also represented a new espoused theory for the 
organization that would require members of MCTOG to change their approaches in instruction, 
organizational structure, and responsibilities. The campaign plan, as a new espoused theory, 
represented a threat to the status quo Model 1 theory-in-practice. This threat to the status quo 
encountered numerous defensive routines at the individual and group levels, the most common of 
which employed to maintain the status quo Model I theory in use were avoidance, inertia, and 
indifference. 
A primary defensive routine employed within MCTOG by the faculty and staff was a 
conspicuous avoidance, inertia, and indifference to addressing the published campaign plan. The 
campaign plan was published in January 2018 and went exactly nowhere for nearly a year. As 
one of the major contributing authors to the campaign plan, I was invited to participate in an 
MCTOG leadership offsite in December of 2018 to help provide a framework for its 
implementation. In preparation for that offsite, the commander of MCTOG issued guidance for 
the attendees, consisting of division heads, senior instructors, both officers and enlisted, and key 
members of the staff, to read, reflect, and discuss the campaign plan implementation. I found 
evidence of avoidance as many of the leadership team in attendance had not even read the 
campaign plan, let alone internalized, analyzed, and discussed the implementation of it within 
their sub-organizations. During the offsite, it was clear that elementary discovery learning was 
going on with attendees engaging with the campaign plan, and each other, in a meaningful way 
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for the first time in a year since it was published.  
“When we finally looked at our campaign plan, and that was good exposure, 
good discussion… frank discussion, about what it is what the purpose is.” 
(Faculty participant) 
 Interestingly, the participants that complained of uncertainty and not knowing the 
direction MCTOG was headed did not read the campaign plan. When challenged about their 
disengagement, most cited being too busy and not having enough time. When I probed into the 
‘not enough time’ avoidance defensive reasoning tactic, most all backed away from that excuse 
as indefensible. An example of abandoning the ‘not enough time’ defensive routine follows. 
“But so, let me rephrase that I believe we do have enough time, we got all the 
time in the world. It's just that we use that as a crutch to prevent us from going 
where we need to go. There is time; there is a ton of time.” (Faculty participant) 
Other participants avoidance of defensive reasoning focused on the concern that they would 
invest effort in an initiative that would end up changing anyway. 
“I don't know. People not caring, probably, people not caring enough. They know 
that stuff is going to change, so they're just oh yeah we got a campaign plan, Oh, 
I'll just wait until it changes.” (Faculty participant) 
This quote sums up the wait and see defensive reasoning to avoid the campaign plan. 
“I honestly thought at the offsite that we’re going change it up a little bit. So, I 
didn’t want to get too wrapped around it.” (Faculty participant) 
One participant, an intelligent, very capable, and well thought of instructor and member 
of the fire brigade, was at the end of his three-year tour at MCTOG and about to transfer to 
another duty station within days. In a way, our interview served as a very candid exit survey of 
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sorts. During the interview, we discussed his issues with, and opinions on, the campaign plan. 
The following exchange revealed a sequence of layered defensive routines as the participant 
employed one, and then abandoned it once challenged, quickly falling back on another before 
abandoning it as well in an inwardly collapsing perimeter of defensive routines. When asked 
about the campaign plan, the participant confirmed he had read it. When asked what it was 
about, his defensive routine was one of indifference, stating the campaign plan was too vague to 
be of much use. 
“What’s the campaign plan about? That’s a good question… I read it about eight 
months ago; I don’t feel the campaign plan gave enough granularity in the 
functional or even detail realm.” (Faculty participant) 
When pressed to give his opinion on some of the details the campaign plan lacked, he 
admitted he yet had not read the campaign plan in detail. He then added that the campaign plan 
had likely changed since it first came out, employing the “it’s going to change, so I won't engage” 
avoidance defensive routine. 
“I mean, I have a feeling it has been updated three or four times since I’ve had a 
chance to see it.” (Faculty participant) 
I informed the participant that the campaign plan had been neither updated nor modified since it 
was published. Shifting in his seat, the participant then commented on senior management’s 
attempt to ‘roll-out’ the campaign plan in January 2018 and intimated that the rollout of the 
campaign plan was insufficient. 
“We had a one-day PME [professional military education] in Classroom 1 on the 
campaign plan… with the whole staff. Like, here's where we're going here's what 
we're doing. I didn’t understand it then. Well, we didn’t spend the whole day.” 
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(Faculty participant) 
I then presented to the participant the fact the MCTOG Commanding Officer had issued a 
directive for all personnel to read it and conduct a mission analysis within their sections and to 
discuss and determine the details necessary for executing the campaign plan. The participant fell 
back to the “we’re too busy” ‘inertia’ defensive routine. When asked what happened after the 
rollout of the campaign plan, the participant responded with this avoidance/inertia defensive 
routine. 
“You know, at the instructor level, not a whole lot to be honest with you. People 
got back to work in the trenches as far as what had to happen on a daily basis, 
working with the students, there wasn’t a lot of energy from the organization 
forced into the whole organization.” (Faculty participant) 
 I explained how the campaign plan was a 10-year vision that provided goals, reasoning 
behind those goals, and lines of effort with waypoints to achieve those goals. The campaign plan 
was never intended to be a detailed checklist, and the commander's instruction was for the staff 
and instructors to engage with the campaign plan and bring the details to life. At this moment, 
the participant revealed what seemed to be his truest objection to the campaign plan, which was 
not having a say in drafting the campaign plan versus the campaign plan itself. 
“I think some of this was unintentional, but part of it, you know, was intentional. 
At least what I’ve seen in the past three years. Things are closely guarded, walled 
off, then like a big unveiling, like, bam, here’s where we’re going. It’s like man, 
where did this come from? Turns out, a small group of people decided that what 
we’re going to do. Some of it’s good, yeah.” (Faculty participant) 
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This final defensive routine, a feeling of indifference due to disenfranchisement, was 
interesting and felt like something closer to the actual reason for resisting any action on the 
campaign plan. What was more interesting is that the MCTOG senior management clearly gave 
direction to middle management to solicit feedback from their sections and even required middle 
management to provide that feedback to senior management. Despite these efforts from senior 
management, middle management provided very little if any feedback. The participant above, as 
a mid-grade instructor near the bottom of the hierarchy, had felt he was never given the 
opportunity to contribute to the campaign plan’s development. While senior management gave 
direction for vigorous discussion and feedback from across the command, that wasn’t translated 
by the middle management to the instructor cadre. This point will resurface in the following two 
explanatory frames concerning a tension between governing variables and clan activity. 
IV.4  Explanatory Frame 4: Lions Living as Lambs 
MCTOG is a relatively high performing organization that is well-led and populated by 
intelligent, energetic individuals in and out of uniform. All but one of the participants had one or 
more tours of combat, and as Marines, all would jump on a grenade if asked. Interestingly, 
during the course of interviewing the participants, I frequently came upon the theme of fear. 
“Fear” was the word the participants used in the context of the “fear of looking bad” and was 
referenced 42 times in 12 interviews. In the interviews, I probed for but did not detect any fear at 
all from the chain of command, taking punitive action, withholding support, or any other form of 
coercive action. Digging deeper into the data, I was looking for the driving factors behind this 
curious sense of fear in the organization. I found, embedded in the bureaucratic governing 
variable (the drive to have a successful career and advance upwards through the bureaucracy), 
typical defensive routine behaviors. Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978, 1996) define defensive 
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routines as “maximize winning and minimize losing.” Defensive routines are used by individuals 
to protect themselves and others from embarrassment and suppress defects or errors in the status 
quo. 
Reputation and Saving Face: The Marine Corps is small, and one’s reputation precedes 
them like a shot from duty station to duty station for the length of their career and beyond. As 
one participant stated: 
“I can tell you from someone who's been here for four, five, six years, a person's 
(reputation) can be misperceived, distorted, and then turned into the folklore of 
how that person is or isn't. Without actually getting to know that person... The 
perception is don’t go to him because you know, he’s whatever, angry, grumpy, 
mad.” (Staff participant) 
The above quote speaks to the social capital one’s reputation provides not just in terms of being 
competent but in conforming to the norms of being a team player and not rocking the boat. It 
also hints at the need to curate one’s reputation in a positive light. In addition to not protecting 
one's reputation, staying in the middle ground of the system is important in the Marine Corps, as 
“individuals that fail to conform to the norm, buck the system or challenge the system are likely 
not to be promoted” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p. 37). 
“I don’t think they wake up, ‘like how am I going to hide and slide today?’ I think 
its’s like learned behavior and the Marine Corps makes it well known that they 
don’t like extremist on either end. So, it’s safe. That’s what the institution is 
telling them.” (Faculty participant) 
Maintaining one's reputation is, therefore, important, even existential for one's career, 
seemingly more so in the senior ranks as the bureaucratic pyramid narrows and competition for 
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promotion stiffens. Maintaining one’s professional reputation as a competent warfighter was 
indispensable for promotion and thus closely guarded. One participant and member of the fire 
brigade made this observation about curating one’s outward persona into order to conform to the 
norm. 
“That very conservative middle of the road, the way they wear their hair, the way 
they dress, what they read, how they talk, it's the very conservative middle of the 
bureaucratic road. And it's safe. If you take either of USMC or Mw variables to 
the extreme, it is no longer safe for you even to question some of the bureaucratic 
values or effectiveness of maintaining the status quo, especially in combat.” 
(Faculty participant) 
The active-duty Marines serving in middle management or as senior instructors had built 
their reputations in the operating forces during combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Over 15 years of combat, the theater of operations had matured, become more static, and evolved 
into very structured, rigid, procedure-oriented operations. A signature feature of the rigid 
procedure-oriented characteristics of these deployments was the Battle Update Assessment 
(BUA). With access to nearly limitless data and the bandwidth for transmitting terabits of 
information, the BUA had evolved into a very stylized Kabuki theater with staff officers 
displaying artful PowerPoint slides and spreadsheets crunching data from past encounters and 
publishing future combat schedules. This phenomenon is aptly captured by Vietnam veteran and 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Bing West. West spent many months on the front 
lines in both Iraq and Afghanistan and became a keen observer of all levels of command in those 
theaters. In his book The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, West 
(2011) made this observation of the BUA: 
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“Headquarters staffs convened daily for a Battlefield Update Assessment or BUA. 
In operations centers across Afghanistan, rows upon rows of midlevel officers sat 
in front of laptop computers looking, as though in a movie theater, at huge 
screens that displayed colored maps and spreadsheets of data. The center screen 
showed the gigantic image of the senior general chairing the meeting. He 
presided like a deity, while one after another, junior officers walked to a 
microphone to gravely report statistics on personnel, operations, logistics, 
electric power, fuel, news, weather, and the latest engagements, from a few shots 
fired in the north to a bomb explosion in the south. After each set of data was 
displayed, the staff awaited the general's oracular pronouncement.” (p. 151) 
The BUA practice described by West, and the behavior it created, represents the very 
antithesis to Mw. Becoming very good at this mechanistic approach is what many of the 
instructors at MCTOG had built their combat reputations on, and this carried over into their 
approach to teaching their experiences and sticking to what they know—MCPP and IPB. 
“Right, you will not be judged for your failure, because you used the prescribed 
process. The problem with MCPP is it has become a high religion in the Marine 
Corps… you run the process, and it poops out this two-inch thick order that I'm 
going to execute step-by-step-by-step, and if it fails, oh, I used the right processes, 
and we did everything by the book.” (Staff participant) 
The planning processes and BUA techniques and procedures lent themselves to instruction at the 
explicit end of the spectrum and therefore, within the comfort zone for many instructors. As 
discussed earlier, with Mw as a presumed competency section, teaching Mw at the tacit level 
was something uncomfortable, if not threatening, to many instructors. 
93 
 
“What I've picked up on is people come in as unprepared [in instruct at the tacit 
level], and they don't want to be identified as unprepared.” (Faculty participant) 
The need to protect one's reputation, combined with combat experiences that were not 
relevant to Mw and the direction MCTOG was headed with the campaign plan, created angst 
among many of the instructor cadre who responded with defensive routines to suppress this 
defect. These behaviors showed up throughout the data in various forms but were all connected 
by fear of looking bad theme. Together, these behaviors formed an impressive panoply of 
defensive routines conforming to Model I behaviors. The panoply of defensive routines consisted 
of the following. 
The first defensive routine to avoid embarrassment, individuals employed a “faking the 
funk” routine to feign knowledge or competency in order to preserve their reputation. One 
participant articulated the motivation behind “faking the funk” this way: 
“And like, oh, you’ve been in 17 years and can’t explain it, [Mw] shame on you.” 
(Faculty participant) 
 During a Core Design Team (CDT) session, the Deputy of MCTOG wrote on the 
whiteboard a statement about creating battalion systems as a goal for curriculum development to 
support the campaign plan. As a participant-observer, I did not understand what the Deputy 
meant by this term but kept silent to observe the others. I noticed blank expressions. After 
several more minutes of the Deputy talking and the working group being superficially engaged, 
the Deputy began to move on to another topic, so I interrupted and asked what he meant by the 
battalion system. This question was answered, and a meaningful discussion then took place to 
define it further and the implications it held for the curriculum. In follow-up interviews, I asked a 
participant who had been present in that session why nobody asked for clarification to the term 
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and just passively sat there. His response clearly spoke to the “faking the funk” defensive 
routine. 
“I think that’s usually it [on why to fake the funk]. People are afraid that they’ll 
look dumb in front of peers or subordinates or seniors.” (Faculty participant) 
Illustrating that this observation was prevalent across MCTOG, another participant extended my 
observation to include instructors and students in the classroom. 
“If we had an audience of 10 or 20 people, everybody would just do this [nodding 
head up and down]. They would nod their heads north and south and say 'we get 
it'. But if that instructor or guest facilitator started to have a dialogue with the 
group, they won't be able to have a conversation.” (Staff participant) 
The second defensive routine data unearthed a defensive routine of “nay-saying” and 
claiming “not enough of…” to deflect responsibility for acting or achieving results. This 
defensive routine was a claim of a paucity of one resource or another to account for one's 
inaction. This appeared in a few forms, such as not enough information, not enough time, not the 
right people (students and instructors), not the right structure and finally, not enough institutional 
buy-in. I likened the employment of the “not enough of…” routine to a tactical aircraft's 
countermeasures of chaff and flares to decoy enemy-guided missiles away and protect the 
aircraft. This defensive routine was referenced 76 times over 13 interviews.  One staff member 
commented on the weighting of the curricula to the explicit end as: 
“I think from explicit learning [perspective], they're rock stars, ready to the next 
level. But, then we have a bunch that is coming in, and I don't know, I could 
probably make an argument that there is a failure of the system, as an 
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organization writ large, the way we look at training and education is a little 
warped.” (Staff participant) 
MCTOG had never collected any data to gauge the level of knowledge for an incoming 
student, so subjective assessments by the instructors were made that tended to reflect low 
expectations for student preparedness. For example, the following was said from an instructor at 
the end of a three-year tour. 
“So, the assumption is that we have students starting at a certain level [gestures 
one hand low], and we aspire to get them to this level [gestures the other hand 
high]. At the instructor level our experience has been that students are actually 
starting down here [gestures the low hand even lower] but we still aspire to get 
them at least to there [gestures the top hand somewhere in the middle].” (Faculty 
participant) 
 Another variation of low student preparedness as a reason for the curricula to remain at 
the explicit level was a lack of student motivation. 
“Our students that show up at MCTOG … and it’s like one-on-one, we have to go 
back to the very basics of certain tactics and here's what MCPP stands for 
[Marine Corps Planning Process], we spend so much time on that we don't get to 
the deep levels. Another thing is people can’t fail [no academic attrition] when 
they come through here.” (Faculty participant) 
Another instructor and member of the fire brigade at the end of his three-year tour at 
MCTOG saw the issue differently and made this observation regarding the claim of low student 
preparedness as the justification for instruction remaining at the explicit end of the spectrum. 
“There was a longstanding mentality here that because the students came in with 
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a below-average understanding of [Mw] the [instructors] had to maintain explicit 
knowledge to get them up to speed. I don't think that was actually true. Knowing a 
lot of the students coming through here, I think it became a coping mechanism 
[for the instructors] to maintain the status quo of what we did. Labeling the 
students as not where they need to be so we can harp on the [explicit] brilliance 
in the basics. “I think that reflected I'm only comfortable teaching the basics. 
Therefore, I'm going to shape my environment to justify my staying basic, 
explicit.” (Faculty participant) 
 In the cases where Mw instruction engaged the students more experientially with 
Kriegsspiel (a student vs. student manual wargame), decision-forcing cases (DFC), and tactical 
decision games (TDGs) and experientially taught Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum, student 
engagement was remarkably different. 
“It’s almost like they teach themselves. They don’t get a lot of time so they use 
every single minute of it and they do their plan much better now, the students and 
instructors both. It’s like 10 times better since I’ve been here.” (Faculty 
participant) 
The MCTOG middle management often claimed the reason for keeping the curriculum at the 
explicit end was that the Marines assigned to MCTOG as instructors who were not capable of 
teaching Mw at the tacit level. 
“If we want a world-class organization, [referring to MCTOG campaign plan] 
we need to do better as far as our vetting for who gets in here. It needs to be a 
priority for higher [Marine Corps supporting establishment], that's the first step. 
Due to the lack of [supporting establishment)] buy-in the recruiting, the [right] 
97 
 
people coming in here.” (Faculty participant) 
There is more than a thread of truth to the claim of not having a talented enough 
instructor cadre. Some of those assigned to MCTOG for instructor duty had never performed as 
an operations or intelligence officer of a unit in the operating forces, yet they were being asked to 
train operations and intelligence officers from the operating forces. However, one key senior 
middle manager with the position and authority to address instructor development was a 
proponent of the “just stick to the basics” defensive routine and identified a lack of support from 
the Marine Corps-supporting establishment for the shortage of capable instructors at MCTOG. 
“Oh yeah, the right people, the first thing is we don’t have the right people 
because we don’t have [supporting establishment] buy-in to this place, we don’t 
have the right people. So, it makes your instructor development program even 
more imperative because you don't recruit the right people to start with, with the 
right qualities, background, and experience.” (Faculty participant) 
When I followed up with a question on what he was doing about the imperative of instructor 
development, he replied with the following: 
“Due to the lack of [supporting establishment and operational force] buy-in, 
people are coming in and right away, having to; they're teaching. There's no 
depth to the current model; it’s not like you could have a dedicated instructor 
development program; well, it would be second or third [priority] to their daily 
duties.” (Faculty participant) 
When I followed up again with the question if he himself was one of the right people, he replied: 
“Um, yes, and no. Okay, Um, and why I say that, I say on a scale of 1-10, I'm a 6. 
As a [states military occupational specialty], I know my [job]. Um, some of the 
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things where I was deficient, which, [is] still not an excuse, because we don't 
need, to focus on, you know regular infantry, it had been quite some time since 
doing it in nature. So, I had to go back and think through the basics and through 
my experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan at higher levels [of staff]. So yes, in that 
respect, yes.” (Faculty participant) 
 A senior member of MCTOG management saw the resistance to developing the faculty to 
teach Mw and operations at the tacit end of the spectrum as being less about institutional support 
and more about avoiding the effort required to change the status quo. 
“So, it’s a paradigm shift, but so what? You know where the pain come[s] from? 
It’s a massive amount of work because quite frankly, if you go to this model 
[teaching Mw at the tacit level as the campaign plan calls for], your one little 
PowerPoint class that you just read slide for slide, isn’t going to cut it. That’s 
where the hurt feelings [resistance] come from.” (Staff participant) 
 The data show there was a common acknowledgment that MCTOG needed to do more to 
gain supporting establishment support to bring in instructors with the requisite backgrounds. 
However, the action MCTOG could have done to address the issue of competency within their 
span of control was conducting the instructor development necessary to deliver a curriculum to 
teach Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum. Instead, the “not enough of…” defensive routines, 
motivated by the desire to avoid embarrassment, prevent damage to one's reputation, and to 
suppress conflict, ultimately reinforced a Model I learning system and retarded the Model II 
learning system necessary for the implementation of the campaign plan.  
IV.5 Explanatory Frame 5: Sub Rosa Clan Control to Maintain the Status Quo 
During discussions, interviews, focus groups, and observation of working groups, the members 
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of MCTOG occasionally referenced tribes, or being tribal. The reference to tribes was not 
surprising. From my own experience, Marines considered themselves to be the strongest tribe 
among the warring tribes of the Al Anbar Province in Iraq (West, 2008). Merging this tribal 
reference observation with the previously addressed explanatory frames contributing to the failed 
implementation of the campaign plan provided me another perspective on the case. From this 
new tribal perspective, a fifth explanatory frame was revealed.  Emerging from the data was the 
existence of a sub rosa9 clan operating within the formal hierarchical organization. I researched 
this further, looking at the works of Ouchi (1980), Kohli and Kettinger (2004), Chua et al. 
(2012), and Eng et al. (2017). Ouchi and Price’s (1978) definition of a clan as a “culturally 
homogenous group where members share common values, beliefs, and norms, and draws 
informal control from peer monitoring and sanctions to promulgate shared values, beliefs and 
norms” (p. 64) adequately described the dynamic I was observing at MCTOG. This definition 
described the actions of an influential group of middle management and seasoned instructors at 
MCTOG that resisted the campaign plan, instructor development, and teaching Mw at the tacit 
level. In short, this clan acted against the MCTOG senior management’s directives in order to 
maintain the status quo and used Model 1 behaviors to do so. 
Informal Control Exerted by the Status Quo Clan: The above status quo clan (SQ 
clan) employed different approaches to encourage the behavior to maintain the status quo. For 
example, newer instructors not yet socialized to the clan’s norms or those capable of teaching 
Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum (due to experience or self-education) were sanctioned by 
being called out for going off script or cutting corners, not following the didactic master lesson 
 
9 Sub rosa is a Latin phrase translated literally as “under the rose,” meaning, out of sight, in secrecy or private. 
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file to the letter. An eyebrow-raising example of this was mentioned in three separate interviews. 
One participant who witnessed this event first-hand described it this way: 
“Like we had Master Sergeant X getting into with a Major Y outside of the 
classroom about him [the major] not using the prescribed PowerPoint and 'doing 
things his own way and cutting corners.' Well, he wasn't [cutting corners] he was 
going above and beyond [teaching at the tacit end of the spectrum.]” (Faculty 
participant) 
The witness described the master sergeant’s likely motive. 
“Yeah, he's one of the closed-minded. I mean, he's really not open to new things 
because he knows what he knows. He knows the steps and sub-steps of everything, 
[MCPP and IPB] and he sticks strictly to that. If they missed one thing, they fail.” 
(Faculty participant) 
This exchange is eyebrow-raising because the enlisted Marine was yelling at an officer, which 
indicates the scope of the SQ clan's desire to maintain the status quo. The master sergeant in this 
story was in his third year, and the major was in his first year of being an instructor at MCTOG. 
This indicates that regardless of rank, the SQ clan was rooted to “time in MCTOG” and censored 
the behavior of newcomers for upsetting the status quo. 
“It got [sic] into a yelling match, and I was the one that stopped it. I said this had 
gone far enough. You're not going to talk to a major like that; as a matter of fact, 
he could charge you right now. ‘But, he's wrong.' [the master sergeant 
responded].  I'm like no, what you think you know is wrong.” (Faculty participant) 
Further indicative of the value the SQ clan placed on time in was relayed by an instructor at 
MCTOG. 
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“So, the culture right now is, and it's a lot of the old guard [on their third year at 
MCTOG], is that you don't get a say unless you've been here for a year, and even 
then, you get a minimal say. You're not really an instructor until you've been here 
for two years, and then you're leaving again.” (Faculty participant) 
One member of the fire brigade at the end of his tour described the SQ clan promulgating their 
world view. 
“These individuals want to maintain the status quo, the loudest voice with the 
highest rank wins.” (Faculty participant) 
Model I SQ clan control had impacts on learning within MCTOG for both faculty and 
students. A key moment for learning occurs at the end of a tactical exercise or decision-making 
problem when the after-action review (AAR) is conducted. By surfacing and openly discussing 
mistakes, both the students and faculty learn from the exercise not only from their own mistakes 
but also the mistakes of others. This process is only effective if people feel safe to raise mistakes 
and discuss them. The following exchange from an interview with a highly competent and 
earnest first-year faculty member showed more open AAR formats than what he encountered at 
MCTOG. The participant relayed an incident from an AAR where a key debrief point concerning 
the capability of a reconnaissance system was egregiously glossed over to the point that false 
capabilities were being taught and negative learning occurring for both faculty and students. 
Interviewer: “So when this incident was debriefed, why didn’t you stand up and say 
anything?” 
Faculty participant: “I think it would have been seen as rude.” 
Interviewer: “Why would it have been rude? This is a learning institution.” 
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Faculty participant: “It’s a learning institution, but this-it’s not how-it’s never happened 
before… in a mass debrief like that.” 
Interviewer: “So in a mass debrief, the norm is to just keep your peace?” 
Faculty participant: “I would feel so yes… I think that debrief [critical feedback] happens 
privately, but I've not seen that… I think it [a public correction] would have come off as 
rude.” 
Interviewer: “So calling that out would have produced some sort of conflict or tension, 
and the norm is to suppress that?” 
Faculty participant: “I think I would have been reprimanded by [omitted] had I done 
that.” 
When pressed further on why superficial debriefs occur across the faculty, the participant 
replied: 
“I think it's either not to ruffle feathers, or you know, they don't think they have 
the political clout to do that [critical feedback], you know.” (Faculty participant) 
When I raised the topic of superficial debriefs and discussing how touchy subjects are handled 
with another instructor, he replied: 
“They’re [touchy subjects] not [handled]. I think it’s a hierarchy thing…if there’s 
any conflict they’ll disengage, and after that, talk behind each other’s back, to 
prove they’re right I guess…you’ve just got to maintain the status quo.” (Faculty 
participant) 
The above exchange provides a sharp contrast to the example provided by Popper and Lipshitz 
(1998) when discussing organizational learning that takes place within the Israeli Defense Force 
Air Force, widely considered a world-class organization, during training and operational flight 
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debriefings. The debriefings are described as “fiercely competitive… no stone is left unturned, 
yet are open, cordial and democratic… and knowledge gained at one particular subunit are 
shared throughout the air force” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, p. 168). In terms of organizational 
learning, Popper and Lipshitz (1998) called debriefs that are open and honest “high quality 
because they force participants to confront their errors” (p. 169). Conversely, the authors equated 
“low quality debriefs as those that allow participants to go through the motions of learning” 
(Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, p. 169). The authors attributed a thorough socialization, a form of clan 
control, as the key enabler to high-quality debriefs where participants seek to surface and correct 
defects in a Model II learning system. In the case of MCTOG, clan control reinforces a Model I 
single-loop learning system where conflict is suppressed and therefore low quality debriefs are 
conducted and the participants go through the motions of learning. 
Another control tactic employed by the SQ clan was by virtue of their middle 
management role. Their positioning within the formal hierarchy enabled a mediating of 
communications between the MCTOG senior management and the rest of MCTOG. In mediating 
the message, they would water down guidance and intent from MCTOG senior management. 
Watering down was an action strategy motivated by trying to satisfy the bureaucratic variable, 
preserving one's reputation, and getting promoted by maintaining the status quo. However, the 
approaches used to satisfy the bureaucratic governing variable by maintaining the status quo ran 
directly counter to the USMC’s and Mw’s governing variables. 
Behavior Running Counter to USMC Governing Variables: The data revealed 41 
references across 14 interviews where participants related to bureaucratic variables trumping 
USMC values in order to enact SQ clan control. It is an axiom of Marine Corps leadership to 
“issue every order as if it were your own, especially if it is a difficult or unpopular order.” This 
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means taking ownership of a decision, even if you personally do not agree with it. An example of 
watering down the commander's guidance in order to maintain the status quo was described 
below. 
“There’s a tendency around here that if they don’t like the decision, to not go out 
there and own it. We will use the name of the decider, if you will, as the excuse, 
and say the Deputy, or the Commander, or the OPSO said.” (Staff participant) 
When asked why middle management leaders with 12–20 plus years of service would go against 
USMC core values, he replied: 
“I think it’s because they’re more concerned about being liked, I think it goes, 
you know, they’re looking out for their own self, their own self-interest, how they 
are seen.” (Faculty participant) 
Behavior Running Counter to Mw Governing Variables: The data also revealed 84 
references across all 14 interviews and all three focus groups instances where behaviors are 
favoring the goals of bureaucratic governing variables over Mw governing variables. Mw is an 
intent-based form of direction. The commander's intent is the vision for the outcome of an effort. 
It provides the underpinning why for the organization and provides subordinates with ample 
latitude in the ‘how’ of the desired outcome. The commander’s intent is threaded through every 
element of the Marine Corps’ series of doctrinal publications. The Mw doctrine and the 
commander’s intent is to be practiced in combat, training, or garrison and is expected to be 
communicated two levels up and two levels down (USMC, 1997a, 1997d, 1997c, 2001). 
“It’s interesting to watch it play out sometimes. I know that everybody in Trailer 
1, [MCTOG senior management] when they pass guidance and intent and 
taskings, they explain the ‘why’. Somewhere in the midlevel management, that 
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gets lost and falls by the wayside.” (Faculty participant) 
Typically, intent or guidance from Trailer 1 was either translated into a simplistic “go and do” 
order (typically associated with attrition warfare) without context or was altogether ignored 
through inertia or avoidance. In the quote below, avoidance was referred to as a “skewing” of 
intent and “just follow orders” and then inappropriately contextualized as Mw, thus illustrating 
an incomplete understanding the role of intent in Mw. 
“Yep, it [intent] gets skewed. Just do it; follow orders. And that's ok sometimes, 
right? From a maneuver warfare perspective, I want to understand why. So, if 
your tactical task and mission don't work, I still know what I need to get done.” 
(Staff participant) 
Under Mw, doctrine intent is never “skewed.” Rather, it is the bedrock of the Marine 
Corps’ warfighting philosophy. MCDP-1 Warfighting dedicates an entire chapter to the 
commander's intent, as in this key passage: “Understanding the intent of our commanders [two 
levels up] allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires” (USMC, 
1997 p. 89). 
The defensive routine employed by SQ clan members in justifying these actions was the 
claim of uncertainty in mission or priority. The claim of uncertainty rang hollow, however. The 
commander of MCTOG directed all hands, as individuals and as leaders of sub-groups within 
MCTOG, to read, internalize, and discuss the campaign plan with their sub-groups. The data 
shows in 31 references over 10 interviews and in all three focus groups that faculty and staff 
admitted to having never made a serious effort to either understand the campaign plan or discuss 
it internally. 
The 8-Ball Chart, Misery Loves Company and a Cry for Help: Through all the 
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explanatory frames discussed above, a pattern of well-worn defensive routines employed by 
members of MCTOG was unearthed. Also examined was the tension between satisfying both the 
USMC and Mw governing variables and the bureaucratic governing variable, with the latter 
winning out over the two former governing variables. In other words, MCTOG members opted 
to employ defensive routines in order to conform to norms, suppress conflict, and protect their 
reputation, resulting in a form of careerism at the expense of USMC and Mw variables. If I had 
explained this observation to the participants, I have no doubt they would have protested the 
blasphemy of careerism being attributed to them. This makes sense, however, as individuals 
simply do not accept responsibility for defensive routines (see Argyris & Schon, 1996). 
One action strategy employed by the SQ clan to avoid facing the responsibility for 
creating the conditions for careerism is following the first rule of misery, which is that misery 
loves company. In this case, “company” was achieved through co-opting others into the SQ clan 
using a graphic tool to help diffuse responsibility for personal actions to the faceless 
“institution.” The graphic tool used was a PowerPoint slide titled “MCTOG Tour of Duty Phases 
of Emotion,” most commonly referred to as the 8-Ball Chart. 
The 8-Ball Chart (Figure 7) depicts the emotional progression of an MCTOG member 
throughout their tour. This chart was sometimes tacked up in a cubical or in a desk drawer. All 
participants were aware of it, though not all retained a copy of it. Many of the MCTOG senior 
management saw the 8-Ball Chart as unprofessional and a form of insubordination. Such 
unaccountable and victim-like behavior is not expected of Marines and GS civilians, especially 
as senior as those at MCTOG. I must admit, when I first encountered this chart, I initially reacted 
as a Marine colonel and shared the sentiments of the MCTOG senior management. I was able to 
acknowledge this initial reaction and check my bias, though, by asking the question a researcher 
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should ask, “What’s going on here?” 
Figure 7: The 8-Ball Chart 
 
In the data and the literature, I found the answers to that question. The chart was used as a 
tool to both diffuse personal responsibility for the defensive routines employed by the SQ clan, 
(Argyris, 1996; Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1996b) and as a tool to co-opt others, typically those in 
the first year of their tour, into the SQ clan by normalizing clan attitudes and expectations 
(Ouchi, 1980; Ouchi & Price, 1978a) that ran counter to Marine Corps core values. One MCTOG 
member recounted their introduction to the chart. 
“I will share my experience with this chart [pointing to the 8-Ball Chart]. So, I 
think I was here about maybe three months, and I went to go home. I won't say 
who, there were a couple of people in the room. They pulled out this [8-Ball 
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Chart] and said, you're right here [pointing to #4 frustrated]. I was at step four. 
Yeah, I'm frustrated every day, but I don't stay frustrated. I didn't realize after 
three months here, that was something people actually had on the desk or under a 
calendar or pinned up and referred back to on occasion. That prevents us in some 
aspects, not all, from projecting forwards.” (Staff participant) 
The experience relayed above likely played out in one form or another for all members of 
MCTOG. As mentioned earlier, MCTOG experienced a 40% or greater turn over in uniformed 
personnel every year. Still, there was always a senior member with a connection to the past that 
reinforced old norms, values, objectives, and defensive routines to maintain a Model I status quo 
theory-in-use. 
Again, checking my bias as a Marine colonel, I began to see the 8-Ball Chart less as an 
act of insubordination and more of a cry for help. The 8-Ball Chart represented a reaction to the 
uncertainty surrounding MCTOG as a hybrid organization and the threat of the campaign plan as 
a new espoused theory that threatened the status quo. The SQ clan sought to use the 8-Ball Chart 
to normalize their behavior and recruit others to diffuse the pain of the internal incompatibility of 
their defensive routines that fell outside the Marine Corps values of honor, courage, and 
commitment. The Chart was alternatively used to censure and recruit those trying to operate 
outside the SQ clan’s values, beliefs, and norms. In this cry for help vein I found a rival to the 
SQ clan – a very loosely formed clan among those that were later in their tours and who, while 
frustrated, had not joined the SQ clan. This clan, which I’ll call the Mw clan, is composed of 
those Marines who are well-versed in Mw and capable of teaching at the explicit or tacit levels 
and still held on to an appropriate balance of the governing variables. The Mw clan was 
generally junior to MCTOG middle management, who were often the SQ clan “elders.” While 
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Mw clan members had resisted the informal control of the dominate SQ clan, they were still 
under the hierarchical control of the more senior middle management (the highest rank with the 
loudest voice in the room) of the SQ clan. This dynamic was captured in this quote from an Mw 
clan member at the end of his three-year tour. 
“So, it’s those that have a year or less under their belt, regardless of rank, are 
really excited. They're really perceptive and they're really willing to bring up 
observations that could potentially evolve the organization in the right direction. 
What I've seen year after year, they kind of get beaten down either by exhaustion 
or by the loudest voice in the room to where they rarely speak up again. They 
rarely bring up insights anymore. I know [Trailer 1 senior management] doesn't 
like this, but the MCTOG tour of duty phases of emotion [8-Ball Chart] are very 
real here. And then once you get to a certain phase, you're just, I just want to 
survive the rest of my tour, nothing's going to change.” (Faculty participant) 
The impacts of the SQ clan Model I behavior and clan control can be traced through 
every aspect of MCTOG and all five explanatory frames. With regards to learning at MCTOG, 
the data revealed Model I behaviors produced negative consequences to learning with 121 
references overall in 14 interviews and three focus group sessions. The Model I SQ clan control 
also created consequences to behavior within MCTOG members, with 58 references over 12 
interviews or focus groups, stifling communications and trust—the essential ingredients of 
Model II behavior. 
The next chapter answers the research question and makes the arguments for this study’s 
contributions to the literature streams and contributions to practice.
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V DISCUSSION 
“There are two kinds of people when it comes to change. Those that don’t like it, and 
those that really hate it.” -Anonymous 
This study set out to answer the following research question: “Why is it difficult for the Marine 
Corps to implement Mw despite 30 years of training and education efforts to do so?” To answer 
that question, the study began by casting the net widely over the literature streams of 
organizational learning, organizational culture, and learning in the military; Mw; and the Marine 
Corps planning documents regarding the reinvigoration of Mw. A review of these literature 
streams illuminated a general area of concern surrounding organizational learning as it 
implements strategic change, as well as a specific problem area concerning the adoption of a 
warfighting philosophy within a military organization. A final literature stream was included 
after the field work was complete, when the data analysis revealed the presence of clan activity. 
The review process also identified where contributions might be made by extending the 
literature. 
The qualitative case study and interpretive approach to answering this “why” question 
concerning an emotional and existential topic created a tremendous amount of both structured 
and unstructured data. Making sense of the unstructured data was the biggest, yet most rewarding 
challenge of this study. Unstructured data is more elusive and requires time-intensive contextual 
analysis to give it meaning. The data were organized into five explanatory frames: uncertainty 
within MCTOG as a hybrid organization, functional illiteracy in Mw among the faculty, the 
faculty and staff ignoring the campaign plan, lions living as lambs, and the phenomenon of an 
informal clan operating sub rosa within the MCTOG hierarchy. 
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Applying the academic rigor of ToA to these five explanatory frames provided a fil de 
guidage rouge that lifted the discourse above the chatter—the noise of opinion and conjecture. It 
allowed the unstructured data to be noticed and structured into meaning. The five explanatory 
frames woven together with ToA answer the research question and produce contributions to both 
literature and practice. 
V.1 Answering the Research Question 
The results of this study illustrate that the Marine Corps’ difficulty in implementing Mw is not 
restricted to organizational structure or culture. Rather, the reinvigoration of Mw, embodied in 
the strategic initiative of the MCTOG campaign plan, failed due to a persistent Model I single-
loop organizational learning system. This system was made persistent by the actions of the SQ 
clan operating in sub rosa fashion, which exerted informal clan control over many of the 
members. The SQ clan Model I behaviors created a bête noires effect that subdued attempts by 
MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II double-loop organizational learning. Table 3 
and Table 4 identify the attempts made by MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II 
double-loop learning and the ways in which the SQ clan countered those attempts with Model I 
behaviors and the outcomes of those interactions. Table 5 synthesizes the attempted Model II 
learning cycles and Model I counter-cycles, with the five explanatory frames, to fully illustrate 
the impact of Model I clan behavior on the failed initiative to reinvigorate Mw. 
Identified Attempted Model II Double-Loop Learning Cycles: The campaign plan 
was an intervention by MCTOG senior leadership to move the organization towards a strategic 
vision and initiate change that would require members of the organization to engage in double-
loop learning; to question assumptions, norms, and governing variables; and to take a risk to 
move away from the familiar status quo. The campaign plan introduced a new espoused theory. 
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To fully implement the campaign plan, MCTOG required Model II double-loop organizational 
learning to take place in order to align the status quo with the new espoused theory. Argyris and 
Schön (1996) offers four variables typically present within an organization for Model II double-
loop learning to occur, namely, “valid information, free and informed choice, internal 
commitment to the goal, and constant monitoring” (p. 87). MCTOG senior leadership made 
attempts to effectuate each of these four factors. Table 3 below identifies four attempts by 
MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II double-loop learning, describes what 
happened, and lists the impact on Model II double-loop learning.  
Table 3: Identified Attempted Model II Double-loop Learning Cycles 
Cycle Description of Attempted Cycle What Happened Impact  
1 Management attempted to 
communicate valid information and 
provide free and informed choice 
through the opportunity to provide 
feedback and contribute to 
campaign plan implementation.  
SQ Clan muted this opportunity 
for all by defensive routines of 
not communicating this 
opportunity and gave passive, 
false, or no feedback. 
Model II double-loop 
learning not achieved. 
Passive resistance to the 
campaign plan characterized 
by defensive routines of 
avoidance, inertia, and 
indifference. 
2 Management attempts to establish 
instructor development program to 
build world-class faculty.  
No evidence of strong internal 
commitment and monitoring 
management to make it 
mandatory.  
Model II double-loop 
learning not achieved. The 
lack of demonstrated internal 
commitment allowed the SQ 
Clan to ignore the initiative as 
optional. 
3 Management held a Leadership 
Offsite (Dec 18) to openly discuss 
problems with implementing the 
campaign plan.  
Valid information was 
exchanged with minimal 
defensive routines present.  
Model II double-loop 
learning is temporarily 
achieved at the offsite. 
However, once back at 
MCTOG, SQ clan began 
defensive routines thwarting 
commitment to execution. 
4 Management formed the core 
design team to implement campaign 
plan. 
This was a cross-section of 
faculty and staff; valid 
information was not exchanged, 
and high amounts of defensive 
routines were present. Most had 
not read the campaign plan and 
passively participated. 
Model II double-loop 
learning not achieved. 
Management makes unilateral 
decisions to press forward 
with its implementation of the 
campaign plan. SQ Clan 
continues the defensive 
routine of inertia. 
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In successful Model II double-loop learning cycles, members will sense a decrease in 
defensiveness in others and will reciprocate in turn, thereby, producing a reduction in the 
overwhelming and stifling presence of “the fear of looking bad” and risking their reputation and 
chances of promotion. In double-loop learning, the bureaucratic governing variable would have 
been examined, and participants would have realized that the defensive routines employed to 
maintain the status quo were not necessary to have a viable career, and therefore, altered the 
bureaucratic governing variable to be more within tolerance of the remaining governing 
variables. In other words, one can have a viable career while also upholding Marine Corps core 
and Mw values. 
Double-loop learning did not take place in cycle numbers 1, 2, and 4 because of the 
action strategies employed by the SQ clan to keep the bureaucratic governing variable within 
tolerance, resulting in an increasing level of incongruency with the Marine Corps’ core values 
and Mw governing variables. In cycle number 3, MCTOG achieved a near miss as a temporary 
environment of low defensiveness, and an exchange of valid information occurred. However, it 
was short-term and ended once the actors returned to the physical MCTOG location. Without a 
change to the bureaucratic governing variables and the Model I defensive routines, double-loop 
learning could not occur. 
Identified Model I Single-Loop Learning Counter-Cycles: Single-loop learning is 
appropriate in many cases. The process of error detection and correction is completely 
appropriate for incremental learning and maintaining a status quo. Single-loop learning also 
maintains and does not question the governing variables. When the espoused theory of an 
individual, group, or organization matches the theory-in-use, the governing variables are 
compatible. However, when the espoused theory and the theory-in-use do not match, dilemmas 
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develop between governing variables and behavior. Single-loop learning is then engaged to find 
various ways to suppress conflict through action strategies and defensive routines to bring 
governing variables back into tolerance without ever questioning the appropriateness of the 
governing variable. In the case of MCTOG, the bureaucratic governing variables in a Model I 
environment, the fear of looking bad and protecting one’s reputation, and by extension one’s 
career, was out of tolerance with the other two. 
For Model I single-loop learning to occur, four variables are typically in place: “define 
goals and manage the environment to achieve them, maximize winning, minimize losing, 
minimize expressing negative feelings, and be rational” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 68–69). 
Table 4 below captures identified SQ clan Model I single-loop actions and activities which 
severed as “counter-learning cycles” that retarded MCTOG’s senior management efforts to 
engage in Model II double-loop learning cycles, and effectively, preserved the status quo.  
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Table 4: Identified Model I Single-loop Counter Cycles 
Cycle Description of Model I 
Counter Cycle 
What Happened Impact 
1 The SQ Clan countered 
MCTOG management 
Model II efforts by 
redefining the goals of 
MCTOG management by 
teaching the MCPP, IPB 
basics and remaining at the 
explicit end of the 
knowledge spectrum.  
 
The SQ Clan engaged in defensive 
routines of avoidance, inertia, and 
indifference to the campaign plan and 
blaming low student and instructor 
quality as the reason for remaining at the 
explicit end of the teaching spectrum for 
maintaining the status quo. 
Status quo maintained. 
Campaign plan was not 
effectively implemented 
for more than 18 months.  
2 The SQ clan countered 
MCTOG management 
Model II efforts with 
Model I to maximize 
winning and minimize 
losing by falsely taking 
responsibility for making 
change. 
 
The SQ Clan publicly agreed with 
MCTOG management but in private 
complained of lack of clarity, direction, 
and resources. SQ clan enacted clan 
control over other MCTOG instructors to 
maintain the status quo by keeping 
instruction of classes explicit.  
Status quo maintained. 
Campaign plan was not 
effectively implemented 
for more than 18 months. 
3 SQ clan countered 
MCTOG management 
Model II efforts by 
minimizing the expression 
of negative feelings to 
protect self and others. 
When publicly asked about the campaign 
plan by Management, the SQ Clan 
nodded “north and south” in agreement to 
avoid conflict with management and 
preserve one’s reputation and therefore 
get promoted. Holiday leave pointed to 
for “loss of momentum” on campaign 
plan changes. 
Status quo maintained. 
Other than the “near miss” 
at the Dec 18 leadership 
offsite, issues with the 
campaign plan never 
publicly surfaced. Instead, 
new defensive routines 
were engaged. 
 
4 SQ clan countered 
MCTOG management 
Model II efforts with the 
“be rational to protect 
others” approach by 
withholding or distorting 
communication from 
MCTOG management to 
faculty and staff and by 
censoring behavior. 
This was a classic SQ clan activity. The 
clan censored information by not 
conveying intent and guidance from the 
commander. It also sanctioned behavior 
through the 8-Ball Chart and keeping 
people in line by teaching only at the 
explicit level. Rational defensive routines 
included blaming a lack of resources 
(time, talent, guidance) as the reason to 
maintain the status quo.  
Status quo maintained. 
Very low internal 
commitment to the 
campaign plan and overall 
success of MCTOG as an 
organization.  
 
 
 The Impact of a Model I Single-Loop Learning System: The data showed that the 
impact of a Model I single-loop system at MCTOG countered and retarded any efforts by the 
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MCTOG senior management to implement the campaign plan. The middle management and 
senior instructors of MCTOG that generally comprised most of the SQ clan became quite adept 
at employing defensive routines. In fact, in my interviews, I observed a reflexive use of these 
routines, and if I challenged one, then another was instantly deployed. How this well-used 
panoply of defensive routines ran across each Model II learning attempt made by MCTOG senior 
management, along with each of the explanatory frames, is captured in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Explanatory Frames by Model II Learning Cycles & Model I Counter-Cycles 
 Cycles and Counter-Cycles 
 1 2 3 4 
MCTOG 
Management 
Model II 
Attempt 
Opportunity to shape 
the campaign plan 
(Free and Informed 
Choice) 
Establish Instructor 
Development Program 
(Internal Commitment) 
 
Leadership Offsite I 
December 18, 2018 
(Valid information) 
 
Establish Core Design 
Team to Implement 
Campaign Plan (Valid 
information) 
 
SQ Clan  
Model I 
Reinforcement 
and Counter 
Cycle 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Re-define MCTOG 
Goals 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Maximize Winning and 
Minimize Losing 
SQ Clan Minimizes the 
Expression of Negative 
Feelings to Protect Self 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Appear Rational While 
Controlling 
Communication from 
MCTOG Senior 
Management to Faculty 
and Staff and by 
Censoring Behavior. 
Explanatory 
Frames 
    
Uncertainty in a 
Hybrid 
Organization 
“These individuals 
want to maintain the 
status quo, the loudest 
voice with the highest 
rank.”  
“Some people, you’ll 
see them get shut 
down in discussion, 
someone will ask a 
probing question and 
won’t continue.” #07 
“So, there are 
individuals on the staff 
doing everything they 
can…in an underhanded 
way, return us to the 
explicit state at 
MCTOG.” #04 
 
“So, the culture right 
now is, and it’s a lot of 
the old guard, is that you 
don’t get a say unless 
you’ve been here for a 
year. You’re not really 
an instructor until 
you’ve been here for 
two years.” #14  
“I think they’d rather 
just shut up and color, 
go with the flow, don’t 
cause a ripple, ask a 
question. They’re not 
being told to shut up and 
color…what they want 
to do doesn’t fit with 
MCTOG’s adult 
learning approach.” #03 
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 Cycles and Counter-Cycles 
 1 2 3 4 
MCTOG 
Management 
Model II 
Attempt 
Opportunity to shape 
the campaign plan 
(Free and Informed 
Choice) 
Establish Instructor 
Development Program 
(Internal Commitment) 
 
Leadership Offsite I 
December 18, 2018 
(Valid information) 
 
Establish Core Design 
Team to Implement 
Campaign Plan (Valid 
information) 
 
SQ Clan  
Model I 
Reinforcement 
and Counter 
Cycle 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Re-define MCTOG 
Goals 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Maximize Winning and 
Minimize Losing 
SQ Clan Minimizes the 
Expression of Negative 
Feelings to Protect Self 
SQ Clan Attempt to 
Appear Rational While 
Controlling 
Communication from 
MCTOG Senior 
Management to Faculty 
and Staff and by 
Censoring Behavior. 
Explanatory 
Frames 
    
Maneuver 
Warfare 
Functional 
Illiteracy 
"Labeling the students 
as not where they 
need to be so we can 
harp on the [explicit] 
‘brilliance in the 
basics.’  I think that 
reflected “I'm only 
comfortable teaching 
the basics; therefore, 
I'm going to shape my 
environment to justify 
staying explicit.” #04 
 
"If we had 10 or 20 
people, everybody 
would just nod their 
heads north and south 
and say 'we get it'. But 
they won't be able to 
have a conversation [on 
Mw]. What I've picked 
up on is people come in 
as unprepared, and they 
don't want to be 
identified as 
unprepared.” #01 
"Yep, It, [commander's 
intent] gets skewed. Just 
do it; follow orders. And 
that's ok sometimes, 
right? From a maneuver 
warfare perspective." 
#03 
“So initially we did [the 
campaign plan] working 
groups, then the [CDT] 
stood up. It became the 
Deputy's working group; 
he has a vision; this was 
propaganda to sell us his 
vision. My personal 
opinion, I'd like to hear 
more commander's 
guidance.” #08 
 
Lions Living as 
Lambs 
Oh yeah, the right 
people, the first thing 
is we don’t have the 
right people because 
we don’t have 
[HQMC] buy-in to 
this place, we don’t 
have the right people. 
#08 
"There's a reluctance to 
put themselves in a 
vulnerable 
position…exposing 
yourself to judgment, we 
talk about [MCTOG] as 
graduate level, it's not, 
most of what we do here 
is entry-level." #13 
“I honestly thought at 
the offsite that we’re 
going change it up a 
little bit. So, I didn’t 
want to get too wrapped 
around it.” #05 
"We don't want to have 
uncomfortable 
discussions; it's 
undiscussable. But you 
know, we'll focus on 
discussions about how 
we're going to support 
ITX [exercise] all day 
long. #02  
Sub Rosa Clan 
Control to 
Maintain Status 
Quo 
"You know, at the 
instructor level, not a 
whole lot to be honest 
with you. People got 
back to work; there 
wasn't a lot of energy 
from the 
organization." #12 
“Like we had Master 
Sergeant X getting into 
with a Major Y outside 
of the classroom about 
him [the major] not 
using the prescribed 
PowerPoint and ‘doing 
things his own way and 
cutting corners.’” #05 
“It’s interesting to 
watch. I know 
(management) passes 
guidance and intent, 
they explain the ‘why.’ 
Somewhere in the 
midlevel management 
that gets lost and falls by 
the wayside.” #09 
"The CO was frustrated; 
he was like 'What is 
going on? Why isn't the 
information getting 
down to the lowest 
echelon, you all come 
here and make notes, it 
is going in one ear and 
out the other, and you're 
not giving it to your 
Marines.'" #11 
Note: # = participant 
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In effect, the SQ clan Model I behavior and their negative socialization influences 
employed to exert informal control over other members to MCTOG effectively neutralized the 
Model II learning attempts and preserved the status quo. With the SQ clan active and operating 
in sub rosa fashion, the MCTOG campaign plan and the reinvigoration of Mw within MCTOG 
were destined for stagnation. The data showed that a congruence of goals between the SQ clan 
and senior management at MCTOG did occur, but only episodically and only under duress. One 
instance of episodic congruence occurred when MCTOG was required to lend critical support to 
an external and highly visible requirement from its higher headquarters. The requirement 
impacted the daily tasks and priorities of MCTOGs’ members eliciting the defensive routines of 
nay-saying, inertia, and resource blaming to avoid the task. In the eleventh hour, with a deadline 
looming and failure approaching, the groups came together and “pulled it off,” a feat recounted 
by one participant with some pride. The driving factor for congruence was that the bureaucratic 
governing variables, specifically personal reputations, was held in extremis, as failure would 
have splashed on the reputations of the SQ clan and senior management alike. Even then, change 
was spasmodic and in the form of short-term cooperation lasting only until the crisis passed.  
Additional evidence of this short-term convergence occurred after my onsite fieldwork 
concerning the campaign plan. In this instance, the Commanding Officer dropped his attempts to 
gain buy-in to a change in the curriculum to teach Mw at the tacit level and directed via 
executive fiat a significant change to the core academic course. The new course featured a heavy 
focus on teaching Mw at the tacit level, and MCTOG would execute the first course in three 
months. The name of the new course, interestingly enough, was the Advanced Maneuver 
Warfare Course (AMWC). The faculty and staff, regardless of clan and previous views, were 
goaded by necessity and fear of failure to pull together, develop the curriculum, and initiate an 
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internal instructor development course to prepare instructors to deliver the curriculum. Three 
months after the field work was complete, the inaugural AMWC course was successfully 
executed; however, it remains to be seen how long the cooperation and instructor development 
will last. 
The remainder of this chapter will highlight the study’s contribution to the literature and 
to the related field of practice. It will also provide an overview of each explanatory frame and 
detail its impact on organizational learning and offer potential corrective interventions. The 
results expose the many nuances of the interplay between organizational learning and clan 
control and provide a wealth of insight for managers and leaders alike who are contemplating, or 
have undertaken, organizational change. 
V.2 Contributions to Literature 
The findings in this study contribute to the literature on organizational learning, specifically 
ToA, and to the literature on Mw. Additionally, and unexpectedly, this study also examined the 
interconnectedness between organizational learning theory and control theory. The role of clans 
operating within hierarchical organizational structures are every present, and managers and 
leaders must learn how to identify and manage them (Ouchi, 1980; Ouchi & Price, 1978a). 
V.2.1 Organizational Learning 
This study extends the extant literature on organizational learning by situating the study within a 
large military organization attempting to reinvigorate a warfighting philosophy through 
implementing a strategic initiative. What is unique to this study is that the strategic initiative of 
the MCTOG campaign plan essentially imposed a new espoused theory on the organization. 
Ironically, this new espoused theory in and of itself upset and threatened the status quo theory-in-
use by requiring faculty to teach Mw at the tacit end of the knowledge spectrum, a most-lacked 
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capability that put reputations at risk. 
The risk to reputation placed the governing variables of Marine Corps core values and 
Mw core values in conflict with the bureaucratic governing variable of preserving one’s 
reputation and being promoted. This conflict, in turn, created a state of incongruency among the 
governing variables that required many members to use action strategies to maintain the 
bureaucratic variable within tolerance and sustain the status quo. 
The organizational learning literature was further extended by examining how 
organizations can look to organizational learning systems to address the challenges of difficult 
organizational change that accompany strategic initiatives. Frequently, when organizations 
attempt to adapt to new and emerging realities in their environments, the methods of adaptation 
often focus on deficiencies in structure and culture (Bate et al., 2000; Holmes-Eber, 2014b; 
Matzenbacher, 2018; Schein, 2017; Terriff, 2007a). The Marine Corps’ “Reinvigorate Mw” 
workshops hosted by TECOM also produced recommendations focused on changing both 
structure and culture (TECOM, 2016, 2017, 2018). As seen in this study, members at MCTOG 
readily claimed deficiencies in resources, “not the right people,” and deficiencies in institutional 
support from external organizations lack of buy-in (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) as reasons to not 
implement the campaign plan or teach Mw at the tacit level. Given the deeply embedded nature 
of military organizational culture (Hawkins, 2015; Piscitelli, 2017), there is a great, if not 
overwhelming, difficulty in changing it (Kelly, 2008; Schein, 2017). This study illustrated how 
an organizational learning system, not structure or culture, was the principal issue opposing 
change. Contrary to the TECOM workshop claims of culture as the culprit, the Marine Corps 
culture is one of adaptation and innovation (Augier & Barrett, 2019; Davidson, 2010; Krulak, 
1984; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a) and is as well-suited as any military culture to employ Mw. 
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In a contemporary and parallel case, the United States Army's attempt to effectuate and 
reinvigorate their version of Mw, Mission Command, has focused largely on the need for a 
cultural shift for an organization of over 2 million active and reserve soldiers (Matzenbacher, 
2018; Townsend et al., 2019a, 2019b). This study could further inform and reshape the United 
States Army’s approach to include a review of extant organizational learning systems as a pivot 
to reinvigorate Mission Command. 
This study also confirmed that Model I single-loop learning systems are extremely 
effective at maintaining the status quo. Despite documented attempts by MCTOG senior 
management to engage in double-loop learning cycles, Model I single-loop learning system 
behaviors were successful in blunting those initiatives. The study also corroborated Argyris and 
Schön’s (1996b) claim that Model II double-loop organizational learning systems are rare. The 
Model I inhibiting behaviors detailed in the explanatory frames created a level of skilled 
incompetence within the faculty and staff and was sustained by the senior management’s skilled 
unawareness (Argyris & Schön, 1996b, p. 217). Even though the MCTOG senior management 
genuinely attempted double-loop learning, the study documented an unconscious level of skilled 
unawareness surrounding the explanatory frames, with a self-defeating effect. 
V.2.2 Maneuver Warfare 
This study appears to be the first empirical examination of why the Marine Corps’ recent efforts 
to reinvigorate Mw have failed within the training and education continuum. To this point, the 
literature on Mw has primarily centered on three main themes: (1) the inception and initial 
adoption of Mw; (2) the implementation of Mw in practice; and (3) the discussions surrounding 
the need for the reinvigoration of Mw. This study adds the latest chapter to the story arc of the 
Mw literature stream that begins with the strategic Cold War threat that provided the impetuous 
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behind the Marine Corps’ movement to Mw (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a). The 
literature continues with a backwards look at the inception of Mw as a warfighting philosophy 
and details the Marine Corps' initial efforts 31 years ago to adopt Mw as the Marine Corps’ 
fundamental warfighting philosophy (Brown, 2018; Damian, 2001). The story arc then focused 
on explicating Mw as a doctrine with in-depth explanations of Mw theory (Osinga, 2007), 
operational examples of the implementation of Mw (Piscitelli, 2017) and how-to manuals (Lind, 
1985a), and examples of the transferability of Mw philosophy to civilian companies (Clemons & 
Santamaria, 2002). The Mw literature stream includes discourse concerning the utility of Mw 
(Robeson, 1989; Tucker, 1996) and dissatisfaction with the Marine Corps’ commitment to Mw 
(Anonymous, 2011). The story arc culminates with the Marine Corps' strategic initiative to 
reinvigorate Mw through the 37th CMC's strategic initiatives and TECOM workshops that 
advocated for structure and culture remedies to reinvigorate Mw. This study continues the story 
arc of Mw literature with an empirical account of MCTOGs’ efforts to reinvigorate Mw by 
implementing a campaign plan and leveraging its unique position as a schoolhouse and COE 
(MCTOG, 2018b; Nicastro, 2017, 2018).  
This contribution to literature turns the focus of the remedy from structure and culture to 
a discussion surrounding how to reinvigorate Mw to include organizational learning systems for 
serious consideration. This research also exposed the essential role clans played in determining 
the outcome of the reinvigoration of Mw effort within the TECOM training and education 
continuum. 
V.2.3 Control Theory 
Ouchi and Price (1978), Jaeger (1983), and Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) all thoroughly investigated 
the impact of informal clan control within organizations. Kohli and Kettinger (2001), Chua et al. 
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(2012), and Myers (2013) investigated the role of social capital in clans and how management 
may engage to influence clans with social control and negotiated order to achieve congruence 
between the clan and the organization’s goals. Their research was limited to clans operating 
explicitly within an organization. This study extends the literature in two important ways. First, 
this study identified a previously undetected clan operating in sub rosa fashion and counter to the 
organization’s goals. Second, this study further explored and documented the impact of how sub 
rosa informal clan control, striving to maintain the status quo, effectively resisted MCTOG 
senior management’s attempts to engage in the Model II double-loop organizational learning 
necessary to implement the campaign plan. 
Ouchi (1980) attributed organizational control to three factors: markets, bureaucracies, 
and clans. Ouchi and Price (1978a) provided a widely accepted definition of a clan as being a 
group “culturally homogenous with common values, beliefs, and norms and draws informal 
control from peer monitoring” (p. 64). In his writings, Ouchi (1980) described clans as operating 
explicitly to reinforce the organization's goals by employing “social mechanisms [to] reduce 
differences between individual and organizational goals” (Ouchi, 1980, p. 136). Wilkins and 
Ouchi (1983), in their research, described the adaptive nature of clans and how members use the 
clan structure to deal with considerable change within an organization, so long as there is 
congruence between the clan and the organization’s goals (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 479). 
Kohli and Kettinger (2004) examined how clan goals and organizational goals may be brought 
into congruence, even in cases when the organization's management does not possess the power 
to impose conformity. In these cases, congruence was achieved when management created a 
common cause with key clan members through transparency of information (Kohli & Kettinger, 
2004). However, for congruency to occur, the existence of a clan and its goals must be explicit. 
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Chua et al. (2012) discussed ways in which existing clans may be deliberately leveraged 
or “enacted” through clan empowerment and claimed that “clan control is often essential for 
complex multi-stakeholder project success” (p. 577). Their literature thoroughly discusses the 
positives and negatives of clan control when operating explicitly and the steps to bring 
congruency to clan and organizational goals. Where this study extends the literature is in 
addressing the impact of a clan whose goals have fallen out of congruence with the organization 
and which then proceeds to operate in a sub rosa fashion within the formal hierarchy. While 
clans are remarkably adaptive (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983), the impact of the campaign plan as a 
strategic initiative to reinvigorate Mw by teaching at the tacit level threatened the status quo and 
its clan members’ professional reputations. At this point, the clan and the organization 
experienced divergent and incongruent goals and began to operate sub rosa. The result was an 
organization that appeared mired in a status quo that was insufficient for the mission to 
reinvigorate Mw. 
V.3 Contributions to Practice 
This study focused on describing and explaining MCTOG’s attempt and failure to sufficiently 
implement a strategic initiative to achieve a desired outcome. Regardless of business or conflict 
domains, the findings in this study are transferable to any military or non-military organization 
(Augier et al., 2014; Tinoco & Arnaud, 2013). This study may benefit and inform managers and 
leaders who face the need to implement a strategic initiative to adapt to a dynamic and contested 
environment in two ways. The first potential benefit is taking a deliberate approach to 
understanding one’s organizational learning system and recognizing it as a competitive 
advantage (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March, 1991a; Teece et al., 1997). The second potential benefit 
is understanding that strategic initiatives that upset the status quo may foment sub rosa clan 
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activity incongruent with organizational goals. These clan activities will hamper the strategic 
change initiative from within, create turmoil, and result in the loss of time and committed 
resources. 
Focusing for a moment on specific contributions to practice in a military organization, let 
us consider the strategic initiative in question, the MCTOG 2017-2027 Campaign Plan. This 
document articulated a 10-year vision that would alter how the organization would conduct 
business internally, its role in the larger community of interest, and its relationships with external 
stakeholders. It held the potential to create significant and positive gains for the institution it 
served. Understanding and explaining why a “say-do-gap” existed between the espoused theory 
and theory-in-use is not a trivial matter—in fact, it is imperative to the change process, as blood 
and treasure are at stake in the event of war (Davidson, 2010; Kelly, 2008; Shultz, 2012). To 
open the aperture of this study, let us consider the contributions to practice in a non-military 
organization. Whether a commercial enterprise, public service, or non-profit, any organization 
attempting to adapt to a dynamic or contested environment can benefit from this research. Often, 
when significant adaptation to a dynamic environment is required, it involves strategic changes 
to how the organization does business, its relationships, and its commitment of resources to a 
particular goal (Shivakumar, 2014). The prudent manager and leader should understand how an 
extant organizational learning system may influence their strategic initiatives and dynamics 
within their organization. 
The data coding process revealed five phenomena operating within MCTOG that, when 
viewed through the theoretical lens of ToA (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978, 1996), produced a 
framework of five explanatory frames.  Each explanatory frame carried with it consequences to 
organizational learning as detailed in the previous chapter.  Additional insight for each 
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explanatory frame is noted below, along with recommended corrective interventions that 
managers and leaders may wish to consider. 
V.3.1 Explanatory Frame 1: Uncertainty in a Hybrid Organization 
MCTOG’s personnel composition created a dynamic of external pressures influencing internal 
priorities that resulted in members feeling pulled in many directions. MCTOG was also 
unusually top-heavy in rank due to the mid-grade ranks of the students and the presence of GS 
civilian co-workers, an absolute novelty for many Marines. Such a high density of senior 
Marines and the presence of GS civilians, often in senior- or middle-management positions, 
disrupted the normal pecking order to which military members are accustomed. What became 
apparent in the study was that MCTOG members had not been formally informed or socialized 
to the new reality of their role in MCTOG. Socialization instead transpired informally and took 
on as many forms as there were members. 
In many cases, the vacuum of socialization to MCTOG was filled by the SQ clan. The 
data revealed a common theme of not knowing the corporate identity of MCTOG. The campaign 
plan addressed MCTOG’s mission as a schoolhouse and COE and the dynamic space it occupied 
astride institutional tension. However, the lack of engagement with the campaign plan and the 
negative socialization exhibited by the SQ clan sustained and perpetuated the uncertainty 
surrounding MCTOG’s identity. 
Potential Corrective Interventions: The uncertainty induced by a lack of formal 
socialization to this hybrid organization produced a dislocation of expectation for members, 
which induced an ill-defined sense of purpose across the organization and resulted in defensive 
routines to protect reputations. Members' defensive routines were intended to reduce the 
potential for conflict and embarrassment and to “just survive this tour.” The defensive routines 
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also restricted communications into silos with little cross-talk, underwhelming after-action 
reviews, and the avoidance of critical conversations, resulting in superficial learning (Popper & 
Lipshitz, 1998). The weight of uncertainty alone created by the absence of a formal socialization 
process reinforced the elements of a Model I learning organization system. 
A formal socialization process for all incoming members that leverages the formal 
authority of MCTOG senior management will reduce uncertainty and provide legitimacy to a 
new expectation and set norms and assumptions with a level of intentionality. While formal 
socialization alone will not turn a Model I single-loop organizational learning system into a 
Model II organizational learning system, it will reduce uncertainty by assuring members of their 
role within the organization and the goals of the organization. Additionally, a clan operating 
explicitly, and with goals generally congruent with the organization, can be a powerful ally to 
management. These clans, when enabled by resources and the legitimate authority of the senior 
management, can establish positive behaviors favorable to the organizations’ strategic initiative.  
V.3.2 Explanatory Frame 2: Mw and Functional Illiteracy 
The data show that among the MCTOG faculty and staff, the knowledge and understanding of 
Mw and commitment to teaching Mw doctrine was an espoused theory only. The combination of 
a significant level of Mw functional illiteracy, combined with a campaign plan that emphasized 
teaching Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum, presented a threat to faculty. Faculty seeking to 
preserve their professional reputations created an array of defensive reasoning for not teaching 
Mw at the tacit level. Over time, the defensive reasoning produced a condition of “skilled 
incompetence” among instructors. 
The “skilled incompetence” displayed by faculty was enabled by a condition of “skilled 
unawareness” displayed by senior management to avoid the difficult work and take the apparent 
128 
 
but unpopular remedy of a mandatory, formal, and progressive instructor development plan. The 
default action instead relied on the autodidact faculty members to perform the bulk of tacit-level 
instruction. Lacking sufficient knowledge and competency in Mw among the faculty was 
certainly a hindrance to reinvigorating Mw. Moreover, the combination of skilled incompetence 
of middle management and skilled unawareness of senior management ensured a Model I single-
loop organizational learning system would persist despite the Model II aspirations noted in the 
campaign plan. 
Potential Corrective Interventions: It is axiomatic that a formal instructor development 
program in Mw would be a significant remedy to the issue experienced at MCTOG. The large 
issue is, for managers at any organization, to not presume the competence of its members in core 
functions. To do so is an act of omission that hinders organizational learning by placing members 
in the position of suppressing defects in their preparedness with Model I behaviors. If members 
are presumed competent and are asked to perform a task that exceeds their abilities, there are 
very good reasons members will develop an array of defensive routines to camouflage their 
shortcomings to avoid embarrassment and damage to their reputation. Managers initiating a 
strategic initiative should consider conducting an intervention that sets a non-threatening 
expectation of transparent competency and provides a path to achieve said competency. Doing so 
will likely reduce the reliance on defensive routines to hide a deficiency in skill and set the 
conditions for a Model II learning system.  
V.3.3 Explanatory Frame 3: The Campaign Plan Gets a Damn Good Ignoring 
The MCTOG campaign plan was a strategic document meant to serve as an intervention to 
stimulate the adaptive change necessary to realize its role and reinvigorate Mw. However, it also 
represented a new espoused theory for the organization impacting approaches in instruction, 
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organizational structure, and responsibilities. The new espoused theory was injected into the 
MCTOG dynamics and represented a direct threat to the status quo, a Model I theory in practice. 
Combined with the uncertainty extending from a lack of intentional socialization and an 
insufficient capacity to teach Mw, the campaign plan encountered multiple Model I behavior 
defensive routines—namely avoidance, inertia, and indifference—at the individual and group 
levels, which ensured the campaign plan went exactly nowhere. 
Potential Corrective Interventions: Managers attempting to implement a strategic 
initiative should consider the impact on the current status quo theory-in-use. Even if a strategic 
initiative is specifically intended to disrupt the status quo, one should understand a sub rosa 
clan’s potential consequences to organizational learning and incidental development. 
 V.3.4 Explanatory Frame 4: Lions Living as Lambs 
MCTOG is a well-led organization with active senior management, and the workforce is 
comprised of intelligent, competent Marines and GS employees, most of whom had served as 
active duty Marines. Nearly all participants had served operationally overseas and had been in 
harm's way for one or several combat tours. Given this picture of MCTOG and its members, it 
was surprising to me that the data revealed fear, specifically “fear of looking bad,” as one of the 
most dominant themes. The socialization of Marines upon entry into the service is intense and 
comprehensive. Marines are indelibly stamped with the Marine Corps core values of “honor, 
courage, commitment” and the Marine Corps ethos of martial prowess, tenacity, “can-do” 
obedience, and subordinating oneself to the good of the unit and mission. A Marine’s personal 
reputation is built upon those core values and ethos. The Marine Corps is also the smallest of the 
services, and one's reputation is not only lasting, but it precedes them a shot to their next duty 
station. Protecting reputation is important. 
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The campaign plan required teaching Mw at the tacit level and required a level of Mw 
competency that most of the faculty did not possess. The prospect of trying to teach Mw at the 
tacit level with insufficient literacy in Mw posed a direct threat to those instructors’ reputations 
for martial prowess. In their study, Staw et al. (1981) examined how, in the presence of threat 
and fear, individuals, groups, and organizations will respond with rigidity. Threat and fear 
produce"…a reliance on a tried and true mode of operating. As a result, threat is often more 
associated with inertia, protection of the status quo, and sometimes inaction – the deer in the 
headlights syndrome" (Ancona, 2009, p. 12). Threat and fear induced by the campaign plan 
manifested within MCTOG as defensive routines that locked in a Model I single-loop learning 
system. The prospect of executing the campaign plan and teaching Mw at the tacit level 
threatened the professional reputation and, therefore, the careers of the majority of the faculty. 
The fear of looking bad induced Model I behaviors at the individual and group levels to maintain 
the status quo and effectively counter senior managements’ attempts to engage in Model II 
double-loop organizational learning. 
Potential Corrective Interventions: Managers seeking to install a strategic initiative 
should carefully consider how the initiative will impact the members of the organization. 
Understanding what elements of a strategic initiative may be perceived as a threat and what 
elements may create uncertainty among the workforce is the first step. Proactively, preemptively, 
and explicitly addressing threat perceptions and uncertainty through clarity, consistency, and 
connection in their communications will help managers achieve the organization’s goals. Clarity 
of communication requires a dialogue that ensures the message and expectations are not 
ambiguous or vague and that understanding is positively confirmed. Consistency of management 
actions and behaviors refers to the golden rule that actions speak louder than words. Managers 
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and leaders must ensure there is not a “say-do-gap” between their words and deeds. Finally, 
managers and leaders must work to establish a connection between the organizations’ goals and 
the goals of its members to allow a congruency among them to develop. This requires a great 
deal of effort. Clarity of expectations and providing a pathway to achieve the skills to function 
within a new system will reduce the fear of looking bad across an organization. Managers and 
leaders need to see that clarity, consistency, and connection requires the necessary spadework to 
engage in Model II double-loop organizational learning. 
V.3.5 Explanatory Frame 5:  Sub Rosa Clan and Control to Maintain Status Quo 
The literature concerning clan behavior within organizations mainly portrays clans as operating 
explicitly and in some form of congruence with the organization it is in. The findings of this 
study demonstrate the opposite. The data revealed the surprising existence of a sub rosa SQ clan 
operating within the hierarchical structure and counter to the organizations’ goals of 
implementing the campaign plan. The actions of the SQ clan contributed to the ineffective 
implementation of the plan and, ultimately, the efforts to reinvigorate Mw. 
It is not the intent of this study to paint the SQ clan as the villain of the story. The SQ 
clan did exert informal control in the form of Model I behaviors to counter senior managements’ 
attempts to implement the plan. However, in many ways, the SQ clan was responding to the 
uncertainty and fear induced by the insufficiently communicated campaign plan and was 
protecting its members from looking bad. The SQ clan reacted to the organization's failure to 
provide clarity, consistency, and connection of purpose and provide a path to goal congruence 
between the SQ clan and the organization. The impact of informal SQ clan control resulted in not 
only the failed implementation of the campaign plan, but it also ensured through censure of its 
members, that learning would remain superficial and rooted in rote memorization of the 
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processes and procedures. 
The attempt to install a new espoused theory (Mw/campaign plan) was senior 
management's bid for Model II double-loop organizational learning. The unintended outcome 
was that the new espoused theory created ambiguity, uncertainty, and fear and threatened the 
status quo. The response was the rise of the SQ clan—those who maintained the status quo 
through Model I behaviors and informal clan control. These conditions resulted in an 
undiscussable détente between the skilled incompetence of the SQ clan and the skilled 
unawareness of the senior management, ultimately preserving a Model I single-loop learning 
system and the status quo. 
Potential Corrective Interventions: Informal clan control and formal hierarchal control 
need not operate exclusively, as clans and organizational hierarchies inside of MCTOG can work 
through common cause to achieve goal congruence. Hierarchical organizations typically possess 
significant influence, authority, and resources that may be applied to influence clans and shape 
congruency between clan and organizational goals. Managers and leaders can proactively and 
preemptively shape clan behaviors through the “clarity, consistency, and connection” spadework 
addressed previously. However, before a common cause may be achieved, managers must first 
be aware of the clan’s presence, whether explicit or sub rosa, and they must be aware of the 
clan's goals. Once managers have diagramed the internal clan structure, they may thoughtfully 
employ their legitimate control, influence, and resources to enable informal clan control that is a 
common cause with the organization. 
When management lacks the legitimacy to impose control, the common cause may be 
achieved by empowering the clan to legitimize the message. What was discovered in the case of 
MCTOG was the need to ‘flip’ a sub rosa clan to achieve congruency between clan and 
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organizational goals. Flipping a clan that harbors goals incongruent with the organizations’ goals 
requires a Damascene conversion of the existing clan leader. Such a leader, whom already 
possesses sufficient social capital to be influential within the organization, may potentially be 
‘flipped’ through thoughtful, empathetic, and transparent dialogue with senior management. 
Such an engagement can bring clan and organizational goals into congruence. Once congruence 
is achieved the clan leader may operate explicitly and as a sort of Apostle Paul, who then carries 
the message of the new espoused theory to the clan. Alternatively, the organization may enable 
an outsider with sufficient social capital to make the clans’ activities explicit and work to gain 
congruency of goals. With congruency of goals, the reasons for sub rosa activity are known in 
advance and uncertainty and fear are neutralized. The spadework for a Model II organizational 
learning system may now begin. 
V.4 Limitations 
The Marine Corps is a 185,000-person strong, globally distributed organization. This study is 
limited to one organization within that structure, and admittedly a small one. This fact is 
mitigated by selecting an organization that is situated at the nexus of the major elements inside of 
the Marine Corps. The Fleet Marine Force and the supporting establishments each have a stake 
in the MCTOG mission. Additionally, MCTOG was one of the few organizations to aggressively 
pursue the call to reinvigorate Mw and was uniquely situated as a schoolhouse and COE to effect 
that change. Members of MCTOG are drawn from both major elements and include officers and 
enlisted Marines who possess backgrounds in ground combat, combat support, combat service 
support, as well as aviation. This diversity of rank and occupational specialties, while not fully 
complete, provides a cross-sectional representation of the Marine Corps. The transferability of 
this study to the rest of the Marine Corps is not universal, however. Operational units and 
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functional areas of the supporting establishment will not find as much utility as will 
organizations within the TECOM training and education continuum. That said, any organization 
seeking to effect change through a strategic initiative or struggling in the midst of one could use 
the explanatory framework findings of this study to examine their organizational learning 
system.  
This study was a cross-sectional case study conducted in situ and therefore captures a 
snapshot in time of a very dynamic organization. If this study were conducted again today, many 
of the findings would be different. Some of the differences would likely be a result of this study's 
engaged scholarship approach. I partnered closely with the Commanding Officer of MCTOG in 
the co-production of knowledge by sharing analytical memos and the interim case summary. In 
some instances, the Commanding Officer acted on the real-time disclosure of the research 
findings. Specifically, the power in naming a hidden and complex dynamic appropriately and 
effectively prompted the formalized and mandated instructor development program, with the 
Commanding Officer giving full-throttle support. 
One challenge of case studies is to recruit participants with enough diversity to ensure a 
complete view from several aspects within the Marine Corps. This challenge was mitigated by 
recruiting participants who were at the beginning, middle, and end of their tours. Additionally, 
there was a proportional representation among uniformed military, both officer and enlisted, and 
GS employees with representation among senior management, middle management, and the 
instructor cadre. All participants were generous with their time. They were open, honest, and 
eager to participate. 
Self-reported data from interviews and focus groups may threaten the data validity, and 
participant observation is subject to researcher bias (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). These issues 
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were mitigated through triangularization of interviews, focus groups, participant/observer 
activity in workshops and meetings, and direct observations. These methods allowed me to check 
participants’ self-reported data against actual behavior and other participants’ comments. Having 
the time to thoroughly absorb the data provided insight into participant agendas, attempts at 
deception, and to check statements against facts and secondary evidence. 
V.5 Future Research 
The data show where Model II double-loop learning was attempted at MCTOG, but failed to take 
root, due to an overwhelming presence of inhibiting Model I behaviors in the organization. 
MCTOG’s senior management exhibited several attempts of Model II double-loop learning by 
soliciting input on the campaign plan from its members and its attempts to engage at two 
leadership offsite events. Many participants received these Model II overtures enthusiastically, 
yet they were suppressed by SQ clan informal control, suggesting that an organizational learning 
system may not be monolithic when an organization possesses one particular learning system at 
the exclusion of the other. Future research could investigate the presence of both Model I and 
Model II organizational learning systems and the relational dynamics that enable one over the 
other. As the presence of a sub rosa clan operating within the hierarchal structure and at a 
counter-purpose with senior management was as a surprise, future research could be conducted 
to help managers and leaders diagnose clan presence and diagram the boundaries of informal 
clan control, allowing organizational influencers to conduct more precise and mindful 
interventions in enabling positive clan attributes and inhibiting negative clan attributes. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Organizations invest billions and risk their very existence in attempts to implement change 
through strategic initiatives. Managers who understand their organizational learning systems and 
how those systems and people will respond to changes in the status quo will make better 
informed decisions regarding implementation. This study captures the story of one organization's 
attempt and failure to sufficiently implement a strategic initiative. This story may be broadly 
fitted to any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and 
contested environments of business or conflict. The strategic initiative, in the form of a campaign 
plan, was a 10-year vision that would alter how the organization would conduct business 
internally, its role in the larger community of interest, and its relationships with external 
stakeholders and held the potential to create significant and positive gains for the institution it 
served. The dynamics of an SQ clan operating sub rosa within the hierarchical structure of 
MCTOG exerted informal clan control that countered senior management implementation 
efforts. The SQ clan consisted of middle management and those with greater time in the 
organization and was primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo and their individual 
reputations. The SQ clan unconsciously acted with fear-inspired defensive routines establishing 
and sustaining a Model I organizational learning environment that muted the more junior and 
less tenured members through censure and, in effect, blunted the MCTOG senior management’s 
efforts at change. The result was the campaign plan going absolutely nowhere. 
This study was an engaged scholarship effort and offered a penetrating look into the 
subtle, yet impactful interplay between organizational learning and control theory. The interplay 
between these two social phenomena ultimately muted the organization’s effort to implement a 
strategic initiative. The explanatory framework provided a structure and lexicon to a set of 
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unstructured, often hidden, and nameless dynamics at work within an organization. Also 
revealed was how the SQ clan, while acting without nefarious intent, responded to organizational 
uncertainty and employed its collective social capital in the form of middle management 
positions, seniority and an array of Model I defensive routines to enforce status quo norms. 
Ultimately, the actions of the SQ served as the bêtes noires to senior management attempts to 
engage the in the Model II organizational learning activities necessary to implement the strategic 
initiative and reinvigorate Mw.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Dissertation Research 
BP McCoy 
Georgia State University 
______________________________________________________________________________
______ 
Participant # ______ 
Interviewer Name: BP McCoy 
Date of Interview: 
Time Interview Started: 
Time Interview Concluded: 
Location of Interview: 
Length of Service:  
Length of Time at MCTOG:  
Rank/Rate:  
Assigned Working Group:  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Instructions: The interviewer will ask the numbered interview questions. At their discretion, the 
interviewer will use the lettered questions as probes to elicit data-rich, narrative responses. As a 
semi-structured interview, the interviewer should ask additional follow-up questions beyond this 
protocol in order to clarify the participant’s response or probe further into the qualitative data 
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provided in the open-ended responses. 
Note that special instructions are in italics and should not be read aloud. The interviews are 
audio-recorded, in order for the interviewer to later analyze the verbatim interview responses. 
Throughout the course of the interview, the interviewer should record, in writing, nonverbal 
communication as it is observed or immediately following the interview. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this research study. My research 
involves organizational, philosophies, how people interact within organizations, and how 
organizations learn. I will ask you broad questions about what it’s like to work here in order to 
get a sense of the organization’s norms, commonly held assumptions, and the ways people 
interact. Also, thank you for signing the informed consent. Do you have any questions about it or 
the study in general before we get started?  
I appreciate the time you’ve agreed to commit, so I’ll set a timer to ensure we do not exceed the 
agreed-upon 90 minutes. As mentioned in the informed consent, I will be recording this 
interview so that I may have a verbatim transcript and capture everything accurately. Is this still 
ok with you?  
The interviewer should ensure the participant gives a clear response. 
As detailed in the informed consent form, the transcript will not contain any information that 
could identify you, and your comments will be assigned a randomly generated code, such as 
“Participant #XX.”  
I am the lone investigator on this study project and commit to preserving confidentiality for you 
and all other participants. In the interest of confidentiality for you and all those involved and not 
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involved in this study, I must remind you to not use the names, initials, rank, or other identifying 
information of other people in the course of our interview. Do you have any questions? 
______________________________________________________________________________
_ 
This is a semi-structured interview, there are no right or wrong answers, so please answer frankly.  
Questions Regarding Maneuver Warfare and Learning:  
1. How would you describe Maneuver Warfare in practice? What does it look like? 
a. What does it look like operationally? 
b. What does it look like in garrison or in the schoolhouse? 
c. How are the tenants of Maneuver Warfare applied at MCTOG?  
d. What is the role of risk in Maneuver Warfare?  
e. Is risk rewarded? Under what circumstances?  
2. Given MCTOG’s mission as both a schoolhouse and a center of excellence and the 
aspirations of the campaign plan, in which areas does the organization need to excel?  
a. In other words, given MCTOG’s mission and goals, what do you need to be really 
good at to succeed, and what does the organization need to learn in order to 
succeed? 
3. In terms of learning, what new insights and behaviors are required at the individual level 
in this command to achieve the goals of the campaign plan? 
4. In terms of learning, what new insights and behaviors are required and the group or 
community level to achieve the campaign plan? 
5. Given the required insights and behaviors identified for the individual, groups, and 
organizational levels, how can MCTOG facilitate that learning? 
a. Is the knowledge MCTOG is seeking to develop more explicit or tacit in nature?  
b. How does that type of explicit knowledge development shape your learning 
approach? 
c. How does that type of tacit knowledge development shape your learning 
approach?  
d. How does learning happen now?  
e. How do you go about your job as it applies to facilitating learning?  
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6. What are your underlying assumptions about the complexity and adaptability of the 
environment here at MCTOG? 
a. Internal complexity and adaptability? 
b. External complexity and adaptability? 
7. What mental models or framework do you use to guide your decisions? 
8. How do these assumptions influence our learning styles?  
9. How do we test the viability of our assumptions and approaches? 
10. Given MCTOGs agenda, what’s the required speed, depth, and breadth of the learning 
required to achieve the goals of the campaign plan?  
a. How can MCTOG support the transfer of learning throughout the organization? 
Questions Regarding Organizational Norms, Culture, and Learning: 
11. What is it like to work here?  
a. How does everyone get along here?  
b. What is the interaction like?  
c. What are the unwritten rules here about how things get done around here? 
d. How well do people work as a team?  
e. At MCTOG, how does the faculty learn?  
f. At MCTOG how does the staff learn?  
12. What happens when there is disagreement?  
a. How do members communicate during disagreement? 
b. When there is disagreement, what is the atmosphere like? 
c. Are there subjects that are touchy or to be avoided?  
d. When members disagree, how is your work affected? 
13. In what ways is the following statement accurate or inaccurate? “At MCTOG, my talents 
and thinking is valued.” 
a. What does “my talents and thinking are valued” look like? 
b. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? “When members at MCTOG have a 
difference of opinion there is frank and professional discussion about it.” 
c. What does the idea of an “frank and professional discussion” look like for you? 
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14. When conflicts occur at MCTOG, how is that conflict resolved? 
a. What does the idea of “resolving conflict” look like for you? 
15. In what ways is the following statement accurate or inaccurate? “When people disagree at 
MCTOG, it is resolved and the organization learns and makes improvements.” 
a. What does the concept of “organizational learning” look like for you at MCTOG? 
16. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? “I trust those I work with here 
at MCTOG.” 
a. What does the concept of “trust” look like for you here at MCTOG? 
17. Do you have anything else to share with me about the MCTOG culture or the way things 
get done or how members conduct themselves?  
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Appendix B: Government Service Employee Focus Group Protocol  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant Codes: 
 
Interviewer Name:  
 
Date of Focus Group:  
 
Time Focus Group Started:  
 
Time Focus Group Concluded:  
 
Location of Focus Group Discussion: 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Instructions: Gather a group of government service employee staff -members to form a focus 
group. Ask the questions to the group. 
Note that special instructions are noted in italics and should not be read aloud. The focus group 
will not be audio-recorded. The interviewer should record, in writing, both verbal and non- 
verbal communication as it is observed during the focus group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction: Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this focus group. My 
research involves how people interact within organizations and how organizations learn. During 
144 
 
this focus group, I will ask you questions as a group about the learning environment. 
 
Focus Group Questions Interviewer Observations on Qualitative Responses 
from Participants 
1. How do people learn on the job at 
MCTOG? 
 
2. In what ways does MCTOG provide 
(or fail to provide) a supportive learning 
environment? 
 
3. In what ways does the leadership at 
MCTOG promote (or fail to promote) 
learning by welcoming input and 
listening? 
 
4. In what ways does MCTOG provide 
(or fail to provide) the opportunity to 
learn as you work by experimenting and 
sharing ideas with each other? 
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Appendix C: Uniformed Military Focus Group Protocol  
Participant Name:  
 
Interviewer Name:  
 
Date of Focus Group:  
 
Time Focus Group Started:  
 
Time Focus Group Concluded:  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Instructions: Gather a group of uniformed faculty members to form a focus group. Ask the 
questions to the group. 
Note that special instructions are noted in italics and should not be read aloud. The focus group 
will not be audio-recorded. The interviewer should record, in writing, both verbal and non- 
verbal communication as it is observed during the focus group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction: Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this focus group. My 
research involves how people interact within organizations and how organizations learn. During 
this focus group, I will ask you questions as a group about the learning environment. 
 
 
Focus Group Questions Interviewer Observations on Qualitative Responses from 
Participants 
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1. How do people learn on the 
job at MCTOG? 
 
2. In what ways does MCTOG 
provide (or fail to provide) a 
supportive learning 
environment? 
 
3. In what ways does the 
leadership at MCTOG promote 
(or fail to promote) learning by 
welcoming input and listening? 
 
4. In what ways does MCTOG 
provide (or fail to provide) the 
opportunity to learn as you work 
by experimenting and sharing 
ideas with others? 
 
 
147 
 
REFERENCES 
Ancona, D. (2009). Framing and Acting in the Unknown. The Handbook for Teaching 
Leadership, 3–19. 
Ando, F. (2002). The Real Relationship Between Organizational Culture and Organizational 
Learning. Annals of Business Administrative Science, 1(2), 25–34. 
https://doi.org/10.7880/abas.1.25 
Anonymous. (2011). The Attritionists Letters. The Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico VA: The 
Marine Corps Gazette. https://doi.org/10.5149/9780807869758_hassler.6 
Argyle, M. (1990). Bodily Communication (Vol. 2nd ed). London: Routledge. 
Argyris, C. (2003). A Life Full of Learning. Organization Studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/01708406030247009 
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. . A. (1978). Organizational learning: A Theory Of Action Perspective 
(Vol. 15). Reading , MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1974). Theory in Practice : Increasing Professional Effectiveness. 
(1st ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1996). Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice. 
(E. Schien & R. Beckhard, Eds.), Reading. Reading , MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2525281 
Argyris, C. (2000). Double‐Loop Learning. Wiley Encyclopedia of Management, 115–126. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02013415 
Argyris, C, & Schon, D. A. (1974). Theories in Practice. Theories in Practice Proceedings of the 
first international conference on English and American studies. https://doi.org/978-80-
7318-823-8 (print) 
148 
 
Argyris, C. (1996). Skilled incompetence. Harvard Business Review, (September-October), 74–
80. https://doi.org/10.1002/ddr.430350102 
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1996). Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Augier, M., & Barrett, S. F. X. (2019). Organizational perspectives on the maneuver warfare 
movement in the United States Marine Corps: insights from the work of James G. March. 
Industrial and Corporate Change. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtz063 
Augier, M., Knudsen, T., & McNab, R. M. (2014). Advancing the field of organizations through 
the study of military organizations. Industrial and Corporate Change, 23(6), 1417–1444. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtt059 
Bartlett, M. L., & Sweetman, J. (2008). Leathernecks : an illustrated history of the U.S. Marine 
Corps. Naval Institute Press. 
Bate, P., Khan, R., & Pye, A. (2000). Towards A Culturally Sensitive Approach To Organization 
Structuring: Where Organization Design Meets Organization Development. Organization 
Science, 11(2), 197–211. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.11.2.197.12509 
Bazeley, P., & Jackson, K. (2013). Qualitative data analysis with NVivo. (Second edi). SAGE 
Publications. 
Bontis, N., Crossan, M. M., & Hulland, J. (2002). Managing an organizational learning system 
by aligning stocks and flows. Journal of Management Studies, 39(4), 437–469. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.t01-1-00299 
Boyd, J. (1985). (11) Taking Initiative - YouTube. Retrieved February 1, 2020, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jF3O7lcviAE 
Brown, I. T. (2018). A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and maneuver 
149 
 
Warfare. Quantico VA: MCUP. 
Builder, C. H. (1989). The masks of war : American military styles in strategy and analysis. 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Charles, V., & Tzu, S. (2012). Art of War. New York: Parkstone International. 
Christensen I. Overdorf M. (2000). Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change. Research 
Technology Management, 43(4), 63. 
Chua, C. E. H., Lim, W. K., Soh, C., & Sia, S. K. (2012). Enacting clan control in complex IT 
projects: A social capital perspective. MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems, 
36(2), 577–600. https://doi.org/10.2307/41703468 
Clemons, E. K., & Santamaria, J. A. (2002). Maneuver warfare: Can modern military strategy 
lead you to victory? Harvard Business Review. 
Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). Qualitative inquiry & research design : choosing among 
five approaches. (Fourth edi). SAGE. 
Crossan, M. (2003). Chris Argyris and Donald Schon ’ s Organizational Learning : There is no 
silver bullet. Academy of Management Executive. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.2003.10025187 
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. (1999). An Organizational Learning Framework: 
From {Intuition to Institution. The Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 522–537. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/259140 
Damian, F. (2001). The Road to FMFM 1: The United States Marine Corps and Maneuver 
Warfare Doctrine, 1979-1989. University of California, Berkeley. 
Davidson, J. (2010). Lifting the Fog of Peace How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War 
Chapter 1: Military Learning and Competing Theories of Change. The University of 
150 
 
Michigan Press. 
DeWalt, K. M., & DeWalt, B. R. (2002). Participant observation : a guide for fieldworkers. 
AltaMira Press. 
Dubin, R. (1969). Theory building. New York, Free Press ©1969. 
Eisenberg, A., Ignatjeva, S., Iliško, D., & Rauckiene-Michaelsson, A. (2018). Adaptation of the 
Organizational Learning Culture (OLC) Dimension Methodology in the Israeli Local 
Authorities Context. Discourse and Communication for Sustainable Education, 9(1), 50–63. 
https://doi.org/10.2478/dcse-2018-0004 
Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. (1985a). Organizational Learning. Academy of Management Review, 
10(4), 803–813. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1985.4279103 
Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. (1985b). Organizational Learning. Academy of Management Review, 
10(4), 803–813. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1985.4279103 
Friesenborg, L. (2013). The Culture of Learning Organizations: Understanding Argyris’ Theory 
Through a Socio-cognitive Systems Learning Model. University of ST. Thomas, 
Minneapolis, MN. 
Frost, P. J., Moore, L. F., Louis, M. R., Lundberg, C. C., & Martin, J. (1985). Organizational 
culture. (P. J. Frost, L. F. Moore, M. R. Louis, C. C. Lundberg, & J. Martin, Eds.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Gadamer, H.-G., & Linge, D. E. (1976). Philosophical hermeneutics. University of California 
Press. 
Giddens, A. (1993). New Rules of Sociological Method. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
Gorman, M. E. (2002). Types of Knowledge and Their Roles in Technology Transfer. The 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 27(3), 219–231. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015672119590 
151 
 
Haeckel, S. H., & Nolan, R. L. (1993). Managing By Wire. Harvard Business Review, 
71(October), 122–132. 
Hanson, V. D. (2001). Carnage and culture : landmark battles in the rise of Western power. (1st 
ed.). Doubleday. 
Hawkins, B. (2015). Ship-shape: Materializing leadership in the British Royal Navy. Human 
Relations, 68(6), 951–971. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726714563810 
Haynie, J. (2018). SIG Note: The Struggle to Think: Critical and Creative Thinking in the 
Marine Corps. Washington DC. 
Hedberg, B. (2003). How Organizations Learn and Unlearn. In N. Lazaric & E. Lorenz (Eds.), 
Knowledge, learning and routines. Volume 2. Routines (pp. 548–572). Unlisted: Elgar 
Reference Collection. Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, vol. 4. 
Higbee, D. (2010). Military Culture and Education : Current Intersections of Academic and 
Military Cultures. Farnham, Surrey, England: Routledge. 
Holmes-Eber, P. (2014a). Culture in conflict : irregular warfare, culture policy, and adaptation 
in the marine corps. Stanford Security Studies. 
Holmes-Eber, P. (2014b). Culture in Conflict : Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the 
Marine Corps. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies. 
Holmes-Eber, P. (2014c). Culture in Conflict : Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the 
Marine Corps. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies. 
Hough, F. O., Ludwig, V. E., Shaw  Jr., H. I., Kane, D. T., Nalty, B. C., Turnbladh, E. T., … 
Frank, B. M. (1958). History of U.S. Marine Corps operations in World War II. Historical 
Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 
Howard, M. (1998). Clausewitz On war. [electronic resource]. Washington : Library of 
152 
 
Congress, 1998. 
Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures. 
Organization Science, 2(1), 88–115. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.88 
Jaeger, A. M. (1983). The Transfer of Organizational Culture Overseas : An Approach to Control 
in the Multinational Corporation Author ( s ): Alfred M . Jaeger Source : Journal of 
International Business Studies , Vol . 14 , No . 2 , Special Issue on Cross- Cultural 
Management. Journal of International Business Studies, 14(2), 91–114. 
JFD. (2016). Joint Operating Enviroment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered 
World. Washington DC. 
Johnson, J. L. (2018). The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture : Lessons Learned 
and Lost in America’s Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Kelly, J. (2008). Resistance to Organizational Cultural Change in the Military-A JFO Case 
Study. U.S. Army War College. 
Kim, D. (1993). The link between individual and organizational learning. MIT Sloan 
Management Review.  
Klein, H. K., & Myers, M. D. (1999). A set of principles for conducting and evaluating 
interpretive field studies in information systems. MIS Quarterly, 23(1), 67–93. 
Kohli, R., & Kettinger, W. J. (2004). Informating the Clan : Controlling Physicians’ Costs and 
Outcomes. MIS Quarterly, 28(3), 363–394. 
Krulak, V. H. (1984). First to fight : an inside view of the U.S. Marine Corps. Annapolis, Md: 
Naval Institute Press. 
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988). Organizational Learning. Academy of Management Review, 
10(4), 319–340. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1985.4279103 
153 
 
Lind, W. S. (1985a). Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 
Lind, W. S. (1985b). Manevuer Warfare Handbook page 16. Boulder, Colorado. 
Linn, Brian, M. (2002). The American Way of War Revisited. The Journal of Military History, 
66, 501–533. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7600200410 
Lloyd, J. (1989, November). Our Warfigting Philosophy. Marine Corps Gazette, November, 24–
25. 
MAGTF Instructional Group. (2015). Warfighting Panel - Warfighting as a Philosophy - 
YouTube. Retrieved February 23, 2020, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD3zaasobWk 
Maltz, R. S. (1997). Quality leadership as maneuver warfare. Program Manager, 26(3), 42. 
Mandal, F. B. (2014). Nonverbal Communication in Humans. Journal of Human Behavior in the 
Social Environment, 24(4), 417–421. https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2013.831288 
March, J. G. (1991). Exporation and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. Organization 
Science, Vol 2(No.1). 
Mathiassen, L., & Sandberg, A. (2013). How a professionally qualified doctoral student bridged 
the practice-research gap: A confessional account of Collaborative Practice Research. 
European Journal of Information Systems, 22(4), 475–492. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/ejis.2012.35 
Matzenbacher, B. (2018). The U . S . Army and Mission Command Philosophy Versus Practice. 
Military Review, (March-April), 61–71. 
MCA&F. (1960). Guidebook for Marines. (M. C. A. and F. Foundation, Ed.). Quantico VA: The 
Leatherneck Association, Inc. 
MCCDC. (2018). US Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan. Quantico VA. 
154 
 
MCTOG. (2017). MCTOG Org Charts. MCAGCC: Marine Corps Tactics and Operations 
Group. 
MCTOG. (2018a). Lesson plan analyze the operating environment ( OE ).  U.S. Marine Corps. 
MCTOG. (2018b). Marine Corps Tactics And Operations Group Campaign Plan 2017-2027.  
U.S Marine Corps 
MCTOG. (2019a). Core Design Team: An Overview of Activities. Twentynine Palms CA. 
MCTOG. (2019b). MCTOG March 2019 Online Staff Survey. MCTOG. Twentynine Palms, CA. 
MCU. (2016). Information Paper: Review of Maneuver Warfare and Amphibious Operations in 
PME Curricula.  
MCU. (2017).  Information Paper: Maneuver Warfare in the Marine Corps University 
Curricula. 
Merriam, S. B. (1998). Qualitative research and case study applications in education. (Second 
edi). Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J. (2014). Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods 
Sourcebook. Third Edition. Sage Publications Ltd (CA). Sage Publications Ltd (CA). 
Myers, M. D. (2013). Qualitative research in business & management. (2nd editio). SAGE. 
Nicastro, A. (2017). Reinvigorating maneuver warfare: Reflections from workshop 2.  
[Unpublished manuscript]. Twentynine Palms, CA. https://doi.org/10.2307/453678 
 
Nicastro, A. (2018). Reinvigorating manaeuver warfare workshop reflections [Unpublished  
manuscript]. Twentynine Palms, CA. 
 
Nielsen, K. J. (2014). Improving safety culture through the health and safety organization: A 
case study. Journal of Safety Research, 48, 7–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2013.10.003 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. Organization 
Science, 5(1), 14–37. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.5.1.14 
155 
 
O’Connor, N., & Kotze, B. (2008). ‘Learning Organizations’: A Clinician’s Primer. Australasian 
Psychiatry, 16(3), 173–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/10398560801888639 
Örtenblad, A. (2004). The learning organization: towards an integrated model. The Learning 
Organization, 11(2), 129–144. https://doi.org/10.1108/09696470410521592 
Osinga, F. P. B. (2007). Science, strategy and war: The strategic theory of John Boyd. Science, 
Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. New York: Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203088869 
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
25(1962), 129–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392231 
Ouchi, W. G., & Johnson, J. B. (1978). Types of Organizational Control and Their Relationship 
to Emotional Well Being. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(2), 293. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2392566 
Ouchi, W. G., & Price, R. L. (1978a). A new perspective on organization development. 
Organizational Dynamics, 62–70. 
Ouchi, W. G., & Price, R. L. (1978b). Hierarchies, Clans, And Theory Z: A New Perspecitve on 
On Organization Development. Organizational Dynamics, 7(2), 24–44. 
Parker, R. S. V, & Parker, P. (2017). The impact of sleep deprivation in military surgical teams: 
a systematic review. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 163(3), 158 LP – 163. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/jramc-2016-000640 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations : a resource 
dependence perspective / Jeffrey Pfeffer, Gerald R. Salancik. (G. R. Salancik, Ed.). New 
York: New York : Harper & Row. 
Pinfield, L. T. (2006). A Field Evaluation of Perspectives on Organizational Decision Making. 
156 
 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(3), 365. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392828 
Piscitelli, A. J. (2017). The Marine Corps Way of War : The Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps 
From Attrition to Maneuver Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era. El Dorado Hills, California: 
Savas Beatie. 
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (1998). Popper & Lipshitz (1998) Organizational Learning 
Mechanisms: a structural and cultural approach to organizational learning. Journal of Appli, 
34(no.2), 161–179. 
Reddick, C. G., Chatfield, A. T., & Ojo, A. (2017). A social media text analytics framework for 
double-loop learning for citizen-centric public services: A case study of a local government 
Facebook use. Government Information Quarterly. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2016.11.001 
Reiter, D., & Meek, C. (1999). Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitiative 
Empirical Test. International Studies Quarterly, 43, 363–387. 
Robeson, E. (1989, November). A Critique of FMFM-1 Warfighting, 27–29. 
Root-Bernstein, R. S. (1989). Discovering. Harvard University Press. 
Saldaña, J. (2013). The coding manual for qualitative researchers. (Second edi). SAGE 
Publications. 
Salner, M. (1999). Preparing for the learning organization. Journal of Management Education. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/105256299902300504 
Schein, E. H. (1996). Three cultures of management: The key to organizational learning. Sloan 
Management Review, 38(1), 9–20. 
Schein, E H. (2017). Organizational Culture and Leadership. (5th editio). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Schein, Edgar H. (1984). Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture. Sloan 
157 
 
Management Review, 25(2), 3–16. 
Scott, B. B., & Candidate, P. D. (2011). Organizational Learning : A Literature Review, 
(January). 
Shivakumar, R. (2014). How to Tell Which Decisions are Strategic. California Management 
Review, 56(3), 78–97. https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2014.56.3.78 
Shultz, R. Organizational learning and the Marine Corps: The counterinsurgency campaign in 
Iraq, 11 CIWAG case study series 2011-2012 (2012). 
Simon, H. A. (1996). The Sciences of the Artificial (Vol. 3rd ed). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press. 
Skerlavaj, M., Stemberger, M. I., Skrinjar, R., & Dimovski, V. (n.d.). Organizational learning 
culture - the missing link between business process change and organizational performance. 
International journal of production economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2006.07.009 
Staw, Barry, M., Sandelands, Lance, E., & Dutton, Jane, E. (1981). Threat-Rigidity Effects in 
Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, 
501–524. 
Szalma, J. L., & Hancock, P. A. (2008). Performance Under Stress. Aldershot, England: CRC 
Press. 
TECOM. (2016). TECOM Workshop 2017-01: Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare through 
Education and Training.  
TECOM. (2017). Enclosure 5 to TECOM Maneuver Warfare Conference 2017 Institutional 
Structure and Culture Summary Table. 
TECOM. (2018). TECOM Maneuver Warfare Workshop-3 24-25 Apr 2018, 2018(April). 
Teece, D. J., Pisana, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management. 
158 
 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(March), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-7506-
7088-3.50009-7 
Terriff, T. (2006a). “Innovate or die”: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver 
warfare in the United States Marine Corps. Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 29). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600765892 
Terriff, T. (2006b). Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the 
US Marine Corps. Defence Studies, 6(2), 215–247. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430601056139 
Terriff, T. (2006c). Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the 
US Marine Corps. Defence Studies, 6(2), 215–247. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430601056139 
Terriff, T. (2007a). Of romans and dragons: preparing the US marine corps for future warfare. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 28(1), 143–162. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701240583 
Terriff, T. (2007b). Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future 
Warfare. Contemporary Security Policy. London : 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701240583 
Tinoco, J., & Arnaud, A. (2013). The transfer of military culture to private sector organizations: 
A sense of duty emerges. Journal of Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict, 
17(2), 37–62. 
Townsend, S. Crissman, D. McCoy, K. (2019a). Reinvigorating the Army ’ s Approach to 
Mission Command. Military Review, (May-June). 
Townsend, S. Crissman, D. McCoy, K. (2019b). Reinvigorating the Army ’ s Approach to 
159 
 
Mission Command. Military Review, (June), 4–9. 
Tucker, C. (1996). False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of 
FMFM-1 Warfighting. United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth Kansas. 
UNESCO. (1978). Revised Recommendation concerning the International Standardization of 
Educational Statistics. The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (Vol. 20). 
USD DOD. (2019). National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2020. 
USMC. (1989). FMFM-1. Quantico VA: 1989 United States Government as represented by the 
Secretary of the Navy. 
USMC. (1996). MCDP 6 Command and Control (p. 147). Washington DC: Headquarters Marine 
Corps, Department of the Navy. 
USMC. (1997a). MCDP-1 Warfighting. Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 
Department of the Navy. 
USMC. (1997b). MCDP-5 Planning. Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, Department 
of the Navy. 
USMC. (1997c). MCDP 1-3 Tactics. Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, Department 
of the Navy. 
USMC. (1997d). Warfighting. U.S. Marine Corps. 
USMC. (2001). MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations. Washington DC: Headquarters Marine 
Corps, Department of the Navy. 
USMC. (2016a). FRAGO 01 / 2016 : Advance to Contact. Washington DC. 
USMC. (2016b). The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates 
160 
 
in the 21st Century. Washington DC: h. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
USMC. (2016c). The Marine Corps Operating Concept. Washington DC. 
USMC. (2017). Message to the Force 2017 : “ Seize the Initiative .” Washington DC. 
Van de Ven, A. H. (2007). Engaged scholarship : a guide for organizational and social 
research. Oxford University Press. 
Van De Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change. The Acadeny of 
Management Review, 20(3), 510–540. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080329 
Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision : risky technology, culture, and deviance at 
NASA. University of Chicago Press. 
Wang, C. L., & Rafiq, M. (2009). Organizational diversity and shared vision: Resolving the 
paradox of exploratory and exploitative learning. European Journal of Innovation 
Management, 12(1), 86–101. https://doi.org/10.1108/14601060910928184 
Weick, K. E. (1991). The Nontraditional Quality of Organizational Learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1), 116–124. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.116 
Weigley, R. F. (1977). The American way of war : a history of United States military strategy 
and policy. (Indiana Un). Indiana University Press. 
West, F. J. (2008). The strongest tribe : war, politics, and the endgame in Iraq. Random House. 
West, F. J. (2011). The wrong war : grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan. (1st ed.). 
Random House. 
Whiteley, A., Price, C., & Palmer, R. (2013). Corporate culture change: Adaptive culture 
structuration and negotiated practice. Journal of Workplace Learning, 25(7), 476–498. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JWL-09-2012-0069 
Wilkins, A. L., & Ouchi, W. G. (1983). Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship between 
161 
 
Culture and Organizational Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 468–481. 
Yanow, D. (2000). Seeing Organizational Learning: A `Cultural’ View. Social Science, 7(2), 
247–268. https://doi.org/10.1177/135050840072003 
Yazan, B. (2015). Three approaches to case study methods in education: Yin, Merriam, and 
Stake. The Qualitative Report, 20(2), 134–152. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research : design and methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage 
Publications, ©2003. 
Zacharakis, J., & Van Der Werff, J. A. (2012). Flexibility and Placemaking for Autonomy in 
Learning: CH 8 The Future of Adult Education in the Military. New Directions for Adult & 
Continuing Education; Winter2012, Vol. 2012 Issue 136, P89-98, 10p, 28(136), p89–p98. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ace 
 
162 
 
VITA 
BP McCoy served as a Marine for 28 years in a variety of infantry and light armor 
reconnaissance units. Most notably, he was the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion 4th 
Marine Regiment through two combat tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During OIF I, the 
3rd Battalion 4th Marines spearheaded the 1st Marine Division’s entry into Baghdad and toppled 
the Saddam Husain Statue in Firdos Square on April 9, 2003. One year later, BP led the 3rd 
Battalion 4th Marines through counter-insurgency operations throughout the Al Anbar Province 
to include the brutal house-to-house fight in the first battle for Fallujah. BP served in a variety of 
operations and special activities positions and was the US Central Command’s crisis action team 
leader for the rescue of Captain Phillips aboard the cargo ship MV Maersk Alabama and several 
other counter-terrorism operations. BP rounded out his career with a 15-month tour in 
Afghanistan, serving consecutively as the Operations Director for the Joint Special Operations 
Task Force-Afghanistan and as the Executive Officer/Military Assistant to Commander, 
International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan. 
BP founded Xiphos Initiatives LLC, a company that provides strategy and leadership 
solutions and helps organizations bring their mission and vision statements to life. Since 2017, 
BP has developed and delivered the curriculum for new Marine Corps ground combat 
commanders, an effort that impacts 25,000 Marines every year. To feed his soul, BP is a field 
instructor for the National Outdoor Leadership School and develops future civilian and military 
leaders by teaching and mentoring students during multi-week “off the grid” mountain 
expeditions as they experientially learn leadership, decision making, communications, and risk 
management in austere wilderness environments and in situations that bear very real 
consequences. He is a published author of the book Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative 
163 
 
of Leadership. Throughout his career, BP has been awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat 
“V” for valor with Gold Star in lieu of second award, the Bronze Star with Combat “V” for valor 
with Gold Star in lieu of second award, the Purple Heart for wounds received in action, and the 
2002 Navy League John A. Lejeune Inspirational Leadership award. 
